M.L. Joshi, J.
1. This matter comes up for the disposal of the stay application. However, as the point involved it the Stay matter and the main petition befog the same it was taken for final disposal at the request of the parties.
2. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation hereinafter called the R.S.R.T.C. applied for temporary permits under Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter called the Act. An objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner to the grant of permits but despite the objection the permits were granted to the Corporation by its resolution dated 22nd of September, 1976. The petitioner has challenged this resolution by way of ac application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. The case of the petitioner as set out in the application Is that the petitioner was never heard on his objections and the same were decided by circulation without giving him reasonable opportunity of being beard; that the application under Section 62 of the Act does not contain any particulars of temporary need which is essential to constitute a valid application under Section 62 of the Act; and that the portion of the route on which permit is granted is a notified route and, therefore, permit cannot be granted on such route.
4. The R.S.R.T.C. has opposed the petition. Mr. Maheshwari has pressed before me the following contentions:
(1) That no case has been made out under Section 62 of the Act as neither the application discloses any particulars nor there is a specific finding as to the temporary need.
(2) That the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity of being beard on his objections and, therefore, order granting temporary permit is bad in law.
(3) That the permit could not have been given on the route as the portion of the route in question is a notified one.
5. Before I take up the contentions en merits I may first dispose of the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Munshi.
6. The first preliminary objection of Mr. Munshi is that the petitioner bad alternative remedy by way of an appeal and having not availed the same, be cannot invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. His submission is that the petitioner bad filed objections which objections did not succeed and stood impliedly rejected as the temporary permits were granted to the Corporation. I am not very much impressed with this preliminary objection. It is true that the petitioner had filed objections to the grant of temporary permit but the same were disposed of by circulation. There is nothing to show that he was given any reasonable opportunity of being beard It has been argued by Mr. Maheshwari that the petitioner was not even given a notice of hearing of objection. Mi. Munshi, however, contends that the intimation was given to the petitioner as there is an endorsement in the file to that effect that the petitioner was informed orally, It is not the case of the opposite party that the petitioner's signatures were taken at the time of oral intimation. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that the petitioner was given any intimation of bearing much lets the opportunity of beine heard on his objection. Further more it is not borne out from the record that the petitioner was ever intimated in writing the decision of the R.T.A. regarding the grant of temporary permit. In view of the peculiar facts end circumstances the plea of bar of alternative remedy is of no avail to the opposite patty.
7. The next preliminary objection of Mr. Munshi Is that the petitioner having not raised any objections as to the malidity of the application under Section 62 of the Act it was no more open to him now to raise such objection for the first time in the writ petition. I have perused the objections From the conjoint reading of paras 6 and 7 of the objection, such a plea can be spelled out. The petitioner has in para No. 6 said that the S.T.A.T. had rejected the application as there was no temporary need mentioned in the application. In para No. 7 the petitioner had made a reference that the grant of temporary permit will be against the decision of this Court. It is well to remember that this Court In catena of its decisions has held that in order to constitute a valid application it is incumbent on the petitioner to particularise the temporary need. There is therefore no substance in this preliminary objection either.
8. In the last a futile attempt was made that at least an alternative remedy by way of revision was available to the petitioