G.M. Lodha, J.
1. This is a revision petition by a tenant. The proceedings are pending in execution of a decree for eviction passed in favour of the landlord. The decree for eviction was passed on the basis of a compromise. The plaintiff-landlord filed suit for ejectment on the ground of personal necessity as contemplated by Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter called as the Act of 1950). This decree was passed in the year 1974. In terms of decree, 7 years time was granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.
2. The plaintiff alleged bona fide and personal necessity and though initially the suit was contested on this ground, but before any evidence could be recorded, the defendant agreed and filed a compromise in which he admitted the personal necessity of the landlord. Certain other terms were incorporated regarding the compensation of use of land in a phased manner and the right to execute the decree before 7 years in case of default in payment of rent. However, the crux of the compromise was that the benefit of 7 years was allowed to the tenant on the basis of payment of increased rent in phased programme. There was a clear averment that the decree can be executed earlier in case of default in payment of rent and the maximum period permissible was 7 years.
3. In this court, in the grounds of revision petition the petitioner undertook to file and keep ready true copies of compromise and decree as also objections filed in execution case, but as the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, certified copies could not be obtained and therefore, uncertified copies consisting of the office file of the learned counsel were shown to me.
4. The uncertified copy of the decree and the relevant portion reads as under:--
'A decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant in respect of the eviction of the shop in question is hereby given and 7 years time is allowed for vacating these premises. The defendant agrees that the plaintiff has got personal necessity.'
5. Then there were certain conditions about the rent in which it was mentioned that if according to this compromise decree the rent is not paid then the decree-holder plaintiff would be entitled to execute the decree on default even before the expiry of 7 years.
6. On the expiry of 7 years, when the execution was proceeded with, the judgment-debtor filed objections which have been rejected and hence this revision. Mr. Garg, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner submitted that unless there is a clear finding of bona fide and personal necessity and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord no decree of eviction can be passed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Khub Chand v. Tulshi Ram : 1963 Raj LW 45 and Mattu Lal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596. He also pointed out that according to the judgment of Bahadur Singh's case reported in (1969) 2 SCR 432 and Kaushalya Devi's case reported in AIR 1970 SC 838 in the matter of rent restrictions laws, a compromise would be nullity if it is against the public policy and no decree can be executed if it fails to fulfil the conditions of relevant laws. Mr. Garg further submitted that since rent was increased it was a new agreement and new contract and there was no decree in the eye of law. Reliance was placed on decisions in Khalli Rath v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1953 Orissa 74, Kanmal v. Hukam Chand, AIR 1966 Raj 178 and Sudhir Kumar v. Baldev Krishna Thapar, (1970) 3 SCR 114. It was argued that this agreement in the form of a compromise resulted in a new lease deed which was neither registered nor stamped. It was also pointed out that the executing court has failed to decide all the points raised before it and therefore, also the order is liable to be quashed,
7. I have carefully considered the above submissions of learned counsel and have also gone through the various decisions referred to above. Both in Bahadur Singh's case and Kaushalya Devi's case, it was not in dispute that the decree which was passed was not on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. In Bahadur Singh's case the decree was passed on the basis of an award under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, in a proceeding to which the landlord was not a party without satisfying itself that a ground of eviction existed and therefore, it waa held to be nullity. Similarly in Kaushalya Devi's case (supra) a decree was passed on the basis of the compromise but there was nothing to show in that compromise that any of the conditions of Section 13 of the Rent Control Act is fulfilled.
8. In both the above cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that since a decree cannot be passed except mi the ground mentioned in Section 13 Clause (1), a compromise decree simpliciter and a decree passed on award without reference to the condition of Section 13 is a nullity.
