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Shitabkhan Vs. Bar Council of India and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 81 of 1967
Judge
Reported inAIR1969Raj136
ActsAdvocates Act, 1961 - Sections 2, 7, 24(1) and 49; Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 19; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
AppellantShitabkhan
RespondentBar Council of India and ors.
Appellant Advocate P.N. Dutt and; K.N. Tikku, Advs.
Respondent Advocate J.P. Jain,; Renu Chatterjee and; Moti Mal Bhandari,
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredHarla v. State of Rajasthan
Excerpt:
- - it is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present writ application in this court on 7-1-1967. the petitioner also stated in his petition that on 8-3-1966 the bar council of india had made rules regarding standard of legal education and recognition of degrees in law for admission as an advocate and under rule 1 it was provided that 'no person shall be eligible for enrolment under the advocates act, 1961 unless at the time of joining the course of instruction in law for a degree in law he is graduate of university'.in this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the validity of the aforesaid resolutions and also of rule 1 of the rules referred to above passed by the bar council of india, and has finally prayed that the decision of the bar council of rajasthan.....lodha, j.1. this is a petition under article 226 of the constitution of india for issue of an appropriate writ, direction or order against the bar council of india and the bar council of rajasthan calling upon them to enrol the petitioner as an advocate.2. the facts giving rise to this petition lie within a narrow compass. the petitioner passed the higher secondary examination of the board of secondary education, rajas-than, in the year 1960 and thereafter joined three years diploma course in rural services of the national council for rural higher education, ministry of education, government of india, in the jamia rural institute, new delhi and obtained the diploma in the year 1963. he took ll. b. degree from the university of rajasthan in the year 1965. the petitioner wanted to be.....
Judgment:

Lodha, J.

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of an appropriate writ, direction or order against the Bar Council of India and the Bar Council of Rajasthan calling upon them to enrol the petitioner as an Advocate.

2. The facts giving rise to this petition lie within a narrow compass. The petitioner passed the Higher Secondary Examination of the Board of Secondary Education, Rajas-than, in the year 1960 and thereafter joined three years diploma course in Rural Services of the National Council for Rural Higher Education, Ministry of Education, Government of India, in the Jamia Rural Institute, New Delhi and obtained the diploma in the year 1963. He took LL. B. Degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1965. The petitioner wanted to be enrolled as an Advocate and therefore, he got himself registered as a candidate for training in law with the Rajasthan Bar Council in 1965. Subsequently the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the Advocates Act, 1961 exempted the Candidates who had obtained degree in law On the results of examination held before 31-12-1965 from undergoing a course of training as required by the Advocates Act, 1961. The petitioner, therefore, applied to the Bar Council of Rajasthan for enrolment as an Advocate. The Bar Council of Rajasthan by its letter dated 24-2-1966 which has been placed on the record and marked Ex. 7 informed the petitioner that the Bar Council of India had passed a resolution as far back as 25-2-1963 whereby a degree in law obtained after 30-6-1964 from any University in the territory of India could be recognised only if such degree had been obtained after undergoing a course of study in Law for a minimum period of 2 years after graduation and since it was doubtful whether the petitioner fulfilled these conditions, the petitioner's matter had been referred to the Bar Council of India for consideration. The Bar Council of India, however, vide its resolution No. 51 of 1966, held that the diploma in Rural Services awarded to the petitioner by the National Council cannot be treated as equivalent to a degree of a University of India. On receipt of this information from the Bar Council of India, the enrolment Committee of the Bar Council of Rajasthan proposed to refuse the application of the petitioner for enrolment as an Advocate by its order dated 11th August, 1966 but in view of the hardship that may be caused to the petitioner, it again referred the matter to the Bar Council of India for reconsideration.

The petitioner also submitted a written representation to the Bar Council of India on 22-9-1966 but he was ultimately informed by the Secretary, Bar Council of Rajasthan vide his letter D/- 14-12-1966 that the Bar Council of India vide its resolution No. 131/1966 had resolved that the refusal of the petitioners' request to be enrolled as an Advocate by the Bar Council of Rajasthan was in order. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has filed the present writ application in this Court on 7-1-1967. The petitioner also stated in his petition that on 8-3-1966 the Bar Council of India had made Rules regarding Standard of Legal Education and Recognition of Degrees in Law for Admission as an Advocate and under Rule 1 it was provided that 'No person shall be eligible for enrolment under the Advocates Act, 1961 unless at the time of joining the course of instruction in law for a degree in Law he is graduate of University'. In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the validity of the aforesaid Resolutions and also of Rule 1 of the Rules referred to above passed by the Bar Council of India, and has finally prayed that the decision of the Bar Council of Rajasthan endorsed by the Bar Council of India rejecting the application of the petitioner for enrolment as an Advocate be set aside, and a direction be issued to the Bar Council of Rajasthan to enrol the petitioner as an Advocate.

