I.N. Modi, J.
1. This is an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution by the Vijay Transport Company arm two others and has been made under the following circumstances :
2. The three petitioners are holders of stage carriage permits on the Taranagar -- Sardarsahar route and their permits were renewed for a period of three years by an order of the Regional Transport Authority, Jpdhpur, dated 28-2-56. It appears that after some time opposite party No. 3, Laxmi Narain, applied for a temporary permit on this route on the allegation that the permit of petitioner No. 2, Hussamkhan Ramgopal, had been lying idle and was not being utilised, with the result that there was scope for the running of one more bus on the route in question. Consequently, the Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur. by its Resolution No. 9, dated 28-3-57, granted a temporary permit for a period of 4 mouths to Laxmi Narain on the ground that there was temporary need to provide one more bus on the route, in question owing to the fact that the permit of one of the permit holders had not been availed of. Against this order the petitioners went in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority, their contention being that Laxmi Narain had also applied for a permanent permit on the same route and that application was still pending with the Regional Transport Authority and the latter without deciding that application for the grant of a permanent permit had unlawfully granted a temporary permit to Laxmi Narain. The petitioners also applied for a stay order. The stay matter appears to have come up for hearing before the Appellate Tribunal on 29-4-1957 in the presence of both the parties. The learned members of the Tribunal thought it fit to grant a stay order and restrained Laxmi Narain from plying his bus till the petitioners' appeal was finally decided. Thereupon, an application lor vacating the aforesaid stay order was made by Laxmi Narain to the Appellate Authority. This led to the order ot that Authority dated 21-5-1957, whereby the same learned members who had formerly granted the stay order vacated it. We do not consider it necessary to question the reasons which persuaded the learned members to vacate the stay order which was granted by them before.
3. It is against this order that the petitioners have come up to this court by means of the present writ application. It is, however, pertinent to point out that the petitioners have also prayed that the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority granting the opposite party, Laxmi Narain, a temporary permit for a period of 4 months be vacated, as it was opposed to the provisions of the amended Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act.
4. A preliminary objection has been raised before us on behalf of the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority and Laxmi Narain, opposite party No. 3, that we should not enter into the merits of the present application, inasmuch as the appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the Regional Transport Authority is still pending before the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority. This objection is sought to be met on behalf of the petitioners by saying that by the time the appeal comes up for hearing before the Appellate Tribunal, their appeal to that Authority would become infruc-tuous and secondly, that the learned members of the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority have made certain observations in their order vacating the stay order from which it would clearly appear that they have virtually decided the appeal without formally doing so.
5. We have carefully examined the whole matter and wish to point out that the view of this court in circumstances like those we have before ushas been not to interfere in the exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction until a proceeding pending before another Tribunal according to law has been decided by that Tribunal If after such a decision the party concerned feels still aggrieved by the decision of that Tribunal, it would then be open to him to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court; but not before the proceeding filed before another Tribunal has been finally disposed of. The position would of course, be clearly different in those cases where a matter has been taken to another Tribunal in appeal or otherwise; but that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. In those cases this court may still interfere in its discretion before the appeal comes up for hearing before the Tribunal and prohibit the Tribunal from hearing and disposing of such matters. The present case, however, is not a case of that type. The petitioners themselves have gone up in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, which is also being questioned before us, and it is nobody's case before us that the jurisdiction to hear that appeal does not vest in the Appellate Tribunal. The position, therefore, is that the petitioners have come up to this Court in a matter which is properly pending before the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority. It is for that Tribunal to decide the question on the merits whether the temporary permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur, to Laxmi Narain was in accordance with law or not, and it is not for us to interpose our decision on that point at this stage. Reference may be made in 'support of this view to a Bench decision of our Court to which 1 one of us was a party in Tekchand v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1956 Raj 185 (A). In that case the petitioner filed his nomination paper as a candidate at the municipal elections of a certain municipality. Some rival candidates opposed his nomination paper. The Returning Officer accepted the objection and rejected the petitioner's nomination paper. Aggrieved by this rejection the petitioner came up to this Court in a writ application that this Court should quash the order of the Returning Officer as his nomination paper had been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. Among other grounds, one reason which strongly prevailed with this Court was that another authority, namely, the Election Tribunal would be perfectly competent to come to its own conclusion which may conceivably be different from the one at which this Court might arrive. 1 then pointed out,
'Such a situation would be highly undesirable and this, in our opinion, clinches the issue and induces us firmly to come to the conclusion that where the remedy of an election petition is open to a petitioner, this Court should never interfere before the remedy by way of an election petition is exhausted.'
The principle of this decision is clearly applicable to the case before us, the simple reason beingthat it would be open to the Appellate Tribunal ofthe State Transport Authority to decide the matterof the validity of the temporary permit in the pre-sent case according to its own lights and that decision may conceivably be different from the decisionat which we might arrive. Adopting the languageused by this Court in Tekchand's case, such a situa-tion would be highly undesirable and this Courtshould never interfere before the remedy by way ofan appeal (which has already been resorted to by thepetitioners) is exhausted.
6. Turning next to the grievance of the learned counsel that by the time his appeal before the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority comes up for hearing, his appeal would become infructuous. All we need say is that the proper course for the petitioners in a matter of this nature was to havel made an application to the Appellate Tribunal foraccelerating the hearing, so that their appeal is finally decided before the expiry of the temporary permit. The stay order was vacated by the Appellate Tribunal on 21-5 1957, and more than two months have passed since then. From the enquiries made by us from learned counsel for the petitioners we are clearly led to infer that no attempt was made by him to have the hearing of the appeal accelerated before the Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority. For our part we should like to say that we have no doubt that if sueh an application had been made to the Appellate Tribunal by the petitioners the latter would have taken up the appeal of the petitioners for hearing and disposed of (sic) before the expiry of the temporary permit which is due to fake place, according to the information supplied to us, on 14-8-1957. It may still be possible for the petitioners to make a suitable application to the Appellate Tribunal in this connection. But even if it is not, we feel, it is not for us to interfere in a matter like the present which is properly before the Appellate Tribunal and which is within their competence to decide on the appeal which has been taken to them.
7. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the preliminary objection prevails and consequently, this writ application falls to be dismissed; but under the circumstances we make no order as to costs.