Jagat Narayan, C.J.
1. This is a special appeal by one Jagannath Singh against a judgment of a learned single Judge quashing his permit on a writ petition filed by Chandra Lal Jain, respondent No.3 We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and are satisfied that the view taken by this Court consistently in the past is correct and does not require reconsideration.
2. A non-temporary stage carriage permit was granted to Jagannath by the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur on the Udaipur-Fatehnagar via Debari-Dabok-Daroli-Vallabhnagar-Randhera-Intali Tana Akola route under resolution No. 12 (item No 11) of 16-9-68. A condition was laid down in the permit that he shall produce a vehicle of the requisite model within a period of 60 days from the date of the resolution failing which the permit shall stand automatically cancelled. He did not employ any vehicle during the above period and on 15-11-68 his permit stood cancelled as a result of the condition imposed under resolution No. 12. On the application of Jagannath Singh the Regional Transport Authority extended the time for employing a vehicle under its order dated 18-12-68 The writ petition was filed by Chandra Lal Jain, an existing operator on the route, who was interested in the matter, challenging the validity of the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 18-12-68 on the ground that once the permit stood cancelled on 15-11-68 it had no jurisdiction to extend the time for employing a vehicle. The learned single Judge upheld the contention on the authority of the previous decisions of this Court. Our attention was drawn to the decision in Sheo Onker and another v. The Regional Transport Authority Bikaner and Ors. S.B. Civil Writ No. 480 of 1966 decided on 6-12-1966 in which detailed reasons are given for holding that once the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority stands revoked on account of a peremptory order passed by it at the time of granting the permit that authority has no jurisdiction to set aside that order and extend the time further. We are of the opinion that the reasons given in that decision are sound. The same view was taken recently by us in Smt. Shakuntala's case 1970 WLN 45.
3. Rule 86 of the Motor Vehicles Rules runs as follows:
86. Permit: Entry of registration mark on (a) Save in the case of a temporary permit, if the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit and the applicant is not at the date of application in possession of the vehicle duly registered, the applicant shall with in one month of the sanction of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, or such longer period as the authority may specify, produce the certificate of registration of the Vehicle before that authority in order shall particulars of the registration mark may be entered in the permit.
(b) No permit shall be issued until the registration, mark of the vehicle to which it relates has, if the form of permit so requires, been entered therein and in the event of any applicant falling to produce the certificate of registration within the prescribed period, the Regional Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of application.
4. Under the above rule the person to whom a permit is granted is required to employ a vehicle on the route within one month from the date of sanction or such longer period as the authority may specify. It has been held that the time once granted under Rule 86(a); can be extended by the Regional Transport Authority from time to time so long as the permit is not revoked, under Rule 86(b). If a vehicle is not employed within the time granted by the Regional Transport Authority under Rule 86(a) it can revoke the permit under Rule 86(b). There is no reason why it should not be open to the Regional Transport Authority to pass a peremptory order that if the vehicle is not employed within the time so granted the permit shall stand revoked. Such peremptory orders are passed in civil proceedings to which the Code of Civil procedure applies. There is no express provision in the Code for passing such an order. But there is no prohibition either. It has never been held that such peremptory orders are illegal. In Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das AIR 1961 SC 382 on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant it was not held that such an order is illegal. What the Court observed was--
How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal.
5. The above observations go to show that their Lordships of the Supreme Court had no doubt whatsoever about the validity of such orders, they had some doubts about the desirability of passing such orders.
6. Having come to the finding that a peremptory order such as was passed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of granting the permit to the appellant is valid, it is clear that the permit stood revoked under Rule 86(b) because of the peremptory order passed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of granting the permit.
7. Now further time can only be granted by the Regional Transport Authority, after an order revoking the permit is passed by it, if it has power to set aside the order of revocation. Such an order can only be set aside by exercising the power of review. It is settled law that the Regional Transport Authority has no power to review its own orders. That authority is therefore powerless to grant further time after the permit has been revoked under a peremptory order.
8. The distinction between the present case and the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahant Ramdas v. Ganga Das AIR 1961 SC 382 is that the civil court has power to review its own order, but the Regional Transport Authority has no such power. Under Order 47 Rule 1 an order can be reviewed inter alia on account of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of a party when the order sought to be reviewed was passed. This is what their Lordships had in mind in Ram Das's case as is clear from the followings:
For example, it cannot be said that if the appellant had started with the full, money ordered to be paid and came well in time, but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the Court was powerless to extend it.
9. In such a contingency a civil court would have power to set aside its previous order by reviewing it.
10. Once an order revoking a permit is passed the remedy of the aggrieved party is by way of appeal under Section 64(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
11. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. In the circumstance of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of it.