9. In the instant case, situation is different. The plaint specifically mentions the ground of bona fide and personal necessity and the defendant in the compromise admitted the same in express words. Mr. Garg emphasized that the words bona fide and personal necessity have not been mentioned in the compromise and therefore, the conditions of Section 13 are not fulfilled. This according to me is an argument of despair, after having taken the advantages for 7 years, of remaining in possession. Firstly, in the absence of a certified copy of the compromise and the compromise decree which have not been produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not possible to be exact about the words. Secondly, even if the rough copy which was shown to me is taken to be correct the words used are:
^^izfroknhoknhx.k dh futh vko';drk dks ekurk gS**
In the compromise deed which was filedin the form of an application the following was mentioned%
^^;g fd oknh dk nkok izfroknh dfo:) fuDlklu nqdku fooknxzLr dk fMh fd;k tkos vkSj izfrroknh dks nqdku [kkyhdjus gsrq 1&7&74 ls 7 o'kZ dk le; ns fn;k tk; A izfroknh oknhx.k dhfuth vko';drk dks ekurk gS A**
10. The above mentioned words used in Hindi are comprehensive and wide enough to indicate that the defendent admitted the personal necessity of the plaintiff. When a compromise was being entered into by virtue of which 7 years time was granted and the defendant admitted the personal necessity, it would be streching too far and giving unwarranted credence to outdated and outlived 'pound of flesh and not a drop of blood' argument, of Portia of Merchant of Venice of Shakespeare, if a decree is held to be nullity after 7 years by holding that in spite of clear categorical admission of defendant regarding personal necessity the decree cannot be executed because the words bona fide and reasonable have not been translated into Hindi. Latent trend of jurisprudence is 'substantial justice' in contradiction to 'technical' interpretation of law. I am of the opinion, that the compromise read as a whole along with the decree passed on it in the background of the pleadings, it is patent and not latent that the defendant as well as the court passing the decree were conscious of the requirements of Section 13 Clause (1) and passed the decree of ejectment after being satisfied that conditions required under Section 13 (1) (h) of the Act are fulfilled.
11. The second limb of submission of Mr. Garg based on AIR 1974 SC 1598 and 1963 Raj LW 45 requires to be mentioned only to be rejected. In both these cases whatever has been held is that the question about bona fide requirement is a finding of fact and the High Court cannot interfere in Second Appeal. There is no dispute on this point in this case,
12. The next limb of the submission of Mr. Garg relates to creation of new tenancy. The reliance placed on the decisions of Sudhir Kumar v. Baldev Krishna Thapar ((1970) 3 SCR 114) (supra) is aslo of no assistance to Mr. Garg. In the case of Sudhir Kumar, there was a condition in the lease deed that on the expiry of the lease there would be option to renew the lease and by compromise a renewal was made. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held on the terms of the compromise that as per the covenant in the original lease deed a fresh lease was granted and option to renew the deed was exercised. In the instant case, on the basis of the uncertified copy shown to me, it cannot be said that there was any fresh tenancy created. The compromise as well as the compromise decree both mention that the decrees given for ejectment would be executed after 7 years in case the rent as per the compromise is paid regularly, otherwise it may be executed even earlier on default.
13. I am clearly of the opinion that this was not a new tenancy and it did not require any registration. In that view of the matter the decision reported in AIR 1953 Orissa 74 and AIR 1974 SC 1596 and AIR 1066 Raj 178 cannot help the tenant-petitioner.
14. Mr. Garg submitted that all the questions submitted before the executing court have not been decided and therefore, the case may be remanded with the directions to decide the same again. I am not inclined to accept this request because irrespective of the fact whether all these questions were pressed before the executing court or not, I have examined them at length and they are all questions of law which require no inquiry or evidence. I am further convinced that in this case after obtaining 7 years term in the compromise and without challenging the decree which was passed in a form of compromise decree for ejectment, now he wants to take a summersualt for prolonging his possession. In such a situation, it is not at all desirable to remand the case again.
15. I am convinced that all questions raised by Mr. Garg before this Court during the arguments have got no substance and are devoid of any force as discussed above. While dismissing the revision application, I am of the opinion that this is rainy season and it would create hardship for vacating the shop during the rainy season. In spite of equities being against the tenant, 1 would, therefore, further allow time to him for vacation. Consequently, four months' tune is allowed from today. The executing court is, therefore, directed to not to execute the warrant of possession for a further period of 4 months from today and thereafter take active steps to get the premises vacated from the defendant-tenant for giving possession to the plaintiff decree-holder.
16. With the above observations, the revision petition is dismissed.