R.D. Gattani, J.
1. The Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur Region, Udaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the R.T.A.') on 24.4.1970 fixed the scope of two stage carriages with one return trip on Banswara Ratanpur via Garhi, Sagwara, Dungarpur, Kherwada and Bichiwada route (hereinafter referred to as 'the' disputed route') Before that on 9.1.1968 the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur (petitioner in writ petition No. 2260 of 1970 and hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') had published a scheme under Section 68 C of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in respect of the following four routes:(1) Udaipur- Dungarpur via Rikhabdeo, Kherwada, (2) Udaipur-Ratanpur via Rikhabdeo, Kherwada, Bichiwara, (3) Udaipur Rikhabdeo, (4) Dungarpur-Ratanpur via Kumba, Thana, Bichipura. A few persons had already applied for the grant of non temporary permits on 'the disputed route'. These applications after getting them published as required under the law, came to be considered by 'the R.T.A.' on 28 7.1970. By its resolution of that date 'the R.T.A.' granted two temporary permits for three years under Section 68-F (1-C) and (1-D) one each to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers (petitioners in writ petitions No. 114 of 1971, 297 of 1971 and 298 of 1971) and Mohan Dass (Petitioner in writ petition No. 110 of 1971). It might be noted here that even though the applicants had applied for non-temporary permit, the permits granted were temporary in nature and that also with condition that the permits will be ineffective within three years to the extent 'the disputed route' or part of 'the disputed route' became a notified route. There was another condition also attached to the permits, but we are not concerned here with it.
2. Aggrieved by that resolution of 'the R.T.A.' three appeals were preferred before the Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the T.A.T.' one was preferred by Messrs Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur (petitioner in writ petition no. 32 of 1971) under Section 64(f) of 'the Act'; the second appeal was preferred by Satya Narayan (petitioner in writ petition No. 850 of 1971) and the third was filed by one Jagat Singh. The latter two appeals were preferred under Section 64(a) of 'the Act'.
3. 'The T.A.T.' by its impugned order dated 26-12-1970 'accepted the part' all the three appeals, set aside the permits granted to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass holding that 'the R.T.A.' had no jurisdiction to grant temporary permits to them. It remanded the case back to 'the R.T.A.' with a direction to reconsider the applications of Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers, Mohan Dass, Satya Narayan and Jagat Singh and simultaneously to consider other applications also in respect of this disputed route which might be pending or which might become ripe by that time. While doing so 'the T.A.T.' gave a finding that 'the R.T.A.' can grant non temporary permits under Chapter IV on 'the disputed route'. At the same time it allowed Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass to ply on their buses till the applications were considered by 'the R.T.A.' afresh.
4. Aggrieved by the impugned order of 'the T.A.T.' dated 26.12.1970 six writ petitions have been preferred. Three have been preferred by Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and the 4th by Mohan Dass. Two of the three appellants namely, Messrs Rajasthan Transport Corporation and Satya Narain have also preferred separate write petitions.
5. The seventh writ petition has been preferred by 'the Corporation' but that has been preferred against the original resolution of 'the R.T.A.' dated 28-7-1970 granting two temporary permits and in the following circumstances.
6. According to 'the Corporation' on 23.5.1970 it had submitted in application for the grant of a non-temporary permit on 'the disputed route' to 'the R.T.A.' Of course via Doongarpur only was mentioned in the application. 'The R.T.A.' while considering the applications on this route on 28.7.1970 did not consider the application of 'the Corporation' at all. On the other hand it gave the finding that 'the Corporation' had not filed any application for temporary permit for this route. It has, therefore, prayed for the quashing of the resolution of 'the R.T.A.' dated 28.7.1970, whereby it granted temporary permits to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass on 'the disputed route'.
7. The relief sought in the first four writ petitions is the quashing of the impugned order of 'the T.A.T.', whereas Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers have further sought a relief that the permit granted to them by 'the R.T.A.' may be deemed to have been granted under Chapter IV of 'the Act'. The 5th petitioner i.e. the Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur seeks to get the impugned order of 'the T.A.T.' quashed to the extent it has sent the case back to 'the R.T.A.' after clothing it with the power to grant non-temporary stage carriage permits on 'the disputed route. It has further prayed for quashing of the impugned order where by it allowed Messrs Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Das to continue plying their vehicles in the absence of any valid permit. Petitioner Satya Narain has challenged the impugned order to the extent it has remanded to case back to 'the R.T.A.' and allowed Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass to ply their buses even in the absence of a permit.
