1. This is an application in revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against an order of the Civil Judge, Jaipur City dated the 9th March, 1950 holding that the document which was the basis of the suit was not a pro-note but an agreement. He therefore ordered the plaintiff to pay the deficit stamp duty and on payment of such stamp duty held that the document was admissible into evidence. The plea of the petitioner in this case is that the lower Court was wrong in holding that the document was not a pronote. According to him the requirements of Section 2 (22) of the Jaipur Stamp Act are satisfied in this case as regards the document which is the basis of the suit and it is contended that the document ought to have been held to be a pro-note. This objection was raised by the defendant in the lower Court and was disallowed.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the opposite party in this revision that under Section 36 of the Jaipur Stamp Act this question cannot be re-agitated in revision that the document in question is inadmissible into evidence. Section 36 of the Jaipur Stamp Act lays down that:
'where an instrument has been admitted in evidence such admission shall not except as provided in Section 61 be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped.'
3. It is argued by the learned counsel of the petitioner that in the present case this revision was filed no sooner an order was made by the lower Court and Section 36 should therefore not stand in the way of the petitioner. The counsel on the opposite side has put his reliance on the authorities in 'SATYAVATI v.PALLAYA', AIR 1937 Mad 431; 'VENKATE-SWARA IYER v. RAMANATHA DHEEK-SHITAR', AIR 1929 Mad 622; 'BHUPATINATH v. BASANTA KUMARI DEVT, AIR 1936 Cal 556 and 'KRISHANA: kumajl v. MX. JAGPATI KUER', AIR 1937 Pat 73.
4. It may be observed that once a docu-ment is admitted into evidence the intention of the legislature is that it should not be questioned, on any subsequent stage of the same proceeding on the ground that the document was not admissible for want of stamp duty. The learned counsel of the petitioner has not been able to cite any authority in support of his view directly bearing on this point that if an objection is raised soon after the order of the lower Court the provisions of Section 36 should not be considered to be a bar to such revision application. The plaintiff has, we are told, paid the deficit stamp duty and the document should be considered to have been admitted into evidence by the lower Court and we are of opinion that Section 36 bars the petitioner from re-agitating this question in revision. The promptness on the part of the petitioner is no consideration for ignoring the clear provisions of Section 36 of the Stamp Act.
5. The preliminary objection is allowed and the revision is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs of this revision.