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Bherulal Vs. the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Writ Petn. No. 1381 of 1976
Judge
Reported inAIR1977Raj29; 1976(9)WLN458
ActsMotor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 62(1) and 64A; Constitution of India - Article 226
AppellantBherulal
RespondentThe State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and ors.
Appellant Advocate R.R. Vyas, Adv.
Respondent Advocate H.N. Kalla, Dy. Govt. Adv. and; R.N. Munshi, Adv. for Respondent No. 3
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredAndhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. K. Venka
Excerpt:
motor vehicles act, 1939 section 64a - where appeal is maintainable section 64a cannot be invoked--person not filing an appeal--field, he cannot be a lowed to avail of remedy of revision.; as no objection was made to the grant of a permit petitioner had disentitled himself to file an appeal, and consequently would also lose the remedy of revision, followed as a matter of course from the wording of section 64a, because it can only be invoked, in which no appeal lies.; but a person who by his own fault has disentitled himself from filing an appeal by not having opposed the grant of a permit when he had the full opportunity to do so, cannot be allowed to avail the remedy of revision; which only lies, where no appeal lies.;(b) constitution of india - article 226--alternative remedy--where a.....orderrajindar sachar, j. 1. by this petition under article 226 the petitioners challenges the impugned resolution of the regional transport authority, udaipur respondent 2 dated 28-6-1976 granting a temporary stage carriage permit in favour of respondent 3 as well as the order dated 2-8-1976 of the stale transport appellate tribunal respondent 1 which rejected the revision of the petitioner as not maintainable. 2. there is a route known as bhil-wara-jahazpur via bigod-kachola diversion via paged mandalgarh. originally the scope fixed on this route was of 3 stage carriages to perform 2 return trips. the regional transport authority sought to increase it to 5 stage carriages to perform 3 return trips in the year 1970 buta revision against that was allowed by the state transport appellate.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Rajindar Sachar, J.

1. By this petition under Article 226 the petitioners challenges the impugned resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur respondent 2 dated 28-6-1976 granting a temporary stage carriage permit in favour of respondent 3 as well as the order dated 2-8-1976 of the Stale Transport Appellate Tribunal respondent 1 which rejected the revision of the petitioner as not maintainable.

2. There is a route known as Bhil-wara-Jahazpur via Bigod-Kachola diversion via Paged Mandalgarh. Originally the scope fixed on this route was of 3 stage carriages to perform 2 return trips. The Regional Transport Authority sought to increase it to 5 stage carriages to perform 3 return trips in the year 1970 buta revision against that was allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which maintaining the increase of return trips to 3 but reduced the increased scope of stage carriages from 5 to 4. The scope thus fixed on the route came to be 4 stage carriages to perform 3 return trips. One of the existing operators on this route filed a petition being Civil Writ No. 1879 of 74 in this Court with the result that no non-temporary stage carriage permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority against the one vacancy which had arisen by the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. That writ petition was dismissed on 20-4-1976 by this Court. In the meanwhile in October. 1975 the scheme of notified route of Bhitwara to Bundi came to be implemented. The petitioner who was operating on the Bhilwara-Jahazpur route accordingly had his permit curtailed for the portion from Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya. The petitioner is thus now operating on the curtailed route from Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur, a distance of 40 miles. The previous uncurtailed route from Bhilwara to Jahazpur was about 76 miles.

3. On 26-6-1976 respondent 3 applied for the grant of the temporary permit under Section 62 of the Act. In the column meant for the purpose for which permit was required it was stated 'public convenience to meet a particular temporary need.' The route mentioned was Bhilwara to Jahazpur via Begod-Mandal-garh-Triveni Chauraya-Kachola curtailed Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya because (being) portion of Section 68-D now Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur. The said application was taken up for consideration by the respondent 2 in its meeting of 28-6-1976. It was decided that respondent 3 may be given a temporay permit for four months from Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpura via Kachola in the existing vacancy. The petitioner being aggrieved against the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 filed a revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter to be called 'the Act'). Respondent 1 however by the impugned order accepted the preliminary objection of the respondent 3 that as the petitioner could have filed an appeal under Section 64 (1) (f) of the Act and as he had failed to avail of that remedy revision under Section 64-A was not maintainable. The petitioner has come up in writ petition against both the orders of respondents 1 and 2.

