Skip to content


Sewaram Vs. Government of Rajasthan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Writ Appln. No. 88 of 1951
Judge
Reported inAIR1952Raj109
ActsRajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - Sections 22, 22(2), 22(3), 27, 27(2) and 30
AppellantSewaram
RespondentGovernment of Rajasthan
Appellant Advocate P.D. Mathur, Adv.
Respondent Advocate R.K. Rastogi, Government Adv. and; G.C. Kasliwal, Adv. for Opposite Party No. 5
DispositionApplication allowed
Excerpt:
- .....respect of a house against sewaram who was his tenant, and was in occupation of the premises. the rent controller granted a certificate but on appeal the collector, on the 19th of march, 1951, cancelled the certificate. a revision application was filed by madanlal in accordance with the provisions of section 22(4) of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950 and the government set aside the order of the collector and restored the order of the rent controller on the 22nd of august, 1951, and further directed that the landlord be put into possession of the premises which were in the occupation of the tenant. subsequently the government amended its order and deleted that portion of it which related to the placing of the landlord into possession of the premises.it is.....
Judgment:

Ranawat, J.

1. This is an application for a writ of certiorari or mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. Madanlal applied to the Rent Controller, Jaipur for grant of a certificate for ejectment in respect of a house against Sewaram who was his tenant, and was in occupation of the premises. The Rent Controller granted a certificate but on appeal the Collector, on the 19th of March, 1951, cancelled the certificate. A revision application was filed by Madanlal in accordance with the provisions of Section 22(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and the Government set aside the order of the Collector and restored the order of the Rent Controller on the 22nd of August, 1951, and further directed that the landlord be put into possession of the premises which were in the occupation of the tenant. Subsequently the Government amended its order and deleted that portion of it which related to the placing of the landlord into possession of the premises.

It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Government had no jurisdiction to hear a revision application against an order of the appellate authority deciding an appeal in a case filed under the provisions of the Jaipur Rent Control Order, 1947. It is further contended that Mr. Bhajan Lal Chaturvedi, Home Secretary to the Government, who heard and decided the revision application of Madanlal was not authorised by the Government to hear such revision applications under the rules made under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950.

3. In reply it was stated on behalf of Madanlal that the Government of Rajasthan acted within the scope of its jurisdiction in deciding the revision application under the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950. The Government Advocate stated at the time of the hearing of the case that Mr. Bhajanlal Chaturvedi, Home Secretary was duly appointed by the Government under the provisions of the rules made under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950 to hear revision applications which were presented to the Government under Section 22 (4) of the said Act.

4. On the above statement of the Government Advocate, the learned counsel of the petitioner did not press the second point raised by him regarding want of jurisdiction relating to the hearing of the revision petition by the Home Secretary. This point therefore need not be decided now. The only point which remains for determination in this case is whether the Government was competent to hear a revision application under Section 22 (4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950 against an order of the appellate authority made under the Jaipur Rent Control Order.

5. The learned counsel of the petitioner has cited the judgment of the case in P. C. GUHA v. E. A. BASIL', 55 Cal W N 611, in support of his contention that in a case decided under the provisions of the Jaipur Rent Control Order, no revision application lay to the Government under Section 22 (4) of the new Act after the old Act had been repealed.

6. The facts of 'P. C. GUHA v. B. A. BASIL', 55 Cal W N 611, were as follows: B. A. Basil, the landlord filed an application for fixation of standard rent under the Rent Control Act of 1948 in respect of premises occupied by P. C. Guha and others. The Rent Controller fixed standard rent of the premises & against his decision the tenants preferred appeals to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta who transferred the cases to the file of the Small Cause Court Judge. The Small Cause Court Judge, to whom the appeals were transferred, substantially upheld the order of the Rent Controller but before the appeals were decided the Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950 came into force and Section 17 (3) of the Rent Act of 1950 provided:

'If at the date when this Act comes into force proceeding for fixing standard rent is pending before the Controller or in appeal, the Controller or the appellate officer shall fix the standard rent in accordance with the provisions laid down by this Act.'

In view of the provision of Section 17 (3), the tenants contended in a revision application filed by them in the High Court of Calcutta that the High Court should revise the order of the appellate tribunal under Section 32 (4) of the Rent Act of 1950, which gave the High Court jurisdiction to revise the orders of the appellate authority under the Rent Act of 1950. It was held by the High Court of Calcutta that the appeals having been filed in the appellate Court contemplated by the Rent Control Act of 1948 the appeals would have to be decided by the appellate tribunal created by the 1948 Act though in deciding the appeals that tribunal by reason of the provisions of Section 17 (3) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 would have to give effect not to the provisions of 1948 Act relating to the fixation of standard rent but to the provisions of 1950 Act relating to the same.

It was further held that apart from Section 17(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1950 there was nothing which would give the whole of that Act retrospective effect and as there was no right of revision from an order of the appellate tribunal under the Rent Control Act of 1948, the order of the appellate tribunal against which revision was filed could not be challenged by way of revision because they were the decisions of a tribunal under the 1948 Rent Act and not under the Rent Act of 1950.

