Atma Charan, J.C.
1. This is an application in revision by Gyani Kartar Singh from the order of Mr. Abdul Kauf, Magistrate, 1st Glass, Ajmer, convicting him Under Section 19, Punjab Public Safety Act (li  of 1947) as made applicable to the Province of Ajmer. Merwara and sentencing him to undergo two months rigorous imprisonment. His appeal before the Sessions Judge was dismissed, and he has now come up in revision before the Court.
2. The facts of the case have been discussed at length in the judgments of the two Courts below, and need not be reiterated. The counsel for the applicant has raised two points before the Court firstly, that the Additional District Magistrate had no powers to have passed an order Under Section 4, Punjab Public Safety Act and secondly, that there is nothing on the record of the trial Court to justify the inference that he had attended a labour meeting.
3. An order Under Section 4, Punjab Public Safety Act, as the very enactment stands, could be issued by the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate. The order in question was issued by the Additional District Magistrate and not by the District Magistrate. The contention of the counsel for the applicant, as such, is that the order could not have been issued by the Additional District Magistrate. He has in support of this cited the rulings as reported in Prabhu Lai v. Emperor A.I.R. (31) 1914 Nag. 84 : 45 cr. L, j. 896 and Mulchand v. Emperor A.I.R. (36) 1948 ALL. 281: 49 Cr.L.J. 352. Both these rulings refer to delegated powers and not to powers vested, by virtue of a legislative enactment, and lay down as below:
A. I. R (31) 1944 Nag. 84: The word 'law1 in ' any other law' occurring in Section 10 (2), Criminal P.C. is not meant to include an executive order but only legislative enactments, and rules, regulation or orders which have the for a of law and consequently the District Magistrate, who acts for the Provincial Government under the powers conferred upon him by the Provincial Government by an executive order, cannot be regarded as acting under any ' law ' as such. Therefore, a person who is appointed as Additional District Magistrate under Section 10 (2), Criminal P.C. cannot exercise the powers of the District Magistrate upon the latter by an executive order.
A.I.R. (35) 1948 All. 281: 'The word 'order1 in Section 3 (27a), General Clauses Act (1897) refers to what may be called ' a species of delegated legislation.' It does not refer to an executive order passed by the Provincial Government Under Section 11, TJ. P. Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act of 1947 empowering the District Magistrate to exercise powers of detention.
Further, the words of Section 11 clearly show that the Provincial Government while delegating Its authority has to designate the person or officer to whom it is delegating that authority. Hence, where the Provincial Government has delegated its power of detention to the District Magistrates, the power cannot be exorcised by an Additional District Magistrate.
4. The counsel for the prosecution has directed my attention to the ruling as reported in Abdur Bahman v. Emperor A.I.R. (24) 1937 Mad. 637 : 38 Cr.L.J. 661. The question that arose in that case was whether an Additional District Magistrate was empowered Under Section 8, Central Act, XIX  of 1929 to try cases under that Act. It was held therein that in as much aB no reference was made in 8. 8 of Central Act, XIX  of 1929 to Section 10 (2), Criminal P. 0, Section 8 of the Act could be read without difficulty with B. 10 (2) of the Code. The Additional District Magistrate in the present case thus was fully empowered to have passed the order Under Section 4, Punjab Public Safety Act.
5. The question now that arises for consideration before the Court is whether the applicant had disobeyed the order by attending a labour meeting. The evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution before the trial Court goes to show that a meeting of the B. B. & C. I. Railway-men' Union was held on 1st December 194a. The meeting was to appraise the members of the Managing Committee of the Union about the decision that had been taken at a labour meeting convened at Nagpur. The applicant did not deny that a meeting as alleged did take place. He, however, produced some evidence in defence to show that be did not attend that meeting. It has been argued by the counsel for the applicant that had the applicant attended the meeting his signatures would have found place in the agenda and the proceedings of the meeting. The applicant admittedly bad been served with an order not to attend any labour meeting. It does not stand to reason that in the face of the order he would have still signed the agenda and the proceedings and thus left incriminating evidence against him, The two Courts below, in the circumstances, have rightly disbelieved the evidence produced in defence and relied on the overwhelming evidence produced to the contrary on behalf of the prosecution. The meeting, no doubt, was in regard to the affairs of labour and came within the definition of ' labour meeting'. The applicant accordingly has rightly been convicted Under Section 19, Punjab Public Safety Act.
6. The applicant has been sentenced to undergo two months' rigorous imprisonment. The sentence certainly is by no means excessive and, if at all, errs a little on the side of leniency.
7. The application in revision accordingly is dismissed.