1. This is an application by Sanwal Ram under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appellate' Tribunal of the State Transport Authority.
2. The case of the applicant is briefly this. He was the holder of a stage carriage permit on Balotra-Siwana-Mokalsar route. A complaint was made against him by opposite parties Nos. 3 to 7 to the effect that the applicant was not following the rotation fixed by the Regional Transport Authority and that he had plied his bus on some other route to carry a marriage party without obtaining a special permit for the same. Consequently, the Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur, suspended the permit of the applicant for two weeks under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
Thereupon, opposite parties Nos. 3 to 7 who, we are told, are other bus operators onthe same route, preferred an appeal under Section 64 to the Appellate Tribunal, Their appeal apparently was that the punishment given by the Regional Transport Authority was not severe enough and should be enhanced. Thereupon, the Appellate Tribunal heard the appeal and enhanced the punishment inasmuch as it cancelled the permit of the present applicant. This order was passed in January, 1957 and thereupon the applicant came to this Court in April, 1957. It may be mentioned that his permit expired in March, 1957, but his contention is that if the order of the Appellate Tribunal cancelling his permit stands, he may be at a disadvantage when the question of filling the vacancy caused by the expiry of his permit comes up for consideration,
3. No reply has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties in this case. The only question for consideration is whether the Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The provision as to appeals is contained in Section 64 of the Act, and the case can only come under Clause (b) of that section which reads as follows:
'Any person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof may..,....,..,.......appeal to the prescribed authority.........'
Now, this clause came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Jai Ram Dass v. Regional Transport Authority, Civil Writ No. 105 of 1956, D/- 30-4-1957: ( (S) AIR 1957 Raj 312) (A), wherein it was pointed out that where there is a revocation or suspension, only the permit holder would be the person aggrieved, but where the case was of variation in the conditions of the permit, other persons like rival permit holders on that route or in that area would also be aggrieved and may have a right of appeal. Now, this was a case of suspension of a permit and therefore opposite parties Nos. 3 to 7 who were rival permit holders cannot be said to have been aggrieved by the order suspending the permit of the applicant for a certain period.
4. We are therefore of opinion that there was no right of appeal to the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 7 and therefore the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
5. We should also like to point out that Section 64 does not give power to the Appellate Tribunal to enhance the penalty meted out to a permit-holder. What the Regional Transport Authority had done was to suspend the permit for a short period. What the Appellate Tribunal did was that it cancelled the permit which only means suspending it for its entire duration. There was thus enhancement by the Appellate Tribunal and this in our opinion was not contemplated by Section 64. Our attention was drawn to the recent amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act which came into force on 1.6-2-57 and which contains a new Section 64A. It is enough to say that that section is not applicable to the present case and what we have said above about enhancement does not apply to the powers of the State Transport Authority under Section 64A. We express no opinion on that point as it does not arise in this case.
6. The next question is about the order which is to be passed. There is no doubt that the permit in this case expired on 14-3-57 by efflux of time. But it has been urged on behalf of the applicant that if the order cancelling his permit stands, it may do harm to him when the filling of the vacancy is taken up by the Regional Transport Authority. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the order of cancellation by the Appellate Tribunal should be set aside and the order of the Regional Transport Authority should be allowed to stand.
7. We, therefore, allow this application and set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal cancelling the permit of the applicant as it was without jurisdiction. Parties will bear their own costs as the opposite party has not really contested the application.