3. The petition has been opposed both by the Bar Council of India as well as the Bar Council of Rajasthan, who have filed, though separate but identical replies to the writ petition. The University of Rajasthan was also implcaded as non-petitioner No. 3 but it is not represented before us. The main plea raised both by the Bar Council of India as well as the Bar Council of Rajasthan is that the Bar Council of India was perfectly competent to refuse to recognise the degree of law obtained by the petitioner inasmuch as the degree in law had not been obtained by him after graduation as required by the resolution of the Bar Council of India dated 25th February, 1963.

4. For a correct appraisal of the contentions raised by the parties it would be necessary to refer to certain relevant provisions of the Advocates Act (Act No. 25 of 1961), (which will hereinafter be called 'the Act').

5. Section of the Act enumerates the functions of a State Bar Council, the first among which is 'to admit persons as Advocates on its roll'.

6. Section 7 lays down the functions of the Bar Council of India the relevant among which for our purposes are Clauses (h) and (i) which are reproduced below :--

(h) 'to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education in consultation with the Universities in India imparting such education and the State Bar Councils.

(i) to recognise Universities whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an Advocate and for that purpose to visit and inspect Universities;'

7. Then comes the most important provisions for our purposes. Section 24 the relevant portion of which reads as under :--

'24. Persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll--

(i) Subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions, namely--

(a) he is a citizen of India;

Provided that subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, a national of any other country may be admitted as an Advocate on a State roll if citizens of India, duly qualified, are permitted to practise law in that other country;

(b) he has completed the age of twenty-one years.

(c) he has obtained a degree in law--

(i) before the 28th day of February, 1963 from any University in the territory of India; or

(ii) before the 15th of August, 1947 from any University in any area which was comprised before that date within India as defined by the Government of India Act, 1935; or

(iii) after the 25th day of February, 1963, from any University in the territory of India if the degree is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or he is a barrister; or

(iv) in any other case, from any University outside the territory of India, if the degree is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India;

(d) he has undergone a course of training in law and passed an examination both of which shall be prescribed by the State Bar Council;

8. Then we may refer to Section 49 which deals with the general power of the Bar Council of India to make rules. The rele-vant clauses for our purposes in this section are (ag) and (d) which are extracted below for ready reference.

'49. General power of the Bar Council of India to make rules :--

The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under this Act, and in particular, such rules may prescribe.

(ag) the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates;

(d) the standards of legal education to be observed by Universities in India and the inspection of Universities for that purpose;'

9. Before embarking upon the decision of the question of validity or otherwise of the resolution passed by the Bar Council of India dated 25-2-1963 it would bo necessary to reproduce that resolution in verbatim. It reads as follows :--

'1. Resolved that a degree in law obtained on or before the 30th June, 1964 from any University established by law in the territory of India be recognised for the purposes of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Advocates Act, 1961.

2. Resolved that no degree in law obtain-ed after the 30th June, 1964 from any Uni-versity in the territory of India shall be recognised unless such degree lias been obtained after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation; provided however that nothing herein contained shall affect a person who has commenced a course of study in law before graduation prior to 28th February, 1963 and obtained a degree in law before the 1st October, 1966.

3. Resolved that for the purposes of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act, a degree in law obtained from any University in Pakistan shall be recognised only if such degree, has been obtained after a study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation.'

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended before us that the petitioner has obtained a degree in law after the 28th of February, 1963 from the University of Rafasthan and the LL. B. Degree awarded by the University of Rajas-than has been recognised by the Bar Council of India for the purposes of the Act, and it is therefore not open to the Bar Council of India to go behind that degree and reject the petitioner's application for enrolment on the ground that the degree of law had been awarded to the petitioner before graduation. To put it more precisely his contention is that it is within the purview of the Bar Council of India to recognise or not to recognise a degree in law awarded by any University in the territory of India but once the decree of a University is recognised for the purposes of this Act, the Bar Council is not competent to make any distinction between the degrees of Jaw obtained from that University after graduation and those obtained before graduation.

