D.P. Gupta, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties I am in complete agreement with the learned Member of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') that the petitioner committed gross and deliberate mis-representation in the present case and the grant of permit nude in favour of the petitioner was, therefore, rightly revoked by the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as 'the RTA').
2. The petitioner applied for the grant of a non-temporary stage carriage permit on Bhadra-Bhatukala route and when his aforesaid application crime up for consideration before the RTA on May 5, 1975 the petitioner represented that he was a displaced operator and that he had a ready vehicle of 1962 model, bearing registration No. RJK 3554 Another applicant, Yaseon Khan also represented before the RTA that he had a ready vehicle of 1962 model. Applying a uniform standard that permits be granted to displaced operators owning ready vehicles, of permissible models, the RTA granted two permits, one each to the petitioner and Yaseen Khan and allowed them 60 days' time to obtain permits on vehicles of the prescribed model. The petitioner has not now denied the fact that the vehicle No RJK 3554. which the petitioner purchased at an auction sale made on behalf of the State Government on March 23, 1974 and a letter of confirmation respect of which sale was issued to the petitioner on April 29, 1974 was a vehicle of 1962 model but it was a 1959 mode vehicle. It appears from the receipt granted to the petitioner on April 29, 1974 (Annexure P/5) that the possession of the vehicle in question was given over to the petitioner as early as on March, 23, 1974 and it has be borne in mind that more than a year thereafter, the petitioner represented before the RTA that the said vehicle was of 1982 model. After obtaining a preference over other applicants by misrepresentation of facts, namely that he possessed a 1962 model vehicle, the petitioner submitted an application to the RTA (a copy of which is Annexure P/6 on record) stating that the vehicle RJK 3554 against which a permit was granted to him on the route was 'not good enough for this route' and as such the permit may be issued to biro on another vehicle No. RJI 1181 of 1934 model. The matter was placed in the meeting of the RTA and after hearing the petitioner, the RTA came to the conclusion that the petitioner mis-represented the fact in order o obtain preference over other applicants be grant of permits on the ground that he was possessed of a ready vehicle of 1962 model and for that reason, the RTA. revoked the grant of permit made in favour of the petitioner. Against this order of the RTA dated July 5, 1975 the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Tribunal. As I have observed earlier the Tribunal, after consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that there was a clear case of gross and deliberate mis-representation on the part of the petitioner and that the RTA in these circumstances was perfectly justified in revoking the grant of permit in favour of the petitioner. The revision petition filed by the petitioner was, therefore, dismissed by the order of the Tribunal dated July 31, 1975 The petitioner has came up before this Court against the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal.
3. I am of the view that the petitioner, no doubt appears to have deliberately mis-represented the facts before the RTA by falsely stating before it that he was possessed of a ready vehicle of 1962 model in order to obtain unfair advantage so as to gel preference over other applicants for grant of a permit to him, while the vehicle possessed by him was admittedly of 1959 model and by his aforesaid conduct the petitioner has disentitled himself from availing of the discretionary relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In similar circumstances, Bhandari J., as he then was, express-trig the view of this Court in Mangilal v. ATSTA Rajasthan, Jaipur 1956 R.L.W. 384 observed:
We cannot encourage the idea that a man is entitled to adopt dubious or dishonest or fraudulent means in order to support his true right or claim. It would be laying down a dangerous principle in the conduct of human affairs. The courts of law will also be flooded by false evidence and false documents even in support of true claims. The means should be as pure as the end. The applicant who comes to this Court invoking the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands. This Court will refuse to interfere even in cases where it slogans him right unless the conduct of the petitioner has been fair and honest and free from any fraud. This Court cannot help those persons who are guilty of practicising deceitful means on any person or authority.
