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Ramsharan and anr. Vs. Ramavtar and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 236 of 1967
Judge
Reported inAIR1976Raj32; 1975()WLN491
ActsRajasthan Premises (Control of Rent of Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 15
AppellantRamsharan and anr.
RespondentRamavtar and ors.
Appellant Advocate S.K. Keshote, Adv.
Respondent Advocate R.P. Goyal, Adv.
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredP. Venkatesaralu v. The Motor
Excerpt:
.....application and on which, the plaintiff has founded his right to relief is his requirement, or to use an expression which will effectively bring our the real point, his personal requirement. 5. before parting with the case, i would like to mention that the view taken by the learned district judge that subsequent events arising during the pendency of the appeal cannot be taken notice of in the case like title present one, is clearly erroneous in view of the authoritative pronouncement of their lordsihips of the supreme court in p......became necessary for the plaintiff to separate one of his married sons and to keep him in the suit premises, along with his wife and children. it is argued before the learned district judge that the urgency for the additional accommodation was reduced on the death of the plaintiff munshiram. the learned district judge repelled this argument on the ground that it was not necessary for the court to take note of the circumstances which had arisen after the appeal was filed. he accordingly reversed the finding on issue no. 1 and held that the landlord required the premises reasonably and bona fide. he further held that the notice to quit served on the defendants was valid. he accordingly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. as regards issue no. 2 relating to default in the payment.....
Judgment:

S.N. Modi, J.

1. The only point involved in this second appeal by the defendant-tenants is whether the legal representatives of the landlord (since deceased) have no right to continue the suit for eviction based on bona fide and reasonable requirement of the premises for the residence of the plaintiff himself and for the residence of the members of his family?

2. To appreciate the point involved, it is necessary to state the relevant facts. Munshiram (now deceased) filed a suit for eviction against the defendant-appellants on two-fold grounds. Firstly, that the plaintiff required the premises reasonably and bona fide for the use and occupation of himself and the members of his family and secondly, that the defendants had committed default in payment of rent. The appellants resisted the suit and denied that the plaintiff required the premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use or for the use of his family members. The defendants further pleaded that they had tendered the rent by money order to the plaintiff and as such they committed no default in payment of rent. They also took the plea that the notice to quit sent by the plaintiff was not valid. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues:--

1 vk;k tk;nkn eqruktk dh oknh dks usd o tk;tt:jr gS

2 vk;k eqnk;yk us fdjk;k VsUMj fd;k vkSjeuhvksMZj nqckjk Hkstk blfy;s fdjk;k vnk;xh esas dksbZ fMQkYV ugha fd;k

3 vk;k uksfVl bu[kyk; uktk;t gS

4nknjlh D;k gksxh

The trial court after evidence decided all the issues in favour of the defendants and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff Munshiram then preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Alwar. During the pendency of the appeal, Munshiram died and his legal representatives were impleaded in his place as the appellants. The learned District Judge on consideration of the evidence led by the parties held that (sic) finding of the trial court on issue No. (sic) was wholly erroneous. According to (sic) learned District Judge, it stood established from the evidence of P.W. 1 Munshiram, P.W. 2 Ramavtar, P.W 3 (sic) Lal. P.W. 4 Jwalasahai and P.W. 5 (sic) lal that the accommodation with (sic) plaintiff was not sufficient, for the members of his family which expanded as (sic) . result of the marriages of his two so(sic) and birth of grand children. The learned District Judge further held that from the evidence produced by the plaintiff it was also proved that there were frequent quarrels between the plaintiff's two sons and their wives and there was no peace in the family. It therefore became necessary for the plaintiff to separate one of his married sons and to keep him in the suit premises, along with his wife and children. It is argued before the learned District Judge that the urgency for the additional accommodation was reduced on the death of the plaintiff Munshiram. The learned District Judge repelled this argument on the ground that it was not necessary for the court to take note of the circumstances which had arisen after the appeal was filed. He accordingly reversed the finding on issue No. 1 and held that the landlord required the premises reasonably and bona fide. He further held that the notice to quit served on the defendants was valid. He accordingly allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. As regards issue No. 2 relating to default in the payment of rent, it appears that the defendants-tenants made payment and the issue became redundant, The defendants have now preferred this second appeal.