4. Section 64-A provides that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on application made to it call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deem fit. It is apparent that Section 64-A can be invoked only in which no appeal lies. If therefore an appeal is maintainable, jurisdiction under Section 64-A cannot be invoked by an applicant.

5. The appellate provision is to be found in Section 64 (1) (f) which lays down that any person being, a local authority or a police authority or an association which or a person providing transport facilities who having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto may appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. That a right of appeal can be exercised under Section 64 (1) {f) even in cases of the grant of a temporary permit has been decided in Bhanwarlal v. Appellate Tribunal (AIR 1958 Raj 176) and the same view was also accepted in Fatehgarh Sahib Bus Service (Pvt.) Ltd., v. State Transport Commr, Punjab (AIR 1970 Punj. 18) (FB). Of course before a person can exercise the right of appeal it is essential that he should have opposed the grant of a permit. It is this element of the condition precedent of having opposed the grant of a permit which alone allows an appeal to be maintainable that the counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vyas invokes in directing his criticism at the decision of the respondent 1 which has held that the petitioner due to his own fault disentitled himself from filing an appeal and therefore no indulgence can be granted to him by way of revision.

6. The undisputed facts are that on 28-6-1976 i. e. the day of the consideration by the respondent 2 about the grant of the permit to respondent 3 petitioner's brother who holds a power of attorney was present at the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority. It was however further his case before the respondent 1 and the same has been put inthe writ petition and now urged by Mr. Vyas that the agenda of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority on 28-6-1976 mentioned only Bhtlwara-Jhaz-pur route and did not mention the route as Bhilwara-Jahazpur via Begod-Mandal-grah-Triveni Chauraya-Kachola curtailed Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya being portion of 68-D now Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur as mentioned in the application, and as he had not seen the application of respondent 3. the agenda made him believe that the application for temporary permit of the respondent No. 3 was for Bhilwara-Jahazpur route and as he was not concerned with that he did not file any objections. It was further his case that he went away from the meeting for some private work and when he came back after some time he was informed by other operators who were present at the meeting that the Regional Transport Authority had granted a temporary permit to respondent No. 3 on the petitioner's route. At this the petitioner claims to have submitted his objection against the grant of temporary permit on Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur but the Regional Transport Authority refused to take into consideration the objections on the ground that it has already announced its order. The petitioners on these grounds filed a revision petition. Respondent 1 however did not accept this version of the petitioner and opined that the mere fact that the agenda described the route as Bhilwara-Jahazpur could not have persuaded the petitioner's brother to believe that the agenda referred to the second route that is Bhilwara Sanganeri route instead of Bhilwara-Jahazpur route via Begod-Triveni Chauraya. The respondent 1 also thought it rather surprising that the petitioner's brother should have left just at the time when the grant of a permit to respondent 3 was being considered. The Tribunal accordingly came to the conclusion that the petitioner's brother who had a power of attorney for him was present at the meeting in which the application of respondent 3 was being considered and had thus opportunity to object to the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 but as he failed to raise any objection to the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 he by his own fault failed to lay the foundation of filing an appeal against the order and therefore he could not be given any indulgence by way of revision, and consequently rejected the revision petition

