1. Tele Chand Tejwani was prosecuted of an offence under Section 188, I. P. C., for breach of an order under Section 144, Criminal P. C. The learned Magistrate found him guilty and sentenced him to simple imprisonment till the rising of the court. Against his conviction and sentence, the accused filed an appeal which was disposed of toy the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the order under Section 144, Criminal P. C. was bad in law and, therefore, the accused was entitled to an acquittal. Now the state of Ajmer, has come up in appeal against that order of acquittal. In the appeal, I have heard the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for the accused respondent.
2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge relying on - 'D. V. Belvi v. Emperor' AIR 1931 Bom 325 (A) and - 'Sat Narain v. Emperor' AIR 1939 All 748 (B) held that an order prohibiting the public generally from taking part in a procession within the whole of the Municipal limits was illegal. It appears to me that this position was not seriously contested before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and his attention was not drawn to the later rulings, i.e., - 'Sorab Shavaksha v. Emperor' AIR 1935 Bom 33 (C) and - 'Emperor v. Afaq Husain Jauhar' AIR 1941 All 70 (D). It appears to me that an order under Section 144, Criminal P. C. would be valid if the particular place is properly defined so as to be easily understood. But this particular place may be a whole district, a whole town or any smaller area
3. The learned Counsel for the respondent has next urged that an order under Section 144, Criminal P. C. is in contravention of the provisions of Article 19(1) of the Constitution inasmuch as the citizens are deprived of the right of freedom of speech, the right to assemble peaceably and the right to move freely. I may point out that free movement is not restricted by the order in question. The persons against whom the order is directed are only required not to do certain things when frequenting or visiting any place within the Ajmer Municipal limits. So far as the freedom of speech or freedom of assembly is concerned, the restriction imposed is reasonable such as is Clearly permitted by the provisions of the Constitution.
4. The next point urged by the learned Counsel is that the accused was entitled to an acquittal inasmuch as he merely attempted to do certain things. It is urged that the learned trial Magistrate himself came to the conclusion that the accused had not actually committed any act. This 3s not correct. The learned Magistrate clearly held 'actual contravention is, however, proved from the prosecution evidence'.
5. The last question for my consideration is whether a re-hearing of the appeal should be directed. The learned Counsel for the accused has Judged that the case was a petty one and the accused was sentenced only to simple imprisonment till the rising of the court which sentence he has already undergone. It is suggested that no rehearing be directed. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor has not urged any consideration for ordering a re-hearing of the appeal. The matter appears to me to be petty in character. Even if the conviction is restored, the position will be that the accused has already undergone the sentence against which there has been no appeal for enhancement. I do not, therefore, think that any useful purpose would be served by directing rehearing of the appeal.
6. The result is that the order of acquittal stands and the appeal is disposed of accordingly.