4. The aforesaid principle is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner did not know at the time when he made the representation before the RTA that the vehicle possessed by him was of 1959 model, as the petitioner was not possessed of the registration certificate of the said vehicle at that time. The case of the petitioner, as placed by his learned Counsel before this Court is that from the look of the vehicle the petitioner thought that it was of 1962 model. From the receipt Ex P/5 it appears that the vehicle was put in the possession of the petitioner as early as on March 23, 1974 and the matter relating to the grant of permits on the route was heard by the R.T.A. on May 5, 1975. In these circumstances. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner could not know during this long interval of one year as to what was the model of the vehicle which was possessed by him. Moreover, he could not have asserted before the R.T.A. that he was possessed of a 1962 model without making certain about the same. It is also significant to note that in the application Annexure P/6 with the petitioner submitted before the R.T.A in June, 1975 he mentioned the model of vehicle No. RJK 3554 as '1959 model'. It is thus apparent that soon after the resolution of the R.T.A. was passed granting a permit to the petitioner on the route, and thereby the petitioner having obtained preference on the basis of the false representation made by him, he applied to the R.T.A. for availing of the permit so granted on another vehicles with the full knowledge that the vehicle RJK 3554 was of 1969 model only. I am of the view that the story now invented by the petitioner that be was not aware of the model of the vehicle at the time when be represented before the R.T.A. that he was possessed of a vehicle of 1962 model does not at all inspire confidence and the same was rightly discarded by the Tribunal.
5. Learned Counsel argued that the grant of permit made in favour of the petitioner could not be revoked except under the provisions of Rule 86B of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951. I am unable to accept this contention. Rule 86B provides one of the contingencies in which the grant of a permit in favour of a person may be revoked, namely if the grantee is unable to produce the certificate of registration of a vehicle within the prescribed period. But that does not mean that apart from Rule 86B the grant or sanction of a permit in favour of a person could not be revoked by the R.T.A., even if proper and valid reasons for doing so are present before the Transport Authority concerned.
6. Another argument advanced by the learned Counsel was that a permit could be cancelled only after notice under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act and as the R.T.A did not follow the prescribed procedure and notice under Section 60 was not given to the petitioner in the present case, the R.T.A. had no authority to cancel the permit granted by it to the petitioner on the route. The procedure of Section 60 for cancellation or suspension of a permit can be made applicable only after a permit comes into existence. 'Permit' has been defined in Sub-section (20) of Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act as meaning the document issued by the State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage or authorising the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. In the present case no permit was ever issued to the petitioner and as the permit never came into existence, the question of cancellation or suspension of a permit did not arise and the provisions of Section 60 were, therefore, not at all attracted to the facts of the present case. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the R.T.A. should hive first issued a permit and then it should have given a notice under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act and thereafter the R.T.A. should have revoked the permit granted in favour of the petitioner. When fraud or mis-representation practised by the petitioner was detected at an earlier stage, prior to the issuance of a permit to him, the R.T.A. was not bound to undergo the entire procedure of first issuing a permit and then subsequently taking proceedings for revoking the same.
7. Another argument advanced by learned Counsel was that apart from the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules, there was no inherent power in the R.T.A. to revoke the grant of the permit in question. This argument of the learned Counsel cannot also be accepted, it is settled law that fraud vitiates the most solemn transactions and as soon as it was brought to the notice of the R.T.A. that the petitioner had obtained the grant of a permit on the basis of fraud or mis-representation, the R.T.A. was fully competent to correct its own order and cancel the grant made in favour of the petitioner on the basis of mis-representation. It was held by this Court in Jhalawar. Transport Service Ltd. Jhalawar v. The Transport Appellate Tribunal that quasi-judicial Tribunals also possess inherent powers like the Court to make necessary orders for the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. The R.T.A. in the present case was justified in revoking the grant of permit made in favour of the petitioner on the basis of false representations made to it, in order to prevent the abuse of the process of that Authority. Thus, in my opinion, the R.T.A. was perfectly justified in revoking the grant of permit made in favour of the petitioner and the Tribunal rightly concurred in this view. I am, therefore, unable to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal, more so on account of the conduct of the petitioner, to which I have already referred to above.
8. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed summarily.