7. Mr. Vyas challenges the findings of the revisional authority in so far as it held that the petitioner must be taken to have knowledge of the grant of a permit to respondent 3. I may straightway mention that the finding of the respondent 3. that the petitioner's brother must be deemed to have been present at the time of the consideration of the grant of permit to respondent 3 and also the finding that he failed to raise any objection to the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 are findings of fact and are not open to challenge in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. No doubt if as laid down in Kandhari Babu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur 1975 Raj L. W. 176) = (AIR 1975 Raj 203) the findings are contrary to evidence or without evidence the said findings are not binding and can be ignored in proceedings under Article 226. But the argument of Mr. Vyas is not in reality an argument on the basis of there being no evidence but in fact an effort to persuade me to come to a different finding from that of respondent No. 1, on the basis of material on record, a course not permitted in these extraordinary proceedings. He seeks to maintain that it could not be imagined that the petitioner would know from the mention of item in the agenda as Bhila-wara-Jahazpur route that the route for which respondent 3 was seeking the grant of a temporary permit related to the curtailed route of Triveni Chauraya to Bhilwara and not the other route from Bhilwara-Jahazpur via Sanganeri-Kotadi-Roopa-Karauli and Paroli. This argument really asks me to sit as a court of appeal over the finding of respondent Tribunal which obviously I cannot do. The version of the petitioner was before the respondent 1, and it was open to him to come to a conclusion of fact, and even assuming it was wrong finding of fact it would still be within its jurisdiction and not liable to be interfered with, unless it could be shown that the finding is such which no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have arrived at. That is however not the position here. It should also be noted that the respondent Nc. 3 in his reply has stated that under item 3 of agenda of the Regional Transport Authority for the meeting of 28-6-1976, application for grant of temporary permit on the other route i. e. Bhilwara-Jahazpur via Sanganeri-Kotadi-Roopa-Karauli and Paroli was listed and the said routein the agenda at item No. 3 was described as Bhilwara-Jahazpur-Kotadi. Item No. 4 was mentioned as Bhilwara-Jahaz-pur, in contradistinction to item 3 of the agenda. Now admittedly it is the petitioner's own case that there were only two routes from Bhilwara to Jahazpur. From this Mr. Munshi, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 urged, and in my view, rightly, that as under item 3 one of the routes was fully described the petitioner could not have been under any misapprehension that item 4 of the agenda dealt with any route other than the route of Bhilwara to Jahazpur via Begod-Triveni Chauraya-Kacholi and the description as merely Bhilwara-Jahazpur could not have in any manner given any impression to the petitioner that the route was not on the portion from Tri-veni Chauraya to Jahazpur. It will be thus seen that there was sufficient material before the Tribunal respondent 1 to come to the conclusion that the peti-titioner was aware of the grant of a permit to respondent 3 and even knowing about it, as he did not oppose the grant, he had therefore, disentitled himself to file an appeal, and could not by that process he allowed to avail the remedy of revision.

8. Mr. Vyas had also tried to urge that as on that very date 28-6-1976 the Regional Transport Authority had rejected the application for this route of Bhilwara to Jahazpur for the grant of a non-temporary permit as a part of the route overlapped notified route the petitioner did not bother to verify or take any interest in the grant of a temporary permit under item 4 (which dealt with the application of respondent 3 for the grant of a temporary permit) because the petitioner could legitimately believe that as the Regional Transport Authority had rejected the claim to give a non-temporary permit on Bhilwara to Jahazpur route, the same consequences will follow for the grant of a temporary permit, because no temporary permit can be granted on a notified route. I am afraid this argument, runs counter to the stand of the petitioner himself before respondent 1 where the position taken was that the petitioner thought that this was some other route than the one in which the petitioner was interested and that is why he did not think it fit to file any objections. It should also be noted that of the Bhilwara-Jahazpur route, only portion from Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya overlapped the notified route. The petitioner thus couldnot have any rationale in assuming that the application for grant of a temporary permit related to the notified route. It is to be seen that the notified route is Bhilwara to Bundi, and only Bhilwara to Triveni Chauaraya (which is a portion of the Bhilwara-Jahazpur route) overlaps the notified route and consequently there was no bar to respondent No. 2 in granting a temporary permit from Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur. On that material finding that as no objection was made to the grant of a permit, petitioner had disentitled himself to file an appeal, and consequently would also lose the remedy of revision, followed as a matter of course from the wording of Section 64-A, because it can only be invoked, in which no appeal lies.

