D.P. Gupta, J.
1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed against the order passed by the Additional Colonisation Commissioner, Rajasthan-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, Colonisation Project, Bikaner (hereinafter called 'the Appellate Authority') dated July 9, 1974, by which the appeal filed by the petitioner, against the order of the Assistant Colonisation Commissioner, Rajasthan Canal Project. Sri Vijaynagar. District Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter referred to as 'the Allotting Authority') rejecting his application for allotment of land has been dismissed.
2. The petitioner, Phoosa Ram, submitted an application for allotment of 25 bighas of agricultural land under the Rajasthan Colonisation (Allotment of Government Land to Post-1955 Temporary Cultivation Leaseholders and Other Landless Persons in Rajasthan Canal Project Area) Rules. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') before the Allotting Authority on the ground that he was a bona fide resident of Rajasthan since before 1955 and that he was granted a temporary allotment of 25 bighas of land in square No. 298/411 in Chak No. 24 APD in the year 1970-71 under the Rajasthan Colonisation (Temporary Leases) Conditions, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Conditions') and that he was continuously cultivating the aforesaid land since then. The petitioner submitted a copy of the electoral roll of the year 1955 relating the village Suleman Sabu-ki-Mod in support of his contention that he was a pre-1955 resident of Rajasthan. In the aforesaid electoral roll the name of Phoosaram's father has been recorded as Chuniram, while the name of his mother is recorded as Jothi and the name of his grandfather is recorded as Asha, The Allotting Authority examined the petitioner on oath on December 12, 1973 and he stated that the name of his father was Chuniram, while the name of his grandfather was Purkharam and that the name of his mother was Parmi. The Allotting Authority, considering the fact that the names of the petitioner's mother and grandfather as disclosed by him in his statement on oath recorded on December 12, 1973 were different from the names of the mother and grandfather of Phoosaram, who was resident of Sabu-ki-Mod and whose name was entered in the electoral-roll of that place of the year 1955, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was trying to take undue advantage of identity of names and that the petitioner was not the real Phoosaram who was the resident of Sabu-ki-Mod in the year 1955 whose name was mentioned in electoral-roll of that place. The Allotting Authority also made an 'on the spot' inquiry in village Sabu-ki-Mod and found that there was another Phoosaram living there whose particulars tallied with those mentioned in the electoral roll. The Allotting Authority, therefore, by his order dated September 16, 1974, dismissed the application of the petitioner for permanent allotment of land. The petitioner, then, filed an appeal against the aforesaid order passed by the Allotting Authority before the Appellate Authority who also came to the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal. The Appellate Authority also gave two reasons for dismissing the petitioner's appeal namely, that the name of the petitioner's grandfather and mother as disclosed bv him in his statement dated December 12. 1973 did not conform to the particulars of the grandfather and mother of Phoosaram as described in the electoral-roll of the vi village Sabu-ki-Mod in the year 1955 and that the petitioner was thus trying to obtain the permanent allotment of land bv impersonation. The second reason given was that the Allotting Authority had made an 'on the spot' inquiry and found that the real Phoosaram, who was the resident of Sabu-ki-Mod did not apply for any allotment of land nor he was allotted any land on temporary cultivation under the Conditions.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the two grounds given by the Allotting Authority as well as the Appellate Authority for rejecting the petitioner's application for permanent allotment of land to him under the Rules were erroneous. As regards the first ground, learned counsel explained that the petitioner mentioned in the writ petition that the petitioner might have given the names of his maternal uncle and his wife when he was asked by the Allotting Authority to state the names of his grandfather and mother respectively and that this mistake in the statement of the petitioner recorded by the Allotting Authority did not establish any impersonation on the Part of the petitioner. As regards the second ground, the learned counsel submitted that the Allotting Authority as well as the Appellate Authority were not competent to take into consideration the fact relating to an inquiry alleged to have been made on the spot by the Allotting Authority, behind the back of the' petitioner and without any notice to him.