8. Before proceeding further it will be useful to note that the scheme published by 'the Corporation' in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 9.1.1968 under Section 68 C of 'the Act' relates to four routes. Out of these, portion Kherwara to Doongarpur of Udaipur Doongarpur route, portion Kherwara to Ratanpur of Udaipur-Ratanpur route and portion Bichiwara to Ratanpur of Doongarpur Ratanpur route over-lap portions of disputed route. The next thing to be noted is that radical amendments have been made in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by Central Act No. 56 of 1969 and most of these amendments came into force from 2 3.1970. The amendments very material for the purpose of decision of these writ petitions are (i) the introduction of definition of the word 'route' in Section 2(28A) of 'the fact' and the introduction of Section 68F(l A) to (1-D) in Chapter 4A of the Act'. The decision of these writ petitions will depend upon interpretation of Section 68 F(1-C) and (1-D) of 'the Act' and (ii) the impact of the definition of the word 'route' now introduced in 'the Act'.
9. So far as the part of the impugned order of 'the T.A.T.' allowing petitioners Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass to continue plying their buses even after cancellation of the permits in their favour, the learned Counsel of these parties frankly admitted that this part of the impugned order cannot sustain. Apparently when the law says that a stage carriage shall not be plied without a permit issued by the concerned authority and when the temporary permits granted by 'the R.T.A.' in favour of Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass were quashed by 'the T.A.T.' it does not stand to reason now could it at the same time allow these persons to continue plying their buses.
10. The main arguments were advanced by Shri Ram Raj Vyas, the learned Counsel for Messrs Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur, which were replied by Shri D.P. Gupta and Shri B.L. Maheshwari. Shri M.M. Vyas adopted the arguments of these two gentlemen.
11. The only argument of Shri Ram Raj Vyas left to be considered is based upon the provisions of Section 68-F (1-C) and (1-D) of 'the Act', which read as under:
68F(1-C): If no application for a temporary permit is made under Sub-section (1-A), the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant subject to such conditions as it may think fit, temporary permit to any person in respect of the area or route or portion thereof specified in the scheme and the permit so granted shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Under-taking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof.
68-F(1-D): Save as otherwise provided in subsection(l-A) or Sub-section (1-C), no permit shall be granted or renewed during the period intervening between the date of publication, under Section 68-C of any scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme in favour of any person of any class or road transport service in relation to an area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme:
Provided that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any area, route or portion thereof specified in a scheme published under Section 68-C expires after such publication such permit may be renewed for a limited period, but, the permit so renewed shall cease to be effective on the publication of the scheme under Sub-section (3) of Section 68 D.
It was vehemently urged by Shri Ram Raj Vyas that with the change in law as now introduced, the question of granting permits temporary or non-temporary either to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers or to Mohan Dass did not arise, as the permits granted in favour of them are in relation to portion of the route covered by the scheme published under Section 68-C of 'the Act.' The permits granted to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass are of Banswara-Ratanpur route via Garhi, Dungarpur, Kherwara and Bichiwara. It is an admitted position that excepting the Udaipur-Nathdwara route of the published scheme, the other three routes do over-lap different portions of 'the disputed route'. The question, therefore, arises whether the permits of the disputed route' can be said to be permits in relation to any of the route or portion of that route, which is covered by the scheme published under Section 68-C of 'the Act'. To say in other words simply because portions of three of the routes published under the scheme overlap different portions of 'the disputed route' as stated above, can it be said that the provisions of Section 68 F (1-D) of 'the Act' are attracted.