3. Shri S.K. Keshote, the learned advocate for the appellants contends that the right to sue on the basis of personal necessity did not survive to the heirs of the deceased-landlord Munshiram. He emphasised that the bona fide requirement of the premises for the residence of the plaintiff himself and his family members was the personal requirement of the landlord Munshiram and such a personal cause of action perished with the death of the landlord. Reliance is placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Phoolrani v. Naubatrai Ahluwalia, AIR 1973 SC 2110. In my opinion, the contention is devoid of force. Smt. Phoolrani's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is distinguishable on facts and does not apply to the present case. In that case, their Lordships observed:

'The survival of the right to sue on the death of a plaintiff is a problem that has often to be solved on a permutation of several facts and circumstances.' Their Lordships then added :

'The solution to the problem whether the appellants can continue the proceedings in their capacity as the legal representatives of the plaintiff lies in the pleadings of the plaintiff for those alone can reveal the true nature of the right asserted by the plaintiff in the ejectment proceedings. In column 18 (a) of the ejectment application the ground for evicting the tenant is stated thus:

'The premises are required bona fide by the petitioner for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family and that the petitioner has no other reasonable, suitable residential accommodation.''

In column 18, the other relevant information is stated to be that the plaintiff had a large family consisting of his wife, son. daughter-in-law and three minor grand-daughters, and that the family had only two rooms in its possession, which were wholly inadequate for its requirements.

Thus the requirement pleaded in the ejectment application and on which, the plaintiff has founded his right to relief is his requirement, or to use an expression which will effectively bring our the real point, his personal requirement. If the ejectment application succeeds--we will forget for a moment that the plaintiff is dead--the premises in the possession of the tenant may come to be occupied by the plaintiff and the members of his family but that does not make the requirement pleaded in the application any the less a personal requirement of the plaintiff. That the members of his family must reside with him in his requirement, not theirs. Such a personal cause of action must perish with the plaintiff.' (Paras 10 and 11).

4. In the present case, the relevant allegations for eviction are contained in para. 3 (ka) of the plaint which runs as under:--

^^ d ;g fd eqnbZ ds nks yMds jkevorkj oksy{ehukjk;.k gS budh 'kknh gks xbZ gS oks buds cPps Hkh gS eqnbZ vius yMdksa lfgrftl edku esa jg jgk gS mlesa lkjs ifjokj dh fjgk;'k ds fy, LFkku ifj;kIr ugha gSvkSj edku de gksus ds dkj.k cgksr raxh jgrh gS blds vykok jke vorkj o y{ehukjk;.k dh vkSjrksa essa vkil esa >xMs ckth jgrh gS blls nksuksa HkkbZ;ksaesa Hkh vucu jgrh gS vkSj >xMs ckth gksus ds dkj.k gekjs lcds fnekx esaijs'kuh o v'kkUrh jgrh gS bl dkj.k eqnbZ vius ,d yMds dks mldks cgw cPpksa lfgrmDr fdjk;s 'kqnk tk;nkn esa vkckn djuk pkgrk gS blfy, tk;nkn eqruktk dh oknh dksusd oks tk;t t:jr gS A**

It follows from the aforesaid para that the plaintiff Munshiram claimed eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on two-fold requirements. The first requirement which he pleaded was almost similar in terms to that pleaded in Smt. Phoolrani's case (AIR 1973 SC 2110) (supra). But the second requirement pleaded by him, namely, the requirement for the residence of one of his two married sons in the interest of the peace of his family, cannot be said to be the personal requirement of the plaintiff Munshiram It is a requirement of the family so that peace in the family be restored and such a cause of action, in my opinion, did not perish with the death of the plaintiff Munshiram. In this view of the matter, the legal representatives of the landlord Munshiram had the right to continue the suit for eviction against the defendants. It is obvious that the requirement that the suit premises are needed for the use of the family members in the circumstances of the case is both reasonable and bona fide. The learned District Judge has found proved from the evidence on the record that there were frequent quarrels between the plaintiffs two eons and their wives and there was no peace in the family and as a result of these quarrels the plaintiff wanted to separate one of his married sons and to keep Mm in the suit premises, line right to sue survived even after the death of the plaintiff Munshiram so far as this part of the requirement pleaded in the plaint was 'Concerned', The learned District Judge, in the circumstances, rightly decreed the suit.

5. Before parting with the case, I would like to mention that the view taken by the learned District Judge that subsequent events arising during the pendency of the appeal cannot be taken notice of in the case like title present one, is clearly erroneous in view of the authoritative pronouncement of their Lordsihips of the Supreme Court in P. Venkatesaralu v. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 UJ (SC) 327 = (AIR 1975 SC 1409). In that case, their Lordships held as under-

'We affirm the proposition, that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed' (para 4),

6. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.

7. The prayer for Leave to Appeal is refused.


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