4. Even if, the second contention of the learned counsel may be correct, for which I do not express any opinion, I am of the view that the first contention is absolutely unfounded and cannot be sustained. The petitioner was directed by this Court by its order dated August 9, 1974 to submit a certified copy of the statement of Phoosaram recorded by the Allotting Authority and it was only thereafter that the petitioner submitted the certified copy of his statement recorded by the Allotting Authority on December 12, 1973. I have gone through the certified copy of the aforesaid statement, which is marked Ex. 8. The petitioner categorically stated therein that the name of his father was Chuniram and that of his grandfather was Purkharam and of his mother was Parmi. He stated that his mother was alive whereas his father had died and that the name of his brother was Jessa. On being further questioned, he stated that the name of his grandfather, which he had deposed, was correct. Thus there can be no doubt that the 'petitioner, when examined, by the Allotting Authority on December 12, 1973, had correctly disclosed the names of his father; mother, brother and grandfather It may also be noticed that neither before the Allotting Authority nor before the Appellate Authority, the petitioner made any complaint that the Allotting Authority had not correctly recorded the statement of the petitioner on December 12, 1973. Before the aforesaid two Authorities, it was also not stated on behalf of the petitioner that the names given by him in his statement dated December 12, 1973 as those of his grandfather and mother were, in reality, the names of his maternal uncle and his wife. In fact no grouse was made at any stage during the proceedings relating to the allotment of land or in the appeal that the name of his grandfather was not Purkharam or that of his mother was not Parmi. It is sheer igenuity that when the writ petition came to be filed in this Court, it was for the first time averred by the petitioner in para. 10 (V) that : 'the petitioner feels that he might have given these names under the impression that he is being asked the names of his maternal uncle and his wife.'
5. The contents of para. 10 are verified by the petitioner in his affidavit dated August 2, 1974 to be true and correct 'on the basis of the legal advice given by the counsel.' I may also mention here that in para. 8 of the writ petition where the petitioner referred to his statement dated December 12, 1973, recorded by the Allotting Authority, he did not state that the names of his grandfather and mother given by him on that day to the Allotting Authority were either incorrectly recorded or that he was not asked about the names of his grandfather and mother by the Allotting Authority while recording the aforesaid statement. From all these facts I come to the conclusion that the plea now sought to be raised for the first time in writ proceedings is absolutely false. The petitioner is bound by his statement dated December 12, 1973 recorded by the Allotting Authority and as the particulars mentioned therein did not tally with those mentioned in the electoral-roll of the year 1955 relating to Popsaram of village Sabu-ki-mod, the Allotting Authority as well as the Appellate Authority were right in coming to the conclusion that it was a case of sheer impersonation and the petitioner was trying to take advantage of identity of names,
6. Then learned counsel argued that even if one of the two grounds given by the quasi-judicial authorities for coming to the conclusion was erroneous in law then the entire order was vitiated and was liable to be set aside. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commr. of Income-tax. Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 271 in support of his aforesaid contention. In that case the dispute raised was as to what was a question of law within the meaning of Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, requiring the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer it to the High Court as arising out of the order of the Tribunal. Mahajan, C. J. observed that when a Court of fact acts on material which was partly relevant and partly irrelevant in arriving at a finding, such a finding is vitiated because of the use of inadmissible material and thereby an issue of law arises. It may be observed that it was not a case of a writ of certiorari with which I am concerned at present. In State of Maharashtra v. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore. AIR 1967 SC 1353 the decision in the aforesaid case, AIR 1955 SC 271 was distinguished by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a matter relating to a writ of certiorari. After a consideration of the entire case law on the point, their Lordships deduced the following principles :--
'The principle underlying these decisions appears to be this. An administrative or quasi-judicial order based on, several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order based on several grounds some of which are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision.'
The same view was again reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Zora Singh v. J. M. Tandon. AIR 1971 SC 1537 wherein it was held:--
'The High Court was right in holding that even if there were, amongst the reasons given by the Commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered sufficient, the Commissioner's conclusions would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence,' (Underlining is mine).'
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, even if the other ground given by the Allotting Authority and the Appellate Authority relating to the 'on the spot' inquiry, is left out being inadmissible or irrelevant, then in my view, there was still sufficient legal evidence before the aforesaid Authorities based on the statement of the petitioner himself dated December 12. 1973. on which they were entitled to conclude that the petitioner was a mere imposter and was not the genuine Phoosaram who was the resident of Sabu-ki-Mod in the year 1955 and whose name was entered in the electoral roll of the year 1955 of that village. The petitioner thus failed to prove that he was a pre-1955 resident of Rajasthan and as such he was not entitled to permanent allotment of land under the Rules as he was not a pre-1955 temporary cultivation lease-holder as defined in the Rules.
7. I am, therefore of the view that the decisions of the Allotting Authority as well as the Appellate Authority rejecting the application of the petitioner for permanent allotment of land under the Rules were perfectly justified In law and were based on legal evidence,
8. The writ petition has no force and is, therefore, dismissed summarily.