D.S. Dave, C.J.
1. This is a writ application by Messrs. Ramanlal Chunnilal under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts giving rise to it are as follows:
Respondent No. 3 Shri Shyam Sunder Shaima obtained one non-temporitry permit for plying a stage-carriage On 'Chechat-Jhalawar route on 15th May, 1953 from the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur. This permit was subsequently extended, upto Jhalrapatan, a township about four miles ahead of Jhalawar, and later on, it was extended to Raipur. On 19th October, 1957, the Collector, Jhalawar, granted further extension of the route upto Chavli which was about six miles ahead of Raipur. Thus respondent No. 3 continued to ply his bus from Chechat to Chavli up-to 31st December, 1960. The period of his permit, however, was to expire earlier and so he had presented an application for the renewal thereof.
When his application for renewal of the permit came for consideration before the Regional Transport Authority, it was found that, the extension given to him by the Collector from Raipur to Chavli was unauthorised and so the Regional Transport Authority rejected his application for renewal of the permit on the ground that there was no such route as Chechat to Chavli in the original permit. Against this order dated 29th Juty, 1900. respondent No. 3 went in appeal. The Transport Appellate Tribunal accepted the appeal partially and it was ordered that the stage carriage permit of respondent No. 3 be renewed for the route Chechat to Raipur for a period of three years from the date of its expiry. His application for extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli was not allowed at that time, but the Regional Transport Authority was directed to publish it and then to dispose it of in accordance with law. This order was passed on 20th April, 1961.
3. On 18th May, 1961, respondent No. 3 presented a fresh application before the Regional Transport Authority for extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli. It was published by the Regional Transport Authority an 27th July, 1961 and it was considered to the meeting on 30th June, 1962along with other fresh applications and it was resolved that the State Transport Authority may be requested to give its concurrence for extension of the route. The concurrence of the State Transport Authority was considered necessary, because the route on which extension was sought, was 'A' Class route and there was a ban for granting permit on that route.
On 6th November, 1962, the State Transport Authority passed a resolution and the ban for grant, of fresh stage-carriage permit was relaxed as a special case for Chechat-Chavli route. The application of respondent No. 3 then came for reconsideration before fee Regional Transport Authority on 5th and 6th April, 1963. The said authority dismissed the application. Aggrieved by this order, respondent No. 3 presented an appeal before the Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. It came to the conclusion that the extension of the permit of respondent No. 3 was in the public interest and so the Regional Transport Authority was directed to grant extension of the route from Raipur to Chavli by its order, dated 29th, April, 1963 It is this order of the Appellate Tribunal which is sought to be challenged.
4. The first contention of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the application of respondent No. 3 for extension of the route was nothing mow but an application to vary the conditions of his existing permit, that when the Regional transport Authority refused to vary the conditions, no appeal against its order lay before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 64 (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It is urged that Section 64 (a) could come into play only if respondent No 3 had presented a new application for the grant of a permit and if that application were refused by the Regional Transport Authority. According to learned counsel, the provisions of Section 64 (a) were not attracted in the present ease and, therefore, the Transport Appellate Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, or, to put it more precisely, exercised the jurisdiction which was not vested in it, in entertaining the appeal of respondent No. 3 which was decided in his favour.
5. In reply, it is contended for respondentNo. 3 that according to Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Actan application to vary the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or anew area could not but be treated as an applicationfor the grant of a new permit, that his client's application, for extension of the route was thus a, freshapplication in the eye of law and since the RegionalTransport Authority refused to grant him a permitfor the extended route, he was aggrieved therebyand the appeal was competent under Section 64 (a)of the Act.
6. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised by learned counsel for both the parties v. They have very frankly conceded that they have not been able to lay their hands on any authority having a direct beaming on the question involved an this writ application.
7. Now, he main ground put forward by the petitioner's learned counsel is, that although Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act lays down thatan application to vary the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or a new area sbould be treated is an application for the grant of a new permit, this change was made by the legislature for the protection of the persons opposing the application and, therefore, the application should be treated as an application for grant of a new permit only for purposes of its publication and giving an opportunity to those who might like to oppose it. It is painted oat that no appeal lay under Section 64 (a) of the Act against the refusal of such application paot to the amendment which was made in 1956, that no corresponding change has been made by the Legislature in Section 64 (a) of the Act and, therefore, Sub-section (9) of Section 57 of the Act should be interpreted in the same manner as it was done before the amendment was introduced.
