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Everest Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. the State of Rajasthan and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberS.B. Civil Write No. 1428 of 1972
Judge
Reported in1975(8)WLN58
AppellantEverest Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.
RespondentThe State of Rajasthan and ors.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases ReferredTiverton & North Devon Ry. Co. v. Loosemore
Excerpt:
.....of constructing a new high court building at jaipur in the year of grace 1960.;(b) rajasthan land acquisition act, 1953 - section 36 to 48--petitioner participating in determination of compensation proceedings--held, no abandonment of a acquisition proceeding.;perusal of the order sheets of the lund acquisition officer shows that the pensioner was participating in the proceedings for determination of compensation. the award made by the land acquisition officer on 13-9-72 (aunexure-r/10) has also been placed on record. the writ petition was filed on 3.9.72. it cannot, therefore be said that the acquisition proceedings had been abandoned by the state na such intention to abandon the proceedings has been manifested either by any express order or by unequivocal conduct.;(c) rajasthan..........constitution challenging the validity of certain acquisition proceedings taken under the rajasthan land acquisition act, 1953, herein after to be referred as 'the act'.2. the petitioner is a cooperative society, hereinafter to be referred 'the society'. on 12.5.60, the government bad published a notification in the rajasthan rajpatra in exercise of their powers under section 4 of the act. the notification was as follows:hkkx 1v jktlfkku jkt; ifk twu 9]1960&&&&&&&lfkkuh; lfkkir 'kklu l fohkkxfokfir;kwt;iqj ebz 13 1960la[;k ,q 2117 ,l-,p-th@1959 pwfd jktklfkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gs afd ljdkj }kjk lkoztfud o;; ij ,d lkoztfud dk;z vfkkzr t;iqj uxj fodkl ;kstukc) gsrq ekstk ekstkiqjk o pd lqn'kzuiqjk es eqlh;r lvsfm;e u;w gkbz dksvz fcfymax ds fy, hkwfe ds fy, tkus dh vko;'drk gksus.....
Judgment:

Kansingh, J.

1. This a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution challenging the validity of certain acquisition proceedings taken under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, herein after to be referred as 'the Act'.

2. The petitioner is a Cooperative Society, hereinafter to be referred 'the Society'. On 12.5.60, the Government bad published a notification in the Rajasthan Rajpatra in exercise of their powers under Section 4 of the Act. The notification was as follows:

Hkkx 1v jktLFkku jkT; iFk twu 9]1960

&&&&&&&

LFkkuh; LFkkir 'kklu l foHkkx

foKfIr;kW

t;iqj ebZ 13 1960

la[;k ,Q 2117 ,l-,p-th@1959 pwfd jkTkLFkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gS Afd ljdkj }kjk lkoZtfud O;; ij ,d lkoZtfud dk;Z vFkkZr t;iqj uxj fodkl ;kstukc) gsrq ekStk ekSTkiqjk o pd lqn'kZuiqjk es eqlh;r LVsfM;e U;w gkbZ dksVZ fcfYMax ds fy, Hkwfe ds fy, tkus dh vko;'drk gksus dh laHkkouk gS vr% blds }kjk foKfIr fd;k tkrk gS AfuEu nf'kZr LFkku dh Hkwfe dks mi;qZDr dk;Z ds fy, ysus dh laHkkouk gS A;g foKfIr jkTkLFkku Hkwfe LFkkfIr vf/kuh;e 1953 dh /kkjk ds xzke iz/kkuks ds vUrxZr blls lEcU/k j[kus okys leLr O;fDr;ks ds fy, fudkyh x;h gSA

mijksDr /kkjk }kjk iznRr 'kfDr;ks dk iz;ksx djrs gq, jktLFkku ljdkj bl le; bl dk;Z es yxs gq, inkf/kdkjh;ks dks muds lcdks o vfudks lfgr ml izns'k es fLFkfr fdlh Hkh Hkwfe es iz;ksx djus vkSj mldks iSekb'k djus rFkk mDr /kkjk }kjk visf{kr ;k lkuqer leLr vU; dk;Z djus ds fy, izf/kd`r djrh gsSA

ifjf'k'V la[;k 410

Hkkstiqjk o pd lqn'kZuiqjk&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&ftyk; rglhy ekStk [kljk ua- {ks=Qyfc?kk foLok1 2 3 4 5&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

By Order of Governor

Sd/ S.D. Ujjwal

Secretary to Govt. Local Self

Govt. Deptt.