9. Mr. Vyas when faced with this came out with the argument that even if it be assumed that the petitioner knew about the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 yet as the condition precedent of having opposed the grant of a permit was not complied, he could not file an appeal and hence a revision would lie. This to me seems, an astounding proposition. I can understand a case where it is found that the petitioner did not oppose the grant of a permit because he had no opportunity to do so. In that case of course revision will be maintainable because of the fact not simply because the petitioner had not opposed the grant of a permit but because he had no opportunity to oppose the grant and it would be inequitable if not having had an opportunity to oppose the grant of a permit he was to be deprived of the right not only of filing an appeal but also of revision. But a person who by his own fault has disentitled himself from filing an appeal by not having opposed the grant of a permit when he had the full opportunity to do so cannot be allowed to avail the remedy of revision, which only lies, where no appeal lies. Reference in this connection may be made to Hardutt Singh v. State Transport Authority (AIR 1967 Raj 208) where it has been laid down that where a party on account of its own lapse has not filed any objection then he will not be entitled to maintain an appeal before the Transport Appellate Tribunal and in such a case to hold that though that party may not have a right of appeal he will still be having a right of maintaining a revision application may lead to an odd result which may not have been intended by the legislature. No doubt that authority was dealing with a case of agrant of a non-temporary permit. But in my opinion these principles and equitable consideration will equally apply in the case of grant of temporary permit.

10. The next argument of Mr. Vyas was that in any case the Tribunal should have of its own motion exercised its re-visional power. Now whether the Tribunal should exercise its revisional power suo motu is a question of discretion and it is pointless for Mr. Vyas to urge that this Court should compel the Tribunal to exercise its discretion. As held in Har-dutt Singh v. State Transport Authority it is for the revisional authority to see whether in any case it should exercise its revisionai jurisdiction of its own motion as the exercise of that jurisdiction is a matter of judicial discretion. It is patent that no mandamus can lie to compel a body to exercise its discretion in a particular manner unless the refusal to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction is vitiated by mala fide or is based on irrelevant ground or extraneous consideration. Such is not the case here and therefore, it is not possible to find fault with the respondent 1 as to why it did not exercise its own revisionai jurisdiction in the present case,

11. Mr. Vyas next contended that the grant of a permit by respondent 2 was in any case without jurisdiction as it did not fulfil the requisite condition prescribed in Section 62 (1) (c) of the Act I may note that as I have held that the petitioner had disentitled himself by his own default for filing an appeal or a revision, it would not be open to the petitioner to urge any grievance on the merits to the grant of a permit by respondent 2. The reason is that the order of Tribunal dismissing his revision petition has put a stamp of finality on the order of the Regional Transport Authority. To allow him to urge against the order of respondent No. 2 (when the order of respondent No. 1 is in the field) would lead to anomalous result, because if this court was to set aside the order of respondent No. 2, there will still remain the order of respondent No. 1 affirming the order of respondent No. 2 and in that case a problem will be created for the authorities in forcing them to choose between the order of this Court and the appellate Tribunal. Mr. Vyas had however suggested that in the present case it should be assumed that the petitioner has come direct to this Court from the order of Respondent No, 2. Though one cannotaccept this situation (which is against fact) the petitioner will be faced with another hurdle of not having availed of alternative remedy before coming to this Court. I am aware that in number of cases it has been held that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is without jurisdiction this Court may interfere even without the party having availed of the alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision. But I have no doubt that it is only in gravely exceptional cases that this court will entertain a writ petition direct and in normal course it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to entertain it, if a party, has not availed of the remedy of appeal or revision, more especially as the matters which are necessarily contentious can be examined more satisfactorily by the authorities constituted under the Act. Moreover the present case where the petitioner did avail the remedy cf revision but ultimately it is found not to have been a proper remedy cannot be equated with a case where the petitioner chooses to invoke this Court's jurisdiction in the first instance. So normally the petitioner would not be allowed to urge any grievance against the merits of the order of the Regional Transport Authority but as I permitted Mr. Vyas to urge on merits, I deem it only fair that I should deal with this contention on merits also.

