G.M. Lodha, J.
1. This is a defendants' second appeal in an ejectment suit, which has been decreed by both the courts on the ground of default. The Addl. District Judge (7), Jaipur City, in Civil Appeal No. 83/80 decided on 16-3-81 has upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Addl. Munsif (2), Jaipur City on 21-5-80 in Civil Suit No. 276/80.
2. The plaintiffs filed a suit on 7-4-77 under Section 13 of the Rajasthan premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) alleging that the defendant-tenant has not paid the rent from 1-9-76 to 31-3-77. On 14-11-77 the Court determined the rent under Section 13 (3) of the Act for a period from 1-9-76 to 31-10-77, and directed the tenant to pay this amount by 29-11-77. Instead of making payment, the tenant applied for extension of period. Extension was granted up to 30-1-78.
3. On 30-1-78, the tenant paid the rent as determined. He also paid the rent of November and December, 1977 on this date. According to law, after the rent is determined, the monthly rent during the pendency of the suit should be paid by 15th of the next month. Thishaving not been done, the tenant committed default in payment of rent for November and December, 1977. Consequently, the defence was struck off and the suit was decreed.
4. In the second appeal, Mr. Mehta, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that once the period for arrears of rent (to be) deposited was extended, the tenant was within his legal rights to deposit the rent by 30-1-78, and, therefore, neither the defence could have been struck off, nor the suit could have been decreed.
5. Before I proceed to decide the controversy, it will be useful if the relevant provisions of law are taken into consideration. Section 13 (1) (a) reads as under:--
'Section 13-- Eviction of tenants-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied--(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months; or .........'
6. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 which provides a mandate to the Court for determining the amount of rent reads as under:--
'(3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (a) of Subsection (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that subsection, the Court shall on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the Court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent, at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the, rate of six per cent per annum from the date whenany such amount was payable up to thedate of determination:
Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit.
7. It would be seen that Sub-clause (6) debars a court from passing a decree on the ground set forth in Clause (a), which is of default in payment of rent, the moment the tenant makes a deposit or payment as required by Sub-section (4).
8. Undoubtely, in the instant case, the Court determined the rent under Sub-section (4) on 14-11-77 and the amount so determined was paid on 30-1-78, which was the extended time for payment of the determined rent. However, Sub-section (4) consists of two parts the first one is about the amount determined under Sub-section (3) and the second one is month to month payment of rest during the pendency of the suit by 15th of each succeeding month, or during such further time not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the Court, at the monthly rent at which the rent was determined by the Court under Sub-section (3).
9. It is difficult to bifurcate this Sub- Clause (4), which according to me is indivisible and to hold that whereas in a case of ejectment based on default, the suit should be dismissed under Sub-section (6), the moment first part of payment of determined rent in respect of arrears is complied with (sic). The effect of this would be that the second pan of month to month payment of rent, which is part and parcel of Sub-clause (4), would become redundant, so far as the suit based on default under Sub-clause (a) is concerned.
10. A comprehensive reading of Section 13 as a whole and of its sub-clauses is that the intention of the legislature was that in a suit based on default of payment of rent, the defendant-tenant need not be ejected, if he shows his readiness and willingness to pay the rent by first depositing the arrears of rent, as determined under Sub-section (3) within the period mentioned in Sub-section (4), and then further making regular payments month to month.
11. I am convinced that both these conditions are essential, inseparable and indivisible. The moment the tenant commits default in either of the two, hecan do so at his own peril by exposinghimself to the consequence of eviction.
12. Sub-clause (5) further confirms the view which I am taking, inasmuch as it makes no distinction between the first Clause Or the second Clause of Subsection (4). Contrary to it, it uses the words 'any amount'. The word 'any' is significant. The Legislature has used the word 'any' to point out that there are two conditions in Clause (4), and if any of the conditions is not fulfilled by the tenant, the court has got no option but to strike out the defence against the eviction.
13. Once the penalty prescribed in Sub-clause (5) comes into play, a tenant cannot be saved from the consequences of eviction, as the defence umbrella provided by Sub-section (6) fails to protect him, because the 'sine qua non' or bed-rock of application of Sub-section (6) again is making deposit as required by Sub-section (4). A combined comprehensive reading of Sub-sections (5) and (6) makes it clear that the Legislature has emphasised the compliance of Sub-clause (4) in unequivocal terms. The object is very obvious, that the tenant should be vigilant if he wants to take benefit of Sub-clause (6).
14. It is true that this legislation is a beneficial legislation primarily to protect evictions of tenants at the sweet whim or caprice of the landlord in these days when the housing accommodation is a serious problem in the urban areas of the State. It is also true that on account of that the interpretation of law should be made liberally so as to obtain the object of the legislation, but the well known principle of the statute is that this can only be done without doing any violence to the language of the statute for the simple reason that the court can interpret and not legislate.
15. In view of the discussion, mentioned above, I am convinced that the decree passed by the lower courts is in consonance with the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and cannot be assailed. Mr. Bhandari in support of the view, which I have already taken above, referred to the decisions of this Court in S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 128/81 decided on 8-5-1981 and another decision in S. B. Civil 2nd Appeal No. 312/80 decided on 18-12-80. It is not necessary to discussin details the above decisions, because 1 have interpreted Sections 13 (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) on the basis of the scheme of Section 13, interaction of these subsections, and on the well established principles and interpretation of statutes. In these circumstances, the appeal cannot succeed.
16. Mr. Mehta then prayed for time on the ground that his client is having an established shop for the last three decades. It will be difficult to find out other premises unless proper time is given. Mr. Bhandari contested the prayer on the ground that already a decree on the basis of plaintiffs' reasonable bona fide necessity is in existence against the defendant, but it could not be executed on account of stay order of this court in the second appeal.
17. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that it would be in the interest of iustice if the decree for eviction is executed after four months from today. The appeal fails and is dismissed with the above modification without any order as to costs.