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Hemraj Vs. Tax Recovery Officer and anr. (No. 2) - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberD.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 65 of 1975
Judge
Reported in[1979]118ITR744(Raj)
ActsIncome Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 156, 280C, 280K, 280R and 280T; General Clauses Act, 1897 - Sections 6; Finance Act, 1966
AppellantHemraj
RespondentTax Recovery Officer and anr. (No. 2)
Appellant Advocate B.L. Purohit, Adv.
Respondent Advocate L.R. Mehta, Adv.
Cases ReferredRayala Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement
Excerpt:
- - purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner, says that the propositions laid down in these cases do not lay down good law, as these cases have been decided with reference to section 6 of the general clauses act which according to him are not attracted in the present case. maharaja pratapsingh bahadur [1961]41itr421(sc) is of no avail to the learned counsel for the petitioner because, there, the act was brought into force by deeming provisions from an anterior date which carried clearly the character of retrospectivity......amendment made by the finance act, no. 13 of 1966, passed on may 13, 1966. the submission, of the learned counsel is that after the amendment the power to make recovery no moresurvives in the department in view of the amendment of section 156 and omission of sections 280k, 280r and 280t with effect from april 1, 1967. 2. the argument of the learned counsel is that the amendment is rather of a retrospective character and no recovery can be made after the coming into force of the amendments introduced by the finance act of 1966. learned counsel has further submitted that section 6 of the general clauses act cannot be attracted while interpreting the above provisions. we are afraid the contention raised by the learned counsel is not correct. the point raised before us is squarely covered.....
Judgment:

M.L. Joshi, Actg. C.J.

1. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the annuity deposit is not recoverable from the petitioner in view of the subsequent amendment made by the Finance Act, No. 13 of 1966, passed on May 13, 1966. The submission, of the learned counsel is that after the amendment the power to make recovery no moresurvives in the department in view of the amendment of Section 156 and omission of Sections 280K, 280R and 280T with effect from April 1, 1967.

2. The argument of the learned counsel is that the amendment is rather of a retrospective character and no recovery can be made after the coming into force of the amendments introduced by the Finance Act of 1966. Learned counsel has further submitted that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot be attracted while interpreting the above provisions. We are afraid the contention raised by the learned counsel is not correct. The point raised before us is squarely covered by J.K.K. Angappan v. ITO : [1974]94ITR397(Mad) and C. Doraiswamy v. TRO : [1975]99ITR494(Mad) . Mr. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner, says that the propositions laid down in these cases do not lay down good law, as these cases have been decided with reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which according to him are not attracted in the present case. In this connection, he has drawn our attention to CIT v. Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur : [1961]41ITR421(SC) and Rayala Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 494. We have gone through these cases. CIT v. Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur : [1961]41ITR421(SC) is of no avail to the learned counsel for the petitioner because, there, the Act was brought into force by deeming provisions from an anterior date which carried clearly the character of retrospectivity. As regards Rayala Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 494 that case has been considered in J.K.K. Angappan v. ITO : [1974]94ITR397(Mad) by the Madras High Court. It is true that in Rayala Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 494 their Lordships have observed that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot obviously apply in regard to the omission of Rule 132-A of the Defence of India Rules for two reasons: Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions and applies when the repeal is of only the Act or Regulation and not of a Rule. That case related to the prosecution under criminal offences under the Defence of India Rules and, in our opinion, is distinguishable as its ratio is confined to the facts of that case only as observed in J.K.K. Angappan v. ITO : [1974]94ITR397(Mad) . The liability for payment of annuity in the present case has accrued prior to April 1, 1967, and that liability cannot be washed away by the simple omission of the provisions which, in our opinion, are not of retrospective operation. The liability to pay annuity deposit being a present and existing liability even on April 1, 1967, the date on which the provisions relating to annuity deposit were omitted from the I.T. Act, 1961, in our opinion, should be enforced even after that date notwithstanding the said omission. If we view the said omission with reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, Section 6 will be attracted unless there is an intention to the contrary.

3. Having perused the provisions referred to by the learned counsel in support of his proposition, we are unable to see any intention to the contrary so as to exclude the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In the present case, the liability to pay the annuity deposit is beyond dispute and merely on account of subsequent omissions in the provisions of Section 280C it cannot be said that the liability once validly accrued could not be enforced in view of the subsequent amendment which came into force from April 1, 1967.

4. We, therefore, do not see any justification to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed summarily.


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