12. The main contention of Mr. Vyas is that the requirement of Section 62 (1) (c) has not been fulfilled and the grant is therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction. Now Section 62 (1) (c) empowers the Regional Transport Authority to grant a temporary permit to meet a particular temporary need. The application by respondent 3 in Clause 4 mentioned the purpose as 'public convenience' to meet a particular temporary need existing on the route. In detailed consideration by the Regional Transport Authority, it was noted that according to the scope there was one vacancy and that previously because of the order from the Rajasthan High Court there was a stay for grant of a non-temporary permit. It was noticed that by a letter of 4-5-1976 it had been communicated that the Rajasthan High Court had dismissed the writ petition No. 1879/74 on 20-4-1976. It was further noticed that on this route Bhilwara-Triveni Chauraya portion is under a notified scheme of Section 68-D and therefore, by a decision of 28-6-1976 the applications for non-temporary permit have been rejected because since 20-10-1975 the buses of Rajasthan State Transport Corporation were plying on that route. The rest of the portion of the route Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur via Kachola was available. It was specifically mentioned that on this portion there is 3 lot of traffic and there is immediate and essential need to provide temporarily more buses, and therefore, the application of respondent 3 for the grant of a temporary permit may be accepted as it was for the convenience of the travelling public. Now the finding by the Regional Transport Authority that there is large number of travelling public and that it was essential to provide for more vehicles for the benefit and convenience of the public is a finding of fact and a matter which is solely within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority. This Court cannot start reassessing the sufficiency of the material on which the Regional Transport Authority has come to such a conclusion. To ask this Court to substitute its own satisfaction for that of the Regional Transport Authority, a body of exports and specialists who have been entrusted by the statute to look after the needs of the travelling public is to ask the court to take on matters for which it is obviously not fully equipped either with reference to the full materials local condition, and other circumstances on the basis of which alone a satisfactory decision can be made.

13. Mr. Vyas had sought to find fault with the order of the Regional Transport Authority by urging that it had granted the temporary permit on the ground that there was a scope of one permit and urged that the mere existence of a vacancy was not sufficient to hold that there was a temporary need. No doubt the existence of a permanent vacancy may not necessarily mean that there is a particular temporary need within the meaning of Section 62 (1) (c) of the Act. But the converse is not necessarily true. The existence of a permanent vacancy and a particular temporary need, can co-exist. There may be circumstances in which both may co-exist and in that case the grant of the temporary permit would be permissible. There is no reason why Section 62 (1) (c) should be given any special or restricted meaning and that there is no antithesis between a particular temporary need and a permanent need and it is manifest that these two kinds of need may co-exist on a particular route ..... and that this sub-section contemplates that there may exist a temporary need for transport facilities on a particular route even in case of permanent need for such facilities vide M P. S. R. T. Corpn. v. B. P. Upadhaya, R. T. Authority, Raipur, (AIR 1966 SC 156). This authority approved Jairamdas v. R. T. Authority, (AIR 1957 Raj 162) where it was held 'there was thus a shortage of the necessary number of vehicles on this route and the Regional Transport Authority had thought it fit to provide for this temporary need till a regular permit was granted after going through the procedure laid down under Section 57. It therefore, had the jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case to grant a temporary permit.' Though no doubt the Regional Transport Authority noticed that there was a scope for one permit, yet it decided to grant a temporary permit only after corning to a finding that the need of travelling public and because of requirement of traffic, issue of a temporary permit was essential. That the issue of a temporary permit by the Regional Transport Authority to meet the requirements of the Travelling public is a good reason for the exercise of its powers under Section 62 (1) (c) of the Act has been held in T. H. N. Ahmad v. Commr., Meerut Division, (AIR 1972 All 146). Temporary permit can be given to meet the requirements of an unsatisfied demand of the public and it means that a temporary need exists. See Thozhilaly Bus Service Chala-kudy v. Secy., R. T. A., Trichur, (AIR 1974 Ker 188), M. P. S. Road Transport Corporation, Bhopal v. Regional Transport Authority, Sagar, (AIR 1974 Madh Pra 10).