12. In these cases we are concerned with permits of stage carriages only. A permit of a stage carriage is either in respect of a route or in relation to an area Since the scheme published is in relation to four different routes only we can safely ignore the word 'area' used in Section 68 F (1-C) and (1-D) of 'the Act' and may concentrate ourselves upon the word 'route' only. And when we talk of route we have to presuppose a road track having two terminii. The word 'route' has been newly defined in 'the Act' as follows:
Section 2(28 A): 'route' means a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and Anr.:
This means a stage carriage permit for a route will always be in relation to two definite terminii. Therefore, if both the terminii of 'the disputed route' lie on any of the route of the published scheme, we can say that the permits granted to Messrs Rajendra Singh and Brothers or to Mohan Dass relates to the route or any portion of the route of the published scheme. Admittedly this is not the factual position. 'The disputed route' as stated above, is a very long route and portion only of the three routes of the scheme overlap different portions of 'the disputed route'. Since both the terminii i.e. Ratanpur and Banswara do not lie upon the routes or portions of the routes of the published scheme' the question of invoking of the provisions of Section 68 F(l-D) of 'the Act' does not arise in these cases. A similar view was taken by me while deciding S.B. Civil Misc Writ Petition No. 2215 of 1970, Ram Swaroop and Anr. v. The R.T.A. Udaipur and Anr. decided on 11.5.1971. Of course in that case the interpretation of Section 68 F(1-C) and not (1-D) of the 'Act' was involved, but that in my opinion hardly makes any relevant difference. Later on the question of interpretation of Section 68 F (1-D) of 'the Act' arose in S.B. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1926 of 1970, Messrs. Modern Transport, Kota v. State Transport Authority and Ors. decided on 7.7.1971 and the same view was adhered to.
13. The learned Counsel drew my attention to the same wordings appearing in Section 68-F(1-C) and (1-D) of 'the Act' which according to them connote different meaning. According to them the words used in Section 68-F (1-C) of 'the Act' are 'in respect of that area or route or portion thereof', whereas the words used in Section 63-F(l-D) of 'the Act' in the same context are 'in relation to an area or route or portion thereof....' Stress was laid upon the phrase 'in relation to' appearing in Section 68 F(1-D) of 'the Act' and it is said that it connotes a meaning different than connected by the phrase 'in relation to' appearing in Section 68-F(l-D) of 'the Act' and it is said that it connotes a meaning different than connoted by the phrase 'in respect of' used in Section 68-F (1 C) of 'the Act'. In this connection it is further urged that because of this difference even if a portion of any of the route overlaps a portion of 'the disputed route', Section 68 F (1-D) of 'the Act' will come into play.
14. The words 'relation and 'respect' find the following meanings in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary:
Relation: 1. the act of telling or recounting: Account 2: an aspect or quality (as resemblance) that can be predicated only of two or more things or parts taken together: Connection 3: the referring by a legal fiction of an act to a prior date as the time of its taking effect 4a(1): a person connected by consanguinity or affinity: Relative (2): a person legally entitled to a share of the Property of an intestate b: relationship by consanguinity or affinity: KINSHIP 5: Reference, Respect (in-to) 6 a: the state of being mutually or or reciprocally interested (as in social or commercial matters) b pa (1): Dealings Affairs (2): Intercourse (3): Sexual Intercourse.
I Respect:(act of looking back, fr. respectus, pp of respicers to look back regard, fr. respecers to look-more at SPY) 1: a relation to or concerned with something usual specified: Reference 2: an act of giving particular attention: Consideration 3a: High or special regard: esteem b: the quality or state of being esteemed: Honorc pl: expressions of respect or deference 4: Particulars, Detail-respectful, respectfully, respectfulness.
2. Respect:1 a; to consider worthy of high regards: Esteem b: to refrain from interfering with (-one's privacy) 2; to have reference to: Concern syn see Regard-re-spect-er.
A perusal of these would hardly reveal any such difference in the meaning of both phrases 'in relation to' and 'in respect of' as is sought to be advanced by Shri Ram Raj Vyas and Shri Raj Narain. The word 'respect' covers many meanings so also the word 'relation' does. But they are interconnected in the sense that they cover a common meaning as well. As such when one talks of 'a permit in relation to a route or a portion of route' and of a permit in respect of a route or portion of route', he does not convey different meanings.