In order to support his argument the learned compel has referred to Section 7(1) of the Act which gives authority to the Bar Council of India 'to recognise the Universities whose decree in law shall be qualification for enrolment as an Advocate'. The learned coun-sel has therefore submitted that the rsolu-tion dated 25-2-1963 passed by the Bar Council of India to the effect that 'no de-gree in law obtained after 30-6-1964 from any University in the territory of India shall be recognised, unless such degree has been obtained after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation' is ultra vires of Section 24(1)(iii) of the Act.

11. On the other hand Shrf J. P. Jain, learned counsel for the Bar Council of India has argued that the Bar Council of India is authorised to recognise or not to recognise the degree in law obtained by a particular individual from any University and according to him it was not the intention of the legislature that once the degree in law of any University in the territory of India is recognised then the Bar Council of India is bound to recognise all degree-holders in law of that University. The correct decision of this point depends upon the interpretation of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act. We may state at once that we are not impressed by the extreme position taken by Shri Jain that the Bar Council of India is competent to distinguish between the holders of the degree in law obtained from the same University in similar circumstances. That would amount to conferring most arbitrary, unbridled and capricious power on the Bar Council of India without any national basis and we do not think it was the inicnlioa of the legislature to confer such a power on thu Bar Council ?f India. The language of Section 24(i)(c)(iii) also does not warrant such an interpretation. But at the same time we are also not pre-pared to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the moment the degree of law conferred by any University in the territory of India is recognised by the Bar Council of India it has to enrol all such degree holders as Advocates and it cannot prescribe any class or category of holders ofi such degree who may be entitled to be enrolled as Advocates.

A bare perusal of the resolution passed by the Bar Council of India in its meeting held on 25-2 1963 would show that in the first instance it recognised degree in law obtain, ed on or before 30-6-1964 from any University established by law in the territory of India. This is the first class or category. The second class or category of persons, it has carved out, consists of those persons, who may obtain after 30-6-64 degree in law from any University in the territory of India after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation. Thus the Bur Council of India has prescribed certain class or category of persons who may be enrolled as Advocates. The condition that if a person who has obtained a degree in law from any University of India after 30th June, 1964 wants to be enrolled as an Advocate he must show that he had obtain-ed the degree in law after graduation, cannot be called arbitrary, unreasonable or discrimi-natory because il is the function of the Bar Council of India to promote Segal education and t? lay down standards of such education The 'Act' has given to it the authority to recognise a degree in law for the purposes of this Act. In this view of the matter we are clearly of the opinion that the resolu-tion passed by the Bar Council of India dated 25-2-1963 to the effect that no degree in Law obtained after the 30th June, 1964 from any University in the territory of India shall be recognised unless such degree has been obtained after undergoing a course of Study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation does not violate the provisions of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act. This classification made by the Bar Council, of India is reasonably related to the object of the 'Act', which sought to create autonomous Bar Councils, one for the whole of India and one for each State and conferred upon the Bar Council of India the duty to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education,

It is further clear from the provisions of Section 24 of the 'Act' that one of the objects of the Act was to prescribe a uniform qualification for the admission of persons to Le Advocates. The classification which the Bar Council of India has made is not arbitrary and there appears in be a reasonable basis for it. The Bar Council of India has in its wisdom deemed it necessary to make provi-skm that the degree in law obtained (sic) any University in India after 28th day of February, 1938 will be recognised for the purposes of this Act only if such degree has been obtained after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation. This, in our opinion, the Bar Council of India was entitled to do. This decision of the Bar Council is not based on grounds of race, religion, sex etc., but solely on the ground of qualifications. Tim petitioner cannot urge with any justification that there were other persons similarly situated as the petitioner out of whom the petitioner has been picked out for unequal treatment. Consequently the impugned resolution does not violate Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution, Upon this view, it follows that the resolution passed by the Bar Council of Rajasthan dated 25-2-1963 prescribing that no degree in law obtained after the 30th of June, 1964 from any University in the territory of India shall be recognised unless such degree has been obtained after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of two years after graduation cannot e challenged as unconstitutional. We are of opinion that on a correct interpretation of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act, the Bar Council of India is competent to prescribe a class or category of holders of degree in law from any University in the territory of India who would be entitled to be enrolled as Advo-jcates.

We are fortified in this view by another provision of the Act which has been inserted by Section 20 of the Act 21 of 1964 whereby under Section 49 of the Act the Bar Council of India has been given an overriding power to make rules for discharging its functions under this Act and in particular such rules may prescribe.

(ag) the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as Advocates.

This provision clearly goes to show that the Bar Council has ample power to prescribe the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled. Thus though Section 49 (ag) was not contained in the Act at the time the impugned resolution was passed, yet the (power of recognition of the degree in law obtained from any University was there in the Bar Council of India by virtue of Section 24(1)(c)(iii) of the Act and it appears to us that the impugned resolution does not con-tain anything which may come in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of India or the Act.