14. I may now notice some of the cases relied upon by Mr. Vyas. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. K. Venkataramireddy, (1970 UJ (SC) 408) no purpose was mentioned in the application which was filed under Section 62 (1) (c). Even in a subsequent letter addressed to the State Transport Authority the purpose or reason for the issue of a temporary permit was not stated. It was in that context that the Supreme Court said that as there was an absence of any purpose or reason for which temporary permits were asked for the Regional Transport Authority should have dismissed the application in limine. The case is obviously distinguishable because in the present case the purpose mentioned in the application is for the public convenience and there is a full discussion and finding by the Regional TransportAuthority that it was essential to give temporary permit, to increase the vehicle for the benefit and the convenience of the travelling public.

15. In Jagdish Prasad v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 980 of 1975 decided on 24-7-1975 (Raj)) in the application for grant of a permit regarding the purpose for granting a temporary permit it was only mentioned 'Temporary need under Section 62 (1) (c)'. The Regional Transport Authority in that case inferred that as there were two vacancies, 'temporary need could be assumed.' It will be seen that there was no finding by the Regional Transport Authority that any temporary need existed in the sense of there being need for extra vehicles because of the traffic requirements. It was in this context that Joshi J. held that the requirement of Section 62 (1) (c) had not been fulfilled. The learned Judge however accepted the proposition that the temporary need may co-exist simultaneously with the permanent need and in those circumstances it is open to the transport authority to grant temporary permit. Obviously the case is distinguishable.

16. In S. Sayardevi v. S. T. A. Tribunal, (AIR 1976 Raj 164) the purpose mentioned in column 4 for asking the temporary permit was 'to carry regular service'. It was also found by the learned Judge that the only circumstance taken into consideration by the Regional Transport Authority for the grant of a temporary permit was the existence of a vacancy on the route to come to a conclusion that there was a temporary need. This obviously has no applicability.

17. Similarly in Gafoor v. R. T. A., Jaipur, (AIR 1976 Raj 166) the purpose mentioned in the applications was 'under Section 62 (1) (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act to meet a particular temporary need' and 'to carry regular service'. The consideration by the Regional Transport Authority showed that it granted the temporary permits only on the ground that as the matter for grant of a non-temporary permit and filling vacancies were likely to take some time there was a particular temporary need. It was specifically found by the learned Judge that the Regional Transport Authority had not considered the question of shortage of the vehicles for the purpose of maintaining the existing services on the route.

18. Similarly in Civil Writ No. 1869 of 1970 decided on 26-10-1970 (Raj)Shinghal, J., (as his Lordship then was) after stating that the mere existence of a vacancy on a route did not warrant a conclusion that the temporary need co-existed with the permanent need however went on to observe 'at any rate there is nothing in the aforesaid order of the Regional Transport Authority to show that it granted a temporary permit to respondent Alam Khan for any of the reasons or in any of the circumstances stated in Clause (1) of Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the Act.'