7. The learned Government Advocate has tried to distinguish the decision in 'P. C. GUHAv. B. A. BASIL', 55 Cal W N 611, by saying that the decision in that case proceeded on the basis of Section 8 (3) of the West Bengal GeneralClauses Act, which is exactly in the same terms as Section 6 (e) of the Jaipur General Clauses Act of 1944 and Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act of 1897 but these provisions of law are not applicable to the present case on account of the proviso to Section 30 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950 which lays down that

'Anything done or action taken before such date under the laws hereby repealed shall, until varied or superseded under this Act, continue and be deemed to have been done or taken as the case may be, under or in pursuance of this Act as if it were then in force.'

8. Proviso to Section 30 of the Act, he contends, gives retrospective effect to the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950, and consequently the decision of the ap-pellate tribunal in a case which was pending in his Court at the time the new Act came into force should be deemed to be a decision under the new Act so as to confer jurisdiction on the Government under Section 22 (4) of the new Act to revise the judgment of the appellate authority. It may be pointed out that the argument of the learned Government Advocate done or action was taken under the Jaipur Rent Control Order of 1947 before the date on which the new Act came into force. In the present case, Sections 1 to 4 and Sections 27 to 31 of the new Act came into force on the 28th of November 1950 and the rest of the Act was applied to Jaipur from the 23rd day of December 1950. The decision of the appellate authority in the present case is dated the 19th March 1951, which means that the action of the appellate authority in deciding the appeal was taken subsequent to the coming into force of the new Act and the proviso to Section 30 of the new Act therefore cannot govern the present case.

9. The words 'before such date' appearing in the proviso (quoted above) are very important and because of these words the application of the proviso to Section 30 is restricted to such acts or actions which were done or taken under the laws thereby repealed before the date the new Act was made applicable and the acts or actions which are done or taken after the new Act became applicable are placed beyond the scope of Section 30 of the Act.

10. As regards pending cases, Section 27 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act of 1950 lays down as follows: '27 Provision for pending matter:

(1) In all suits for eviction of tenants from any premises in areas to which this Act has been extended under Section 2, pending on the date specified in the notification under that section, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 and under the circumstances specified in this Act.

(2) Except as is otherwise provided by or under this Act all cases which are, at the commencement thereof in any area to which it has been extended under Section 2. pending before a Controller or any other authority appointed by or under any law in force therein immediately before such commencement, shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act. be determined and disposed of by such Controller or authority in accordance with such law.'

11. Sub-section (1) of Section 27 makes Section 13 and other provisions of the Act applicable to the pending cases and Sub-section (2) specifically provides that all cases which were pending before a Controller or any other authority appointed by or under any law in force therein immediately before the commencement of the new. Act shall notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the new Act be determined and disposed of by such Controller or authority in accordance with such law. According to Section 27(2) the appellate authority in the present case had to determine and dispose of the appeal, which was pending at the time of the commencement of the new Act in accordance with the provisions of the law which was applicable to the case before the commencement of the new Act. The cases pending at the time of the coming into force of the new Act are therefore governed by the provisions of Section 27 of the Act and the proviso to Section 30 would not apply to the further proceedings taken by a controller or other authority after the commencement of the Act and the decision of the appellate authority in the present case which was given after the coming into force of the new Act shall have to be deemed to be a decision under the old law by virtue of Section 27(2) and that decision cannot be regarded to be given under Section 22(3) of the new Act. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 22 the Government is authorised at its own motion or on the application of any person interested to call for the record of any appeal decided by any appellate authority under Sub-section (3) and to pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. The decision given after the execution (sic) of the new Act to Jaipur and in a case which was pending at the time of the commencement of the new Act, cannot be regarded to be a decision under Sub-section (3) of Section 22, as there is specific provision for such cases in Section 27 and as the Government is authorised to revise only such decision as falls within the scope of Section 22(3) of the new Act, the decision of the appellate authority in the present case not being a decision under Section 22(2) of the Act, it was not competent for the Government to revise such a decision. Moreover, Section 27 of the Act read with Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act in the present case would bring the decision of the appellate authority under the provision of the Jaipur Rent Control Order 1947, and as the decisions of the appellate authority under the Jaipur Rent Control Order were not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Government the Government cannot be regarded to possess revisional powers so as to interfere with the decisions of the appellate authority in the present case.

12. The conclusion is that the decision of the appellate authority dated the 19th March 1951 was not subject to revision by applications under Section 22(4) of the new Act and the decision given by the Government is therefore 'ultra vires'. It is not contended that the action of the Government in dealing with Revision applications under Section 22 (4) was not a judicial or a quasi-judicial act and that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13. The application of Sewaram is, therefore accepted & the revisional decision of the Government is set aside and the Government is directed not to interfere with the decision of the appellate authority given on 19th March 1951, after the date of the passing of the new Act in an appeal, which was pending at that time.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //