G.M. Lodha, J.
1. 'For a Judge, if quantity is lost, nothing is lost, if quality is lost, something is lost but if 'independence, integrity or impartiality', is lost, everything is lost.
2. 'The emblem or symbol of 'Justice is 'Balance' or 'Scales'. A Judge is required to maintain it 'even' maticulously and not allow it to 'tilt' on any consideration whatsoever, 'Tilting of' Balance of justice or the scales of justice' by weight of' coin is the very antethesis of a 'Judge' and 'Justice'. It is the worst 'stigma' against a Judge. For a Judge 'independence, is 'heart' and 'integrity' is his 'lungs'.
3. Inspite of the above explicit law laid down by me in Umed Singh v. Bahadur Singh and Ors. 1980 WLN 276 a judicial officer who has been termed in confidential dishonest officer' in 1974, after withholding of Integrity certificate in 1970, adverse report of Integrity in 1972, bad reputation of integrity in 1972, has dared to invoke discretionary extraordinary jurisdiction for claiming retrospective promotion from 1974. Is it not an attempt for misuse and abuse of extra ordinary jurisdiction by expecting extraordinary relief inspite of extraordinary questionable and derogatory conduct evidenced by confidential reports of the petitioner, is the pivot of debate in this writ petition
4. And now the traditional facts. The petitional is a judicial officer of Rajasthan. He claims that his case for promotion from the post of Munsiff to the post Civil Judge in 1974 should be considered now, because he was superseded on the ground of pendency of the enquiries which have now resulted in exoneration.
5. It is not in dispute that in 1974 the petitioner was a Munsif and the juniors were promoted and he was superseed.
6. The short point raised by Mr. Singhvi and controverted by Mr. Khan appearing for the respondents, relates to the question, whether he can now be reconsidered for the purpose of promotion in 1974 on the ground that these enquiries which were pending at that time have resulted in exoneration ultimately.
7. Before I proceed to consider this aspect of the matter, it may be pointed out that Mr. Khan appearing for the respondents has raised, two more objections which are preliminary in nature. Firstly, it was said that all those officers who were promoted by supersession of the petitioner in 1974 and later on, who would now be adversely affected in case the petition is considered in 1974, have not been arrayed as parties. The petition should therefore, be dismissed on account of non-joinder of necessary parties, argued Mr. Khan.
8. It was again pointed out that the exoneration was done in those enquiries in 1978 and the writ petition has been filed in 1981, and this gross, inadequate and unexplained delay is fatal for the maintainability of this writ peitition.
9. In addition to the above, Mr. Khan pointed out that case of the petitioner was considered on merits in 1974, and as his confidential reports from 1970 to 1974, were extremely bad and adverse and therefore he was not promoted. Mr. Khan pointed that even now the petitioner is under suspension and there are as many as 4-5 enquiries pending against him, and, therefore, this Court under its extra ordinary jurisdiction should not issue any direction for the consideration of the case and that too with retorspective effect upsetting a number of promotees thereafter for such an officer.
10. Mr. Singhvi confronted with the above submitted that in the written reply these two preliminary objections have not been taken. He further pointed out that so far as the delay is concerned, he made several representations after 1974 and onwards, and it was only when no satisfactory reply was received that he was compelled to file the writ petition.
11. On the merits of the case, Mr. Singhvi submitted that in 1974 even if his case was considered, it was on the basis of pendency of enquiries either wholly or partly that he was supersedsd. Mr. Singhvi pointed out that it is wrong to say that four enquiries are pending but he stated that two are pending against the petitioner, which are of later date, being of 1978 and 1981.
12. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties. On the broad principle of law, I am in agreement with Mr. Singhvi that once a civil servant is exonerated in an enquiry, he is entitled to reconsideration for promotion, if he has been superseded earlier only on the ground of pendency of the departmental enquiry. 1 may even go to the extent of saying that in a given case, if it is found that the pendency of the enquiry as well as service record of the candidate otherwise was considered, it is not but possible to find out in what manner the mind of promoting authorities was affected and to that extent and that factor was responsible then in an extreme case this Court my interfere for directions for reconsideration.
13. However, the facts of the instant case are peculiar, The Judicial Officer is still under suspension, and I have just now passed an order in another writ petition No. 1157/81 rejecting his plea against the suspension order Again leaving aside the controversy, whether four enquiries are pending or two are pending, the minimum which can be said is this atleast two enquiries under rules 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules about the misconduct are pending till today. It is also not without significance that the record of 1970, 1971, 1972, l973, and 1974, which was relevant in 1974, as far as it relates to the confidential reports, is bad, and in some cases the remarks are of very serious nature. These reports have been reproduced by Mr. Khan in para 8 of the reply, which reads, as under:
8. The position regarding the entries in the Annual Confidential Reports right from 1970 to 1975 is vividly brought out as here under:
(a) For the year 1970 : The petitioner does not enjoy good reputation His integrity certificate for 1970 was with held. He was also asked to improve in this respect.
(b) For the year 1971 : His quality of work is very poor He should improve it.
(c) For the year 1972 : There were adverse reports about his integrity.
(d) For the year 1973 : A very unreliable and inefficient officer. Very bad reputation for integrity.
(e) For the year 1974 : Disposal of quality. A definitely dishonest officer.
(f) For the year 1975 : Man of doubtful integrity. Work not very goo These entries in the annual confidential reports for the periods ranging from 1970 to 1975 give a definite lie to the claim of the petitioner that the he acted in a judicious, honest and straightforward manner. Of particular significance is the fact that entries have been relied upon by the petitioner himself. It may also be mentioned here that the position after 1975 is not different from what it was before and until 1975. The exonerotion of the petitioner in some of the departmental enquiries doss not meant that the petitioner gave a good account of himself as a judicial officer or did not misconduct himself while working in the capacity of a judicial officer. The representations put in by the petitioner against these entries in the confidential reports ware rightly rejected by the Hon'ble High Court'.
14. The question which calls for consideration is, whether in a case of this nature this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should interfere and direct the respondents to reconsider the case of the petitioner as in 1974 to the detriment of several officers who were promoted in 1974 and afterwards superseding him or thereafter and who are neither parties before this Court, nor the matter was taken up promptly by the petitioner on exoneration in 1978. The cumulative effect of these circumstances, namely, the petitioner being under suspension even now, and facing enquiry in a number of departmental proceedings, may be two or four, the petitioner's confidential reports of 1970; to 1974 being too bad and his integrity repeatedly held to be doubtful, and which have not been quashed so far even though he was exonerated in the enquiries, belated nature of the writ petition, which became all the more important, because many judicial officers in between have been promoted who would adversely be affected, and who are not parties to the writ petition, make out a strong case for refusal of invoking the extra-ordinary discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. The petitioner has disentitled himself to any relief under Article 226, by his conduct by persisting on doubtful integrity, year after year and failure to improve. I have held in Umed Singh 'case' that for a Judicial Officer' integrity and impartiality' is the most important thing and if is lost everything is lost' It is too much for the petitioner that having lost everything due to loss of integrity, he expects to succeed in this Court by persuading this Court to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction to put premium and thus abate dishonesty.
16. I am therefore, of the opinion that it is fit case where I should refuse to issue a writ or direction in favour of the petitioner at this stage.
17. The result is that this writ petition fails and is dismissed in limine without any order as to costs.