19. A reference to all these authorities cited by Mr. Vyas would show that where the grant of a temporary permit was set aside, it was either because no purpose was mentioned in the application, or that the Regional Transport Authority while granting the permit had not considered any temporary need but had only gone by the fact of the existence of a permanent vacancy. This cannot be said in the present case. The purpose mentioned in the application is 'public convenience to meet a particular temporary need'. The Regional Transport Authority has considered the various circumstances and has definitely given a finding that there is a large traffic on this route and that it was for the convenience of the travelling public that further vehicle be provided for a temporary period and that the grant of a permit would be for the convenience of the public. I do not see how under the circumstances it can be said by Mr. Vyas that there has been no application of the mind by the Regional Transport Authority and no finding by it that a particular temporary need exists. The clause 'to meet a particular temporary need' is not to be given any special or restricted meaning vide M. P. S. R. T. Corporation v. R. T. Authority, (AIR 1966 SC 156). In each case it will have to be found whether a particular temporary need exists or not. The insistence of Mr. Vyas that in the applications various details constituting a temporary need should be mentioned is tantamount to asking that the application be treated as a plaint. When the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. K. Venka-taramireddy, (1970 UJ (SC) 408) said that the application should have been dismissed in limine it was only in the context of no purpose having been mentioned in the application form at all. But where, as in the present case, the purpose is mentioned as a public convenience to meet a particular temporary need it isobviously impermissible for the Regional Transport Authority to throw out the application in limine. The insistence of Mr. Vyas that the application itself should have given full particulars and details as if it was in the nature of a plaint and if it did not contain all these details, it should be rejected as if it discloses no cause of action, on the analogy of Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code is not warranted either on principle or on authority. One must look at these matters in a practical manner. An application is filed by a person asking for the grant of a temporary permit and the purpose mentioned is public convenience for a temporary need. Now whether he can substantiate that application will depend upon the various facts and circumstances which are placed for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority, when it considers the question of a grant of the permit. No doubt it will be desirable and in the interest of all if the application was to contain as full a detail as is possible. But that does not mean that if full details are not given it must entail the rejection of the application without consideration of merits. That is not the scheme of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority has to consider the matter and the grant or refusal of the permit will necessarily depend upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case there is a firm finding that the requirement of the travelling public requires the grant of a temporary permit. I cannot say that the Regional Transport Authority could not have come to this conclusion. This court, under Article 226 cannot sit as a court of appeal over these factual decisions given by the Regional Transport Authority. I may however, also mention that it has been stated in the reply by respondent 3 that he is a displaced operator from Bhilwara-Ajmer route but his permit was cancelled because the said route became notified route with effect from 20-10-1975 and could not be renewed after August, 1976, because of nationalisation in order to justify that there is a need for increase of vehicles on the route the respondent has stated that a scope of 3:1 was fixed by the Regional Transport Authority on Begun to Jahazpur route via Ladapur-Mandalpur-Triveni Chauraya but this was stayed by this Court in a writ petition filed by one of the three existing operators on Bhilwara-Jahazpur via Begun-Triveni Chauraya route and since a portion of this route from Begun to Man-dalgarh became a part of the notified route of the Scheme no permit at any time could be granted. Similarly, on Begun to DeoJi border via Singholi-Charbhuja-Ja-hazpur route two permits were granted but they were challenged on a writ petition filed in this Court and the grant was set aside with the result that no permits could be granted. Similarly in another writ petition the stay was given for not granting any permit on Begun-Deoli border Ooncha route and though this writ petition has been subsequently dismissed no permits as yet could be granted. Similarly on Mandalgarh-Deoli-Triveni Chau-raya-Jahazpur route one of the existing operators has obtained a stay order for not granting any permit. The purpose of mentioning all these details obviously is to show that the traffic needs on this route of Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur are not being met adequately. Now it is not necessary for me to go into these details or to give a finding as to how far the facts are correctly mentioned by the respondent No. 3. I am only mentioning these for the purpose of emphasising and that all these details are such which obviously the Regional Transport Authority alone is in a proper position to know and evaluate and therefore, unless it can be shown that respondent No. 2 has not applied its mind this Court will be extremely slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Regional Transport Authority in granting a temporary permit. I am more than willing to agree that the laconic order and sometimes even a one-line order by the Regional Transport Authority in granting the temporary permit creates problems in finding whether the Regional Transport Authority had applied its mind and come to a firm finding that the traffic requirements required the grant of a temporary permit. Much time, energy and avoidable litigation will be saved if the Regional Transport Authority which is a quasi-judicial authority was to take some pains to write a little more detailed order in granting or refusing temporary permit so that the Appellate/Revisional Authority as well as this Court may be in a position to appreciate the various considerations and reasons why a temporary permit has been granted or refused. I am saying this because if the Regional Transport Authority disposes of the matter in a laconic manner without really giving a finding that a temporary need exists, it may lay itself open to the charge of having given, a temporary permit without the existence of the conditions provided by Section 62 (1) (c), and it may become difficult in that case for the Regional Transport Authority to support its order when the reasons for it are not mentioned in its resolution granting or refusing the permit. One would therefore, think that it was in the interest of the Regional Transport Authority itself that it devotes a little more detailed attention at the time of grant of permits and mention all the relevant facts in the resolution granting or refusing a permit. This Court has had occasion on a number of times to caution the Regional Transport Authority as to the deficiencies and lacunae in its order. One is entitled therefore, to expect and hope that the lacunae mentioned by this Court will be carefully taken note of by the Regional Transport Authority and its manner of disposing of the applications for the grant of a permit will show greater attention to details on the basis of which its decision is taken. If in spite of all this caution the Regional Transport Authority continues to dispose of these matters in a laconic and unsatisfactory manner, the charge of the aggrieved operators that the order was without jurisdiction and arbitrary may be difficult to rebut. However as in the present case I have found that the Regional Transport Authority has given a firm finding that it is necessary in the interest of traffic to give a temporary permit for the convenience of the travelling public no fault can be found with it and the argument of Mr. Vyas cannot therefore, be accepted.