15. In order to support their contention that these cases are covered by the provisions of Section 68-F(1-D) of 'the Act' learned Counsel placed reliance upon the following authorities of the Supreme Court viz: Abdul Gafoor, Proprietor, Shaheen Motor Service, Channoryapatna v. State of Mysore and Ors. : 1SCR909 Nilkanth Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. : AIR1962SC1135 C.P.C. Motor Service Mysore, v. State of Mysore and Anr. AIR 1866 SC 1661 Messrs. Standard Motor Union Private Ltd. v. The State of Kerala and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 273
16. The first case relates to the provisions of Section 68 F(1) of 'the Act' i.e. regarding an approved route and lays down that when an application under that sub-section is received, the question of taking recourse to the provisions of Section 57(3) of the 'the Act' i.e of publishing the scheme in the official Gazette for inviting objections does not arise as the concerned authority acts wholly in a ministerial capacity while dealing with such an application. In the first place this case relates to a notified route and in the second place the interpretation of the word 'route' did not arise in this case.
17. In the second case portion of route of private operation formed part of the route of notified scheme. It was, therefore, holding that portions are not different routes observed that private operator was completely excluded from that portion. For two reasons this authority also is of no avail here. In the first place this authority also relates to an approved scheme, where as the scheme in the instant cases, though published in 1068, is yet under the process of finalisation and as such cannot be called an approved or notified scheme. In the second place the Supreme Court did not take into consideration the distinction between 'route' and 'road' and had reason not to follow Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co., Ltd. v. Colombo-Ratanpura Omnibus Col. Ltd. AIR 1946 PC 137 in that respect. In the latter authority the distinction between 'route' and 'highway' was observed in the following words:
If 'route' has the same meaning as 'highway' in the Ordinance this argument must prevail, since admittedly an omnibus running on the highway from Panadura to Badulla will pass over the whole of the highway between Colombo and Ratanpura, but in their Lordships opinion it is impossible to say that 'route and highway' in the two Ordinances are synonymous terms.... A 'highway' is the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a 'route' appears to their Lordships' to be an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and Anr., and to be something distinct from the high way traversed.
18. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealing with the point observed as follows:
This distinction between 'route' and 'road' is relied upon by the appellants to show that the notified route, which we have called 'AB' was a different route from the routes for which renewal of permits was demanded, even though route 'AB' might have been a portion of the 'road' traversed by the omnibuses of the appellants plying on their 'routes'. The distinction made by the Privy Council is right; but it was made with reference to the words used in the Ordinances there under consideration. The question is whether a similar distinction can be made in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act
The Supreme Court refused to make this distinction and while doing so made the following observations:
This means that even these cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common sector, the curtailment by virtue of the notified scheme would be by excluding that portion of the route or, in other words, the 'road' as the national line and 'road' as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap. IV A, because you cannot curtail the route without curtailing a portion of the road, and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred, would also show that even if the route was different, the area at least would be the same. The ruling of the Judicial Committee cannot be made applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Chap, IV-A, where the intention is to exclude private operators completely from running over certain sectors or routes vested in State Transport Undertakings. In our opinion, therefore the appellants were rightly held to be disentitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions cannot be said to be different routes, but must be regarded as portions of the routes of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded under Section 68 F(2)(c) (iii) of the Act.
Since then 'route' has been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act and as such a distinction between 'route' and 'road' will have to be made. No case of any Indian Court has been brought to my notice which even after the introduction of the definition of word 'route' in 'the Act' has not recognised the distinction between 'route' and 'road'.
19. What has been said about Nilkanth Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. : AIR1962SC1135 equally applies to C.P.C. Motor Service Mysore v. State of Mysore and Anr. AIR 1866 SC 1661 and Standard Motor Union Private Ltd. v. The State of Kerala and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 273.
20. There is yet another aspect of the case, when viewed from the angle of the convenience of the travelling public. The scheme regarding the said four routes is as yet a published scheme only. Though it was in January, 1968, it could not be finalised yet in respect of even one of its routes. One does not know how many more years may pass before the scheme is finalised. If, therefore, no permit is to be given to a private operator in respect of a route, a portion only of which overlaps the route of a published scheme would it not result in great inconvenience and harassment to the travelling public. An example may be taken. A to B is a route of a scheme published under Section 68 C of 'the Act.' E to F is a route on which permits by private operators are sought after the publishing of the scheme regarding route A B. Though E to F route is a long route, it overlaps a short track say three-four miles between C to D which is a portion of the route A B. If the contention of Shri Ram Raj Vyas is to prevail then no permit for E to F route can be granted to any private operator. In that case the plight of the travelling public can be well imagined. According to Shri Ram Raj private operators may have permits for E to C and D to F but not E to F. In that case a person starting from E to F will first have to get down at C; wait for any vehicle at C then he will get down at D and then wait for the bus at D for F. And all this because a track of three miles i. e C to D is covered by a scheme published under Section 68-C of 'the Act'.
21. It might be stated here that when a published Scheme is approved, then the concerned State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority has got sufficient powers for the purpose of getting effect to the notified route or routes of that scheme vide Section 68-F(2) of 'the Act' which runs as under:
68. F (2). For the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority concerned may by order:
(a) refuse to entertain any application for the grant or renewal of any other permit or reject any such application as may be pending:
(b) cancel any existing permit;
(c) modify the terms of any existing permit so as to -
(i) reduce the permit ineffective beyond a specified date;
(ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised to be used under the permit;
(iii) curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route'. These powers can be exercised by 'the R.T.A.' in respect of the notified routes as and when the scheme is approved. But so long as the scheme is not approved, the position remains different.
22. As both the terminii, however, of 'the disputed route' do not fall upon any of the route or its portion of the published scheme, the provisions of neither Section 68-F(1-c) nor that of Section 68-F(l D) of 'the Act' are attracted to the present cases. This means that temporary permits under Chapter IV of 'the Act' cannot be granted on Ratanpur-Banswara route. As a corollary to this non-temporary permits under Chapter IVA can be granted. The impugned order of 'the T.A.T.' to that extent is, therefore, confirmed
23. Now I come to the part of the impugned order which speaks of the remand of the cases to the R.T.A. That part of the order runs as follows:.and hereby remand the cases of the appellants Shri Jagat Singh and Shri Satya Narain as also of the respondents M/s Rajendra Singh & Brothers and Mohandas back to the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur with the direction that it shall decide their applications for grant of non-temporary stage carriage permits on the said Bansawara-Ratanpur route afresh along with other applications for grant of non-temporary stage-carriage permits on the said route which might be pending before the said Regional Transport Authority and which might have become ripe for consideration, (SIC)n accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order.
24. Mr. D.P. Gupta has urged that 'the R.T.A.' could have granted non temporary permits as well on this route; that simply because it has named the permits granted to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers as temporary, 'the T.A.T.' was not justified in remanding the cases as the temporary permits could be legally treated as non-temporary as well. It is further said that all the material was available before 'the T.A.T.' and, therefore, also no remand was justified as it could have decided the cases on merits of the appellants before it and the persons who were granted permits. Lastly it is urged that in any case the order of the remand must have been restricted to the cases of the two appellants namely, Jagat singh and Satya Narain and the persons to whom the permits have been granted and that if the whole of the remand order is allowed to stand, then 'the R.T.A.' will have to consider all other applications in respect of 'the disputed' route' which might become ripe at the time when it proposes to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made in the remand order. That would certainly put to the petitioners at a great loss, because the cases of other fresh applicants whose applications were not ripe on 28-7-1970 when the permits were granted by the R.T.A.' will also be looked into. These contentions have been supported by Shri B.L. Maheshwari and by Shri M.M. Vyas, also.
25. I have given my anxious consideration to these contentions. I am of the view that the first contention has got no force. It is not by inadvertence only that the R.T.A.' used the word 'temporary' in respect of the permits granted to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass. It has specifically taken (SIC)course to Section 68-F(1-C) of 'the Act' after holding that' the Corporation, has not filed any application for temporary or non-temporary permit. In these circumstances, the permits in dispute cannot be ipso facto treated as non-temporary permits Coming to the question of the Corporations it has, no doubt, stated in para no. 5 of its writ petition that it submitted an application for the grant of non temporary permit on Ratanpur Banswara route to 'the R.T.A.' on 23-51970. This fact has been denied by the contesting respondents to this writ petition. 'The Corporation' has not been able to file any certified copy of that application, nor a receipt issued from 'the R.T.A.' office showing that such an application was submitted Annexure P. 2 filed by 'the Corporation' is, in my opinion, of no avail to it, because it has been marked as true copy by its own officer, which is certainly not justifiable Respondent Mohandass in his reply has, no doubt, admitted that one application of 'the Corporation' was published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 30-7-1970, though he has further stated that application was not for 'the disputed route'. The learned Counsel for 'the Corporation' laid stress upon this admission of Mohandas about the publication of the application of 'the Corporation' in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 30-7-1970, but, in my opinion, even this admission is of no further help to 'the Corporation', because when its application was published on 30-7-1970 and objections were invited in that respect, it could not have been taken into consideration on 28-7-1970 when 'the R.T.A' after considering the applications which were ripe so far granted permits to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass, To say in other words, if at all 'the Corporation' had filed any application, it was not ripe for consideration on the date when 'the R.T.A.' considered the applications for 'the disputed route'. Incidentally it might be stated here that 'the Corporation' in its writ petition has not prayed for the remand of the case so that its application may be taken into consideration. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the order of the remand of the case passed by 'the T.A.T.' is not justifiable. The material record was with it and it could have considered the cases of appellants Satya Narayan and Jagat Singh and grantees Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass inter se on merits and granted two permits to the two persons, who deserved the best. If the order of remand is maintained that would certainly put at loss not only to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass, but to Satya Narayan and Jagat Singh also, because by the time 'the R.T.A.' reconsiders the cases, there might be many other fresh applications ripe for consideration on 'the disputed routes.'
26. Before parting with the case it might be stated that on behalf of Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition filed by the Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur were raised. On behalf of Mohandass it was urged by Mr. B.L. Maheshwari that in view of the provisions of Section 68-F (3) of 'the Act' the appeal filed by the Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur before 'the T.A.T.' was not maintainable and as such this writ petition also. That sub section reads as follows-
68 F (3) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no appeal shall lie against any action taken, or order passed by the State Transport Authority or any Regional Transport Authority under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2).
Suffice it to say that this sub-section bars the filing of against any action taken or order passed by the concerned. Transport Authority under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 63-F of 'the Act'. 'The R.T.A.' while granting the permits to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass passed the resolution under the provisions of Section 68-F (1-C) and (1-D) of 'the Art' and not under Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Act. This objection has, therefore, no legs to stand.
27. On behalf of Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers it was urged that there is the finding of 'the T.A.T.' that Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur, did not file any objections in respect of any application of his clients and as such the writ petition was not maintainable vis-a-vis Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers. Since Mr. R.R. Vyas raised the contention that 'the T.T.A.' had no patent jurisdiction to grant any permit to private operators under Chapters IV A after the amendment of 'the Act' in 1969 it was thought advisable to ignore this objection and hear the writ petition.
28. As a result of the above discussion the 5 writ petitions namely those filed by Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers (No. 114 of 1971, 297 of 1971 and 298 of 1971), Mohan Dass (No. 110 of 1971) and Satya Narain (No. 850 of 1971) succeed & are hereby accepted. The writ petition filed by Rajasthan Transport Corporation, Udaipur (No. 32 of 1971) succeeds in part. The writ petition filed by 'the Corporation' also succeeds. The impugned order of 'the T.A.T.' is set aside in part i.e., so far it relates to the remand of the case and so far as it allowed Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass to continue plying their buses even after quashing of their permits granted by 'the R.T.A.' The part of the impugned order holding that 'the R.T.A. had no authority to grant temporary permits under Chapter IVA of 'the Act' to Messrs. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass and that non-temporary permits under Chapter IV of 'the Act' could be granted in the present case is confirmed. It is further directed that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (which is now working in place of 'the T.A.T. ') will consider the cases of Messers. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohan Dass i. e. the persons who were granted permits by 'the R.T.A.' and Shri Jagat Narain and Shri Satya Narain i. e. two of the three appellants, who had filed appeals before 'the T.A.T.' against the grant of the permits by 'the R.T.A.' on merits and take decision in the matter of the grant of two non-temporary permits on Ratanpur Banswara route to two persons out of these for. 'The Corporation' in its writ petition prayed for only one relief i. e. quashing of the resolution of 'the R.T.A.' granting temporary permits to Messers. Rajendra Singh and Brothers and Mohandass. This has already been done by 'the T.A.T.' and that part of the order of 'the T.A.T.' has been confirmed above by this Court as well. The parties shall bear their own costs in all the writ petitions.