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BipIn Textile Dyeing and Printing Industries Vs. State of Gujarat and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1985)2GLR1138
AppellantBipIn Textile Dyeing and Printing Industries
RespondentState of Gujarat and anr.
Cases ReferredHarbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab
Excerpt:
- - the words used in section 313(1) are 'for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain' which clearly negatives a written statement which is ordinarily drafted by some other person, very probably the advocate who appears to defend him. the decision of the supreme court which pertains to an offence as well as trial prior to 1st april 1974 cannot be pressed into service in 'the present case as......and then he submitted an application at ex. 12 stating therein that he wanted to file his written statement and it may be taken into consideration. two decisions - one of the allahabad high court and another of the supreme court were also referred to in this application in support of the request. the learned judicial magistrate passed a speaking order below. ex. 12 stating therein that in a summons trial case, there is no provision which permits an accused to file a written statement. the learned judicial magistrate accordingly rejected that application. the accused being 'aggrieved by the said order filed criminal revision application no. 114 of 1984 in the court of the additional sessions judge, rajkot at gondal and the learned additional sessions judge also concurred with the.....
Judgment:

J.P. Desai, J.

1. The petitioner-original accused is being prosecuted in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jetpur. The case against the accused is registered as Criminal Case No. 116 of 1984. The accused was questioned by the Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to enable him to explain the evidence appearing against him. The accused gave replies to the questions put by the learned Judicial Magistrate during the course of: that statement and then he submitted an application at Ex. 12 stating therein that he wanted to file his written statement and it may be taken into consideration. Two decisions - one of the Allahabad High Court and another of the Supreme Court were also referred to in this application in support of the request. The learned Judicial Magistrate passed a speaking order below. Ex. 12 stating therein that in a summons trial case, there is no provision which permits an accused to file a written statement. The learned Judicial Magistrate accordingly rejected that application. The accused being 'aggrieved by the said order filed Criminal Revision Application No. 114 of 1984 in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajkot at Gondal and the learned Additional Sessions Judge also concurred with the view taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate and dismissed the Revision Application. Being dissatisfied with the same, the orginal accused has filed this Special Criminal Application No. 739 of 1984.

2. The learned advocate Mr. R.R. Trivedi appearing for the petitioner very fairly conceded that so far as a warrant case is, concerned, there is a specific provision, viz. Section 243(1) which specifically provides for filing a written statement by the accused, while there is no such specific provision so far as a summons case is concerned. He, however, submitted that there was no bar in the Code which would come in' the way of the accused filing his written statement over and above giving his statement under Section 313 of the Code. He submits that the accused can file a written statement when he is examined under Section 313 of the Code. Now, so far as a warrant case is concerned, the Legislature has made a specific provision that the accused may file his written statement, but no such provision has been made while prescribing procedure for trial of a summons case. This shows that the Legislature did not intend that the accused should be permitted to file a written statement in a summons case, while it intended that the accused should be free to file a written statement in a warrant case and, therefore, a specific provision has been made by the Legislature. So far as Section 313 of the Code is concerned, I am not inclined to accept the submission made by Mr. Trivedi that under that section the accused can file a written statement. The purpose of Section 313 is to enable the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The words used in Section 313(1) are 'for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain' which clearly negatives a written statement which is ordinarily drafted by some other person, very probably the Advocate who appears to defend him. It is difficult to understand how the accused can file a written statement when he is called upon to explain personally the circumstances appearing against him.

3. The learned Advocate Mr. Trivedi drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab : 1966CriLJ82 wherein the Supreme Court made some observations with regard to filing of a written statement by the accused. It was a case of defamation. The punishment provided for the offence of defamation is imprisonment which may extend to two years.

'Warrant case' was defined under the Old Code as a case relating to an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; while under the New Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which came into force with effect from 1st April 1974 'warrant case' is defined as a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. Summons case under both the cases is defined as a case relating to an offence and not being a warrant case. In view of this, the case relating to an offence of defamation was a warrant case as defined under the Old Code while it is a summons case as defined under the New Code. The decision of the Supreme Court which pertains to an offence as well as trial prior to 1st April 1974 cannot be pressed into service in 'the present case as. at that time, the case relating to offence of defamation was a warrant case and not a summons case. When I drew the attention of Mr. Trivedi to this distinction between the Old Code and the New Code, he was not in a position to press this decision of the Supreme Court in support of his submission.

4. The learned Advocate Mr. Trivedi submitted that simply because there is no express provision in the Code as regards filing of a written statement in a summons case, the accused cannot be prevented from filing a written statement when there is no express or implied bar. This argument of Mr. Trivedi requires to be stated for being rejected because as discussed a little earlier, the Legislature has made a specific provision in this regard while prescribing procedure for trial of a warrant case while it has not made any provision in this regard while prescribing procedure for trial of summons case. When we read these two provisions together the intention of the Legislature is very clear.

The result of the aforesaid discussion' is that the learned Judicial Magistrate did not commit any error in dismissing the application Exh. 12 of the accused and the learned Additional Sessions Judge also did not commit any error in confirming the decision of the trial Court. There is no substance in this Special Criminal Application and hence it is dismissed at the admission stage.


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