Omkarmal Vs. Manak Chand and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect -..........particular property had been sold by auction sale in execution of a decree was purchased by one khajan singh, who obtained possession of the property under orders of the court, and thereafter the interest of the plaintiff ceased in the property, and they began to pay rent to khajan singh, and subsequently to his assignee kanhaiyalal radhakishan, the trial court, after evidence accepted the plea of the defendants, and dismissed the suit, and the same judgment was upheld on appeal.3. it was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the property originally belonged to roopnarain, and had been mortgaged with the plaintiff, and that thereafter in execution of a decree against roopnarain, the property was sold and purchased by khajan singh, but that nevertheless the defendants.....

Judgment:
ORDER

Bapna, J.

1. This is a revision by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of rent amounting to Rs. 151/7.

2. The allegations of the plaintiff were that the defendants were let into possession as tenants by document Ex. 1 dated 16-7-194.5, but the defendants had not paid rent from 1-12-1948 to 30-11-1951 for a period of three years. The defendants admitted the execution of the rent note as also their being let into possession by the plaintiff, but pleaded that the particular property had been sold by auction sale in execution of a decree was purchased by one Khajan Singh, who obtained possession Of the property under orders of the court, and thereafter the interest of the plaintiff ceased in the property, and they began to pay rent to Khajan Singh, and subsequently to his assignee Kanhaiyalal Radhakishan, The trial Court, after evidence accepted the plea of the defendants, and dismissed the suit, and the same judgment was upheld on appeal.

3. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the property originally belonged to Roopnarain, and had been mortgaged with the plaintiff, and that thereafter in execution of a decree against Roopnarain, the property was sold and purchased by Khajan Singh, but that nevertheless the defendants tenants continued to remain liable to the plaintiff-landlord as the tenancy had not been determined.

4. One of the modes of determination of tenancy is a cesser of the interest of the landlord. It is conceded that the alleged mortgage in favour of the petitioner being by an unregistered document, the rights of the mortgagee could not be enforced by a suit; but it is contended that thetenants could not deny the landlord's title, and in any case were bound under Section 108(m) of the Transfer of Property Act to redeliver the property at the end of the tenancy. The principle of estoppel is mentioned in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, and is only applicable so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The plea of cesser of the landlord's title is not denial of the landlord's title, and there is no estoppel against the tenants in the circumstances mentioned in this case. It has been laid down in a large number of cases that it is open to a tenant to prove a cesser of the landlord's title by ouster by the holder of a paramount title, and to attorn to the latter without actually going out of possession. The eviction of the tenant by the true owner need not be by actual dispossession of the tenant. If the true owner is armed with a legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted, even though the tenant is not put out of possession, the threat to put him out of possession amounts in law to eviction. In the present case, it was conceded that Roop Narain was the owner of the property, and his interest and title were purchased by Khajan Singh, and Khajan Singh got into possession of the property under warrant of delivery of possession of the Court. In the circumstances, it was open to the defendant to take UD the plea that the plaintiff's title had ceased. There is no evidence to show how his title continued even after the auction sale in execution of the decree against Roop Narain.

5. This revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed in limine.