By the above notification the land covered by Khasras No. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509 was, inter alia, sought to be acquired. On 3rd May, 1961, the Government issued a further notification under Section 6 of the Act. This notification ran as follows:

LFkkuh; LFkkir 'kklu v foHkkx

foKfIr

t;iqj ebZ 4] 1961

la[;k ,Q 2117 Lok- 'kk- foHkkx@59%& pwfd jktLFkku ljdkj dks ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd lkoZtfud iz;kstu vFkkZr t;iqj uxj fodkl ;kstukc) ekStk ekWtiqjk LVsfM;e ds ikl ds fy, ljdkj }kjk Hkwfe yh tku visf{kr gS A blfy, blds }kjk iks'k.k dh tkrh gS A fd uhps foLt fooj.k es ofiZr Hkwfe mijksDr iz;kstu ds fy, visf{kr gS A

;g ?ksk'k.kk jktLFkku yS.M ,Dohth'ku ,DV] 1953 dh /kkjk 5 ds izko/kkuks ds vUrZxr mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 4 dh mi/kkjk 2ds vUrZxr ,DV dh /kkjk 4 dh mi/kkjk 2ds vUrZxr Hkwfe vofIr vf/kdkjh t;iqj ls izkIr gq, izfrosnu ij fopkj djus ds i'pkr mu leLr O;fDr;ks ds fy, dh x;h ftues bles laca/k gks ldrk gS AvkSj mDr ,DV dh 7 izko/kkuks ds v/khu Hkwfe vkokfIr vf/kdkjh] t;iqj dks mlds }kjk mDr Hkwfe dks vokfIr ds fy, vkokl izkIr djus dk funsZ'k fd;k tkrk gS A

Hkwfe ds uD'ks dk fujh{k.k Hkwfe vkof) vf/kdkjh t;iqj ds dk;Zky; es fd;k tk ldrk gS A

foLr`r fooj.k&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&ftyk; rglhy ekStk [kljk ua- {ks=Qyfc?kk foLok1 2 3 4 5&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

By Order of Governor

Sd/ S.D. Thapar,

Secretary Local Self Govt. Deptt.

3. One Smt. Laxmi Devi Sogani who claimed to be the Khatedar tenant of the laud covered by the aforesaid khasra numbers challenged the acquisition proceedings by a writ petition in this Court. It was DB Civil writ Petition No. 47 a of 61. On 18.4.63 the writ was partly allowed & it was ordered hat acquisition proceeding be quashed regarding Khasra Nos. 235/510 and 235/512, as the proceedings were illegal, qua them but in respect of Khasra numbers mentioned above the acquisition proceedings were held to be legal and the writ petition qua them was dismissed. On 15-1-67. Smt Laxmi Devi Sogani sold this land to the Society by a registered sale deed. On 13-9-1972, the Society Sled the present writ petition for quashing the acquisition proceedings regarding the land covered by Khasras Nos. 230, 233, 236, 235/511 and 233/509, in village Bhojpura, and for commanding he respondents to drop the proceedings in respect of these Khasras. It was submitted that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired had ceased to exist and as inspite of the decision of the High Court as back as 18.4.63 further proceedings under the Act had not been taken for almost a period of 9 years and therefore, the State shall be deemed to have abandoned the acquisition proceedings. As regards the non existence of the public purpose it was submitted that although the land was sought to be acquired for the construction of the new High Court building at Jaipur and for he construction of the Stadium the two buildings have already been constructed on different sites and, therefore, the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired has vanished. Apart from this it was submitted that though acquisition proceedings were taken in respect of a number of properties which are mentioned in para 19 of the writ petition, the Government was continuing the present proceedings and this was discriminatory.

4. The writ petition has been opposed by the State. It was submitted that the land was agricultural and the petitioner Society had taken this land avowedly for the purposes of constructing residential houses and consequently the transfer in favour of the Society was illegal. As regards the casing of the so-called public purpose it was submitted that the petitioner is misreading the contents of notification Annexure 2. It does not mean that toe land was being acquit ed for the construction of the new High Court budding or for the stadium, but it was for the purposes of development of Abadi. As regards the delay in completion of the proceedings it was stated that the petitioner had been taking part in the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer and even it there was some delay in completion of the proceedings that cannot amount to abandonment of the proceedings.

5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate General. The notification has been set out by me in extenso and the argument about the public purpose for which the land was ought to be acquired centres round the Urdu word 'Muttasil' The word 'Muttasil' or 'Muttasil' in Fallon's. 'New Hindustani English' Dictionary has been defined as follows:

joined. Contiguous; adjoining; joined; adjacent.

