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HarinaraIn Vs. Nand Kishore and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revn. No. 148 of 1955
Judge
Reported inAIR1956Raj48
ActsCode of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 107 - Order 41, Rule 33; Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 7
AppellantHarinarain
RespondentNand Kishore and anr.
Advocates: C.K. Garg, Adv.
DispositionRevision dismissed
Excerpt:
- .....of the mandatory provisions of section 7 of the act. it is, therefore, difficult to assume that the appellate court had no authority or jurisdiction to determine the question of fixation of provisional rent, when such power could be exercised by the first court. rule 33, order 41, c. p. c. lays down that the appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree as the case may require.the language of rule 33 is very wide, and would include within its ambit all the powers which could be exercised by the court of first instance. the contention raised in this revision petition is, therefore, devoid of force.4. this revision application fails and is dismissed.
Judgment:
ORDER

Ranawat, J.

1. This is a civil revision application against the judgment of the District Judge, Jaipur City, dated 13-4-1955, remanding the case back to the first Court and directing its retrial. It was also ordered that the standard rent fixed by the first court by its judgment should be regarded as the provisional rent under Section 7, Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, as amended by Act No. 9 of 1952.

2. The point which has been raised in this revision by learned counsel is that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to fix provisional rent under Section 7 of the Act, which could only be done by the first court. The jurisdiction of the appellate court is challenged on this point.

3. It may be noted that the powers of the appellate court have been given in Rules 32 and 33 of Order 41, Civil P. C., and it is evident that the powersof the appellate Court are co-extensive with thepowers of the first court. In case the first courtfails to respect the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, itwould be open to the appellate court to advert itsattention to this aspect of the case, and to give adecision regarding the carrying out of the mandatory provisions of Section 7 of the Act.

It is, therefore, difficult to assume that the appellate court had no authority or jurisdiction to determine the question of fixation of provisional rent, when such power could be exercised by the first court. Rule 33, Order 41, C. P. C. lays down that the appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree as the case may require.

The language of Rule 33 is very wide, and would include within its ambit all the powers which could be exercised by the court of first instance. The contention raised in this revision petition is, therefore, devoid of force.

4. This revision application fails and is dismissed.


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