12. The next contention raised by the petitioner is that even if the impugned rsolution of the Bar Council of India dated 25th February, 1963 is considered to be valid, the Diploma in Rural Services awarded to the petitioner by the National Council for Rural Higher Education is equivalent to the first degree of a recognised University and therefore the petitioner fulfilled the qualifications prescribed in the impugned resolution. In this connection the petitioner has brought to our notice that 32 Universities in the territory of India, a list of which has been annexed to the petition have recognised this diploma as equivalent to Bachelors degree and have granted admission for Post Graduate studies in certain subjects for which recognition to such a diploma has been accorded. It has been urged that the University of Rajasthan grants admission to M. A. in Economics, Sociology, History, Public Administration, and similar disciplines to a holder of Diploma in Rural Services. He has also placed on record an order from the Government of Rajasthan dated 13-15-62 (enclosure 'C' to Ex. 1) by which the Government of Rajasthan has decided to accord permanent recognition to the Diploma in Rural Services awarded to the National Council of Rural Higher Education as equivalent to the first degree of a recognized University for the purpose of employment to posts and services under the State Government.

We have also been referred to the dictionary meaning of the word 'graduation'. In Webster's Third International Dictionary, Vol. I, the term 'Graduate' has been defined as 'one that has received an academic degree, a diploma or a certificate (College) (High School). At another place 'graduate' has been shown to mean 'to grant an academic or professional degree, diploma or certificate'. In the same dictionary the word 'graduation' has been defined as 'the act of receiving a diploma certificate or degree from a school, college or University: the act or ceremony of conferring academic diploma, certificates or degrees.

13. In the Random House Dictionary o the English Language the term 'graduate' is understood to mean 'a person (i) who has received a degree or diploma on completing the course of study, as in a University, college or a School; (ii) a student who holds the first of Bachelor's degree and is studying for an advanced degree', in the same dictionary the definition of the word 'graduation' has been given as below :--

'(i) act of graduating; the state of being graduated;

(ii) the ceremony of conferring degrees or diplomas as at a College or a School.' On the basis of the meaning of the words 'graduate' and 'graduation' given in the above-mentioned dictionaries, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the diploma obtained by the petitioner under Rura Services should be considered as 'graduation'.

14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the Bar Council of India has contended that the word 'graduation' has been used in the impugned resolution in the restricted sense of receiving a Bachelor's Degree from a University established by law. In this connection he has placed reliance on Section 22 of the University Grants Commission Act, 195T which runs as under :--

'22. Bight to confer degrees.

(1) The right of conferring or granting degrees shall be exercised only by a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act or an institution deemed to be University under Section 3 or an institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or grant degrees.

(2) Save as provided in Sub-section (1), no person or authority shall confer, or grant, or hold himself or itself out as entitled to confer or grant, any degree.

(3) For the purposes of this section, 'degree' means any such degree as may. with the previous approval of the Central Government, be specified in this behalf by the commission by notification in the offical Gazette.'

He has also invited our attention to Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act to show that the Central Government may on the advice of the Commission declare that any institution for higher education other than a University shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act.

It is contended that the National Council for Rural Higher Education is not a University nor has it been declared by the Central Government that it shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of University Grants Commission Act. Learned Counsel has also referred to the definition of the word 'Law Graduate' as contained in Section 2(h) of the 'Act'. 'Law Graduate', according to this definition, means 'a person who has obtained Bachelor's degree in law from any University established by law in India.' Deriving support from this definition Mr. Jain has argued that in order to be called a graduate in any subject, a person must have obtained a Bachelor's Degree in that subject from any University. It has been submitted on behalf of the Bar Council of India that the University of Rajasthan as well as other Universities have recognised diploma in Rural Services obtained by the petitioner only for certain limited purposes and it was within the competence of the Bar Council of India to recognise or not to recognise this diploma as equivalent to graduation.

15. Wo have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it may bo permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance, However, in selecting one out of the various meanings of the word regard must always be had to the context. Cozens-Hardy M. R. said in Camden (Marquis) v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1914-1 KB 641, at p. 647:

'It is for the Courts to interpret the Statute as best as they can. In so doing the Courts may, no doubt, assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help which they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries.'