20. The next contention of Mr. Vyas was that as Bhilwara-Triveni Chuaraya portion of Bhilwara-Jahazpur route overlaps notified route it was not open to give a permit on Triveni-Chau-raya-Jahazpur route as there is no Triveni-Chauraya-Jahazpur route existing. I think there is fallacy in the argument. Bhilwara-Jahazpur route is existing and all that has happened is that because of the Bhilwara-Triveni-Chauraya portion overlapping on the notified route a permit now cannot be issued to a private operator for that portion. It is for that reason that the petitioner himself who had a permit from Bhilwara to Jahaz-pur is now operating from Triveni-Chau-raya to Jahazpur. I can see therefore, no infirmity in the grant of a permit to respondent 3 from Triveni-Chauraya to Jahazpur. As a matter of fact the application of respondent 3 clearly states thatthe Bhilwara to Jahazpur route has been curtailed from Bhilwara to Triveni-Chau-raya. Mr. Vyas concedes that it is not necessary to first fix a scope for grant of a temporary permit. If so, it is obvious that even though there may not be a se-parate route of Triveni-Chauraya to Jahazpur, no objection can be found to issue of a temporary permit to respondent 3.

21. The next objection was that Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority had by his order of 29th June, 1976, directed the respondent No. 3 that he should ply his vehicles in rotation with the existing operators. Mr, Vyas objected that if the permit to respondent No. 3 allows him to ply his vehicles only in rotation with the petitioner it is apparent that there is no temporary need because there can only be particular temporary need if the existing operators are not able to fulfil the need. Mr. Munshi however pointed out that in the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority D/-28-6-1976 there is no such restriction that respondent 3 is to operate by rotation and the direction by the Secretary cannot therefore, be invoked to hold that there is no temporary need when the Regional Transport Authority had definitely so found that a temporary need exists. Though the direction by the Secretary does seem a little at variance with the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, but that is a matter which may be sorted out from the authorities but cannot help the petitioner in maintaining that this is sufficient to show that there was no particular temporary need on the route. This plea therefore, fails.

22. As a result I find no merit in the writ petition which fails and is dismissed with costs.


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