6 In 'Urdu Hindi Shabda Kosb' by Mohammed Mustafa Khan he word 'Mutasal' has been defined as:

lehiorhZ] djhch] lehi] djhc] fujUrj] yxkukj] feyk gqvk

Therefore, it follows that it is a mis-reading of the notification to say that the land was sought to be acquired for the purpose of construction of a new High Court building or a stadium for that matter It is common knowledge that the Bench of the High Court that was functioning at Jaipur bad been abolished in July, 1958 and the full High Court started functioning at Jodhpur. There could hardly be any question of constructing a new High Court building at Jaipur in the year of grace 1860. A building for the Bench had already been constructed and she reference in the notification is to that building and it is only for the purposes of location of the Khasra numbers that the two building namely, the High Court building and the stadium are mentioned. The contention raised before, no substance.

7. Then as regard the dropping of the acquisition or its abandonment I may refer to Section 48 of the Act It lay down that except in the case pro vided for in Section 36 the State Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Further, whenever the State Government withdrawn from any such acquisition the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceeding thereunder and shall pay such amount to the person interested together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land The provisions of Part III of the Act shall apply so far as may be to the determination of the compensation payable under this section. The Act, therefore, contemplate that it is open to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition. This can, however, be only by a positive; act namely, when the State manifests the intention by an order or by unequivocal conduct not to proceed with the acquisition. This does not appear to have been done. Apart from this for abandonment of the proceedings something beyond a mere delay has to be shown. In Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd. v. Hendon Corporation 1952 (3) All. ER 75 it has been observed in respect of the law of compulsory purchase:

Secondly abandonment. The learned judge held that the delay wan not such as of its own as to amount to evidence of abandonment. For the reasons already given, we prefer to deal with abandonment as something beyond mere delay. In this sense an intention no longer to carry out toe notice to treat must be communicated to the owner ether expressly or by conduct. Had the letter of Aug. 11, 1958, been written to Simpsons, it may well De that the litter could perfectly well then and there have accepted that as a clear intention to abandon and that would have been an end of the matter. The corporation could not, we think have taken cover under the word 'at present', for they are under a continuing duty to evince an intention to proceed under the notice to treat. But, happily for Simpsons, that letter was not addressed to them but to the Central Land Board. When Simpsons put the matter to the corporation, the latter merely said that they would let Simpsons know of their decision, & Simpsons took no objection to this course. The corporation's decision was to proceed. In our judgment, there has been no abandonment in this case.

In the judgment observations of Lord Barnwell in Tiverton & North Devon Ry. Co. v. Loosemore (1884) 9 App. Cas. at p. 506 have been quoted with approval and I may usefully reproduce them:

I quite agree that they might abandon their notice to purchase. If they had said so in so many words, and the respondent had assented, no doubt the notice would have ceased to have any effect. It would have operated like an agreement to rescind a contract. And no doubt what can be done in words can be done by conduct; and furrier it can be done unintentionally by conduct such that those to be affected by it reasonably infer the intention. But what is there here to show that the respondent could reasonably infer that the appellants bad abandoned their notice to take

8. In the present case the writ petitioner has been participating in the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. Order sheets dated 15.3.72, 16.3.72, 1.4.72, 10.4.72, 20.4.72, 4.5.72, 15.5.72, 3.6.72, 27.6.72. 11.7.72, 28.7.72, 11.8.72, 28.8.72, 29.8.72, 2.9.72, 7.9.72 and 11.9.71, have been placed on record by the respondents collectively marked as Annexure-R/1 Perusal of the order sheets of the Land Acquisition Officer shows that the petitioner was participating in the proceedings for determination of compensation. The award made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 13.9.73 (Annexure-R/10) has also been placed on record. The writ petition was filed on 13.9.72. It cannot, therefore, be said that the acquisition proceedings had been abandoned by the State No such intention to abandon the proceedings has been manifested either by any express order of by unequivocal conduct. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention either.

9. As regards the existence of the public purpose the notification issued under Section 6 is conclusive of that Sub-section (3) of Section 6 lays down that declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and alter making such declaration the State Government way acquire the land in the manner laid down in the Act. It is true, there has been some delay in proceeding further with the matter, but it has to be borne in mind that the acquisition had been held to be illegal by the High Court in respect of the two Khasra numbers and the Government had to proceed afresh by issuing notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in respect of these Khasra numbers. It could, therefore, wry well be that the proceedings regarding compensation were not proceeded with in anticipation of the fresh notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.

10. The writ petition is, therefore, without any substance and I hereby dismiss it. The patties are left to bear their own costs.


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