It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Courts should accept the wider significance of the term 'graduation' and include within its connotation the diploma granted to the petitioner by the National Council for Rural Higher Education even though it was not a degree obtained from a University esta-blished under Law. We find ourselves un-abie to accept this contention. As already stated the term law graduate' has been defined in the Act itself to mean a person who has obtained a Bachelor's Degree in Law from any University established by Law in India. This definition of law graduate as contained in the Act, in our opinion, will have more weight in construing the word 'graduation' in pari materia than the meaning of the term 'graduate' furnished by dictionaries. Thus even though the words 'gra-: duate' and 'graduation' have not been de fined in the Act, we have yet to look to the definition of the word 'Law Graduate' given in the Act, and construe the word 'graduation', in the light of this definition. This definition, in our view, makes the meaning of the word 'graduation' used in the impugned resolution quite clear and it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings, the word is capable of, according to lexico-graphers. Consequently we are of the opi-nion that the contention of the Bar Council that graduation as used in the impugned resolution refers to the act of receiving a degree from a University established by law is not incorrect.

16. There is another aspect of the matter also and it is this: Whether the Diploma in Rural Services obtained by the petitioner is equivalent to 'graduation' for the purposes of this Act is purely an academic matter which is to be decided by the Bar Council of India itself which is an autonomous body and it would not be appropriate for us to differ from the opinion of the Bar Council of India on this point when the view taken by that body cannot be said to be patently erroneous. The Bar Council has accepted the restricted definition of the word 'graduation' so as to mean the act of receiving Bachelor's degree from a University established by Law in India and the courts would naturally hesitate to brush aside this view of the Bar Council particularly when it appears that the Bar Council of India which consists of experts such as Attorney-General of India, the Solicitor-General of India and a representative elected by each State Bar Council from its members, was satisfied that the act of receiving diploma, in the Rural Services was not graduation. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the Bar Council has acted unreasonably or erroneously in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner did not satisfy the qualifications prescribed for enrolment as an Advocate.

In this connection we may refer to the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491. Their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows:

'Where one of the qualifications for the appointment to the post of a Renews in the University was that the applicant should possess a First or High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign University the candidate should possess a First Class Master's Degree of an Indian University or High Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University or qualification of a foreign University which is equivalent to a First Class or a High Second Class Master's degree of an Indian University, Whether the foreign degree is equivalent to a High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University is a question relating purely to an academic matter and courts would naturally hostitate to express a definite opinion, specially when the selection Board of Ex-PERIS considers a particular foreign Univer-sity degreee as an equivalient'.

17. These observations of their Lordships indicate that the Courts should be slow to (sic) with the opinions expressed by the experts in academic matters. As already observed about the Bar (Council of India is an autonomous body which has been given wide powers in the matter of laying down standards of legal education and unless it is found that it has acted mala fide or in clear defiance of a mandatory provision contained in any statute, it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decision of such matters to the Bar Council itself.

18. in this view of the matter it is not necessary to adjudge on the validity of the Rules made by the Bar Council of India, vide its circular dated 8-3-1966. In the first place the petitioner's case is not governed by these Rules as they were made later on and the petitioner's application for enrolment was refused not on account of these rules but because the petitioner did not fulfil the qualifications prescribed in the impugned resolution. Apart from that, the condition laid down in Rule 1 of these rules that 'no person shall be eligible for enrolment under the Advocates Act 1961 unless at the time of joining the course of instruction in law for a degree in law, he is a graduate of a University' appears to us to be in order and we do not propose to repeat all those reasons in support of our view which wo have already given while upholding the veli-dity of the impugned resolution. The Bar Council thus had an authority to make such ia rule in view of the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(e)(iii) read with Section 49(ag) and (d) and Section 7(h) and (1) of the Act.

19. Before parting with the case we may dispose of another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, t has been urged that the impugned resolution of the Bar Council of India dated 5-2-1903 was never published nor the public was made aware of it and therefore it should be adjudged as invalid. In this con-nection reliance has been placed on Harla v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467, While dealing with a criminal appeal from conviction under Section 7 of Jaipur Opinm Act their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows :--

'In the absence of any special law or custom, it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subject of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or at the very least, there must be some special rule or rgulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. .... .in the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or custom, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential'.

We may state here that the rationale of the decision in Hada's case, AIR 1951 SC 467 has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The petitioner is not sought to be punished or penalised under the Advocates Act and it was not necessary under any provision of law for the Bar Council to promulgate or publish its resolution. Moreover the act of recognising a degree in law obtained from any University for the purposes of the Act cannot be said to be a law made by the Bar Council. In this view of the matter we do not see any substance in this contention of the petitioner also.

20, For the reasons mentioned abovewe do not see any force in this petition anddismiss it. But in the circumstances of thecase we make no order as to costs.


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