S.N. Modi, J.
1. This is a tenant's second appeal arising out of a suit for eviction from a shop.
2. The suit was based on three grounds, namely, (1) defaults in payment of rent, (2) reasonable and bona fide necessity and (3) material alterations in the suit premises. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff-respondents, the learned Additional District Judge, Udaipur, decreed the suit on two grounds, firstly, that the suit shop was required by the plaintiffs reasonably and bona fide for running a restaurant and secondly, that the tenant has made material alterations within the meaning of Section 13(1)(c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Kent and Eviction) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Hence this appeal by the tenant,
3. The learned Additional District Judge recorded the finding that the tenant made the following alterations in the demised shop without the permission of the plaintiffs: (1) He has closed the door (window) in the, western wall of the disputed shop, (ii) he has removed the iron bars of the window on the eastern wall and fixed the glass window instead of it, (iii) he has broken the floor of the shop and (iv) he has broken the today of the pillars of the shop. The learned Additional District Judge then observed:
'These constructions cannot be said to be in the nature of fittings or fixtures made by the tenant for its ordinary purpose. The other two alterations, that is, fixing of the show-cause by removing the iron bars and breaking of the floor may at the best be said to be not material alterations, but the alterations made by the defendant in the disputed shop by which he has closed the window in the western wall and he has broken the today of the plaintiffs' shop amounts to material alterations made in the rented shop, and as such the plaintiffs are entitled to get eviction on this ground also as defined in Clause (c) of Section 13 (1) of the Act.'
4. The tenant admitted in his written statement that he closed the western window of the demised shop by covering it with bricks because foul smell from latrine, powder of wood and drops of water entered through that window. He further admitted that he removed the iron bars of the window fixed in the eastern wall of the demised shop and fixed glass show-case therein. He, however, stated that these alterations as also other alterations were made with the permission of the plaintiffs. The learned Additional District Judge has held that no permission was sought from the plaintiffs for any of the alterations made by the defendant. This is a finding of fact and I find no justification for interference with that finding.
5. The main question that calls for determination in this appeal is whether the permanent closing of the western window with bricks, in the circumstances of the case, is a material alteration within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (c) of the Act which reads as under:--
'Section 13--Eviction of tenant--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order in favour of a landlord, whether in decree or otherwise evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied
(a) xx xx xx(b) xx xx xx (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court, has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof.'
It is that Clause (c) of Section 13 (1) of the Act will be attracted (1) when the tenant makes any construction without the permission of the landlord in the demised premises and (2) when such construction has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof. In the present case, the tenant has undoubtedly closed the western window with bricks without the permission of the plaintiff-landlords. This is certainly a construction in the demised premises. The question, however, arises whether, in the present case, the construction viz. the closing of the window has materially altered the premises or diminished the value thereof. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret a similar provision contained in Section 3 (1) (c) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Bent and Eviction Act, in Manmohandas Shah v. Bishundas AIR 1967 SC 643. The relevant part of Section 3 (1) of the said Act, as quoted in the above decision, ran as under:
'Subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds.............
XX XX XX XX (c) That the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value.'
Interpreting the above provision, their Lordships observed:
'Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean, as such a question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the alterations in the present case must mean material alterations as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the form and structure of the accommodation. The expression 'material alterations' in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises.'
6. In this part of the country, a window opening on the western side is considered a valuable asset to the property for it is a good source of light and air. By closing the western window permanently with bricks, the tenant, in my opinion, has definitely diminished the value of the shop as it deprived the premises of the valuable amenity, namely, light and air. I am further of the opinion that by closing the western window permanently, the tenant substantially altered the structure of the shop. In this view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge, to my mind, rightly decreed the suit on the ground of material alteration within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (c) of the Act.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Rugunathsingh v. Balabux 1975 WLN 427, Madhavlal v. Smt. Govindi Bai 1971 Raj LW 64 = (AIR 1971 Raj 260), Sukhlal v. Bhopalsingh 1972 Raj LW 232 = (AIR 1973 Raj 35) and Khinvaram v. Lakhiprashad, ILR (1964) 14 Raj 819. None of these cases has any relevancy as they are distinguishable on facts. The learned counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on Suka Ishram Chaudhari v. Ranchhoddas Manakchand Shet Gujarathi (1942) 44 Bom LR 220 which is based on the interpretation of Section 13 (1) (b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Coutrol Act. This case is also of no assistance to the appellant as the language of that section is materially different from the language of Section 13 (1) (c) of the Act.
8. For the reasons stated above, I dismiss the appeal summarily on the ground of material alterations. Since Mr. Mathur has appeared at the admission stage without any notice from this Court, I pass no order as to costs.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant prays that the tenant may be granted some time to vacate the premises. Mr. Mathur, the learned advocate for the plaintiff-respondents, has no objection, if reasonable time is allowed to the appellant to vacate the shop. It is ordered that the plaintiffs shall Dot execute the decree and evict the defendant from the shop in dispute upto 31st December, 1975.
10. The prayer for leave to appeal to a Division Bench is refused.