8. Learned counsel has referred to V. KrishanMurthy v. The Ceded District Auto TransportCo. Ltd., Kurnool, AIR 1953 Mad 321. In thatcase the original condition of the permit was for aroute from K to A. Another application was madeto extend that route to V, but it Was declined. Itwas held that Clause (a) of Section 64 appliedonly to cases where by reason of the existence ofa condition attached to a permit the grantee of thepermit was aggrieved by that condition at th timeof the grant of the permit. It did not apply toagreements which accrued or which arose subsequentto the grant of the permit. The view taken in thiscase was followed by this Court in Bundi ElectricSupply Co. Ltd, v. Appellate Tribunal (State(Transport Auithority), Jaipur ILR (1959) 9 Raj 570.
It may be observed that the view taken in the Madras case, AIR 1953 Mad 321 was expressed priorto the amendment of Section 57 of the Act. Sub-section (8) wasinserted by Act No. 100 of 1956. This sub-section,as it stands at present, runs as follows:--
''Section 57. -
(1) to (7) xxxxx
(8) An application to vary the conditions ofany permit, other than a temporary permit, by theinclusion of a new route or routes or a new areaor, in the case of a stage-carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specifiedmaximum, or in the case of a contract carriagepermit or a public permit-carrier's permit by increasing the number of Vehicles covered by thepermit, shall be treated as an application for thegrant of a new permit:
Provided that it shall not be necessary so totreat an application made by the holder of a stagecarriage permit who provides the only service onany route or in any area to increase the frequencyof the service so provided, without any increase inthe number of vehicles '
A bare perusal of the said sub-section would showthat it enjoins upon the authorities, who are empowered to grant permits, to treat an application forvarying the conditions of non-temporary permitthe inclusion of a flew route or routes or a new areaas an application for grant of a new permit. Thismakes that all the formalities which have to begone into in the case of an application for a newpermit must fee observed in an application for varying the conditions on the said ground.
It follows that Sub-section (7) of Section 57 of the Act would equally apply to such an application. Sub-section (7) required that when a Regional Transport Authority ' refases an application for a permit, if shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. This marks it further clear that even in the case of an application for varying the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area, it is incumbent upon the Regional Transport Authority to give its reasons in writing, if it chooses to refuse such an application. Learned counsel for the petitioner is true to the extent that the provision of Sub-section (8) helps these persons who might choose to oppose the application after its publication, but it cannot be urged at the same time that while introducing Sub-section (8), the Legislature was unmindful of the interest of the applicant. We are inclined to believe that this amendment was made in the interest of both, the applicant and the opponent and not for the sake of the opponent alone.
It is not disputed before as that if an altogether fresh application is made for a non-temporary permit and if it is refused by the Regional Transport Authority, an appeal would lie under Section 64 (a) of the Act. When by the new amendment the application for varying the conditions of a non-temporary permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area is equated with a fresh application for the grant of a new permit. We see no reason why Section 64 (a) of the Act should not come into play. The reasons, which guided the learned Judges in taking the view in the Madras case AIR 1953 Mad 321 would, not in our opinion, hold good after the introduction of Subsection (8) of Section 57 of the Act, We, therefore, see no force in the objection raised by learned counsel tot the petitioner and, in our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal was competent to entertain and decide the appeal by respondent No. 3.
9. The next contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is, that the Appellate Tribunal had committed an error in allowing the application of respondent No. 3 without exploring the scope for extension of the permit on the extended route. In our opinion, there is little force in this contention, because from the facts, which have been natrated above, it would be clear that the Regional Transport Authority itself had earlier recommended to the State Transport Authority that it should consider the question of removing the ban against the extension of the route If the State Transport Authority had nit removed the ban, there would have been no scope for a valid extension of the route. This Appellate Tribunal has given its careful thought to the merits of the application of respondent No. 3 and we see no good reason to interfere In the matter, in our extraordinary jurisdiction.
10. The petitioners application, therefore fate and it is hereby dismissed. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.