G.M. Lodha, J.
1. This is a tenant's second appeal in a suit for eviction. The premises are situated in the town of Shahjahanpur in district Alwar. Admittedly at present the provisions of Rajas-than Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 are not applicable. Both the lower courts have decreed the suit of plaintiff.
2. In this appeal, Shri Rastogi has raised a twofold objection. Firstly, he has submitted that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is a beneficial legislation enacted for the purpose of providing protection to the tenants from the exploitation of the landlords and it has been applied to much smaller places than the town of Shahjahanpur. On these premises, Shri Rastogi argued that his client has been discriminated under Article 14 of the Constitution and therefore, this Court should issue a Mandamus directing the State to apply the above act by extending it to the town in Shahjahanpur. In support of his contention he relied upon the judgment of this Court in Milap Chand v. Dwarkadas, 1954 Raj LW 587: (AIR 1954 Raj 252).
3. Secondly it was argued that the landlord has come on specific grounds of ejectment and therefore, even though the Rent Control Act is not applicable, the Court cannot grant a decree for eviction, Unless those specific grounds of ejectment are proved.
4. I have given a thoughtful consideration on the submission of Mr. Rastogi, which were pressed before this Court with great vehemence and in that context, I have gone through the judgments of both the lower courts.
5. It is true that the rent control legislations are enacted for the purpose of providing protection to the tenants and regulating the rent and eviction- It is also true that it is a beneficial legislation and this Court can in an appropriate case, consider whether non-application by non-extension of the provisions of this Act ina particular case results in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, the present one is an appeal in a civil suit. The controversy about the facts, which may become relevant for the purpose of deciding the question, whether Article 14 ran be invoked were not pleaded anywhere before the trial Court. True, it is, that in a given case, this Court can take judicial notice of certain facts which become too obvious and patent but that too requires an adjudication after both the parties are allowed an opportunity. To contest the same, a proper forum for such a prayer which Shri Rastogi has made, is filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. I am afraid it would not be possible for this Court in second appeal to take judicial notice of all the facts which Shri Rastogi now wants to plead and to grant relief in this jurisdiction.
6. The decision referred to by Shri Rastogi of Milap Chand's case (AIR 1954 Raj 252), wherein this Court considered the question of validity of certain provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act will not provide any help to the defendant in this case. The findings which were recorded by this Court in this judgment are summarised in para 32, which reads as under:--
'32. We are, therefore, of opinion that:--
(1) Sections 6, 8 and 22 (2) of the impugned Act are valid and are not hit by Article 254(1) of the Constitution.
(2) the impugned Act is not invalidated on the ground that it is hit by Article 14, and
(3) the impugned Act was validly extended by the Rajpramukh in November, 1952, under the proviso to Section 31.'
7. Mr. Rastogi referred to sub-head Note F. which reads as under:--
It is desirable, where legislation of this kind (involving selection and classification) is passed that the basis of selection should be put down in the Act itself or indicated in the preamble, so that the courts may easily test the Act on the anvil of Article 14, and may not have to search far and wide for a basis of classification. Such provision in the Act itself or in the preamble would do away with the necessity of the courts trying to conceive reasonably any state of facts which would sustain the legislation. It may happen that the courts may not be able reasonably to conceive of such state of facts as would justify the law, as thatdepends upon the knowledge which the courts may have of the general conditions prevailing in the country. There may also sometimes be special conditions prevailing in particular parts which may justify a piece of legislation; but if these conditions are not put down in the Act or indicated in the preamble, as a basis of classification, it may not be possible for the courts to conceive of them reasonably. But the mere absence of such basis is not enough to invalidate a law, if the courts can reasonably conceive of a state of facts which would sustain it.
The conditions existing in Rajasthan at the end of 1950, when Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act came to be passed, were sufficient justification for passing the impugned Act in order to control rents. The same circumstances justify the selective application of the law to such towns as required in the opinion of the Government, the enforcement of the impugned Act.
The conditions, which the court can assume for holding that the Act is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5), are also the conditions which are the basis of classification. In these circumstances, we must hold that the Act, which applies to the whole of Rajasthan, is not a piece of arbitrary legislation, and that its selective application is controlled by circumstances which are too well known.
Once the basis of classification is assumed to exist the court must further assume that the state of facts, which is necessary for the selective application, of the law, is also in existence in the towns where it has been applied and is not in existence where it has not been applied. The basis for classification, which the court can reasonably conceive of in this case, obviously is the housing difficulty in various towns of Rajasthan due to non-erection of buildings during the period of the last world war, the increase in population in most cities in the last ten years, conditions created by the partition of 1947, and the influx of persons from what is now Pakistan. These assumptions which are reasonable, provide basis for classification of towns where these conditions prevail, and, therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we must hold that the law is not discriminatory and is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
8. As I have already mentioned in the earlier part of my judgment, in a given case the Court can take judicial notice of certain facts but for that too the parties require specific pleading so that both the parties can assist the Court. It is not possible in second appeal under Section 100, Civil P. C. to permit the defendant to raise such a plea for the first time specially when the State of Rajasthan was not even a party.
9. So far as the second limb of the submission of Mr. Rastogi is concerned, in a civil suit, regarding eviction, betweenlandlord and tenant, in the absence of the application of rent control legislation like Rajasthan Premises Act, all that is required to be proved by the landlord is that, there exists relationship of landlord and tenant and further that tenancy has been validly terminated under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
10. I am in agreement with the view of the lower courts that once, it is held and as it has been done in the instant case, that though the tenant has denied the title and pleaded adverse possession, yet he has failed to prove that, and on the contrary the landlord has proved that, there was a valid tenancy according to which the plaintiff was landlord and the defendant was tenant, then the mere mention of some of the grounds which are unnecessary in law would not change the character of the suit.
11. It is well established law that between the landlord and tenant, in the absence of the protection of rent control laws, like the Rajasthan Premises Act, the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant by termination of tenancy unless of course, there is a contract to the contrary.
12. In the instant case, both the lower courts have held that the landlord has proved that relationship of landlord and tenant exists and that by a valid notice, tenancy has been terminated. In view of this, it is not possible to accept the second contention, of Mr. Rastogi also.
13. Even if the Rajasthan Premises Act is applied then also, as the defendant has denied the title, he is liable to eviction on that ground and the extension and application of that law would not make any difference, so far as the present decree of eviction is concerned. I, therefore, confirm the decree of eviction.
14. Mr. Rastogi prayed that this judgment should not act as a bar to the filing of writ petition. It is made clear that in case Mr. Rastogi's client moves the High Court for a writ under Article 226 ofthe Constitution for the purpose of issue of Mandamus, this judgment in itself would not act as a bar, only so far as Article 14 is concerned, but on other grounds the non-petitioners' objections, if any, would be considered and decided according to law.
15. Mr. Rastogi lastly prayed that he may be allowed some time to vacate these premises. This request is reasonable and six months time is allowed for vacation of premises from today.
16. With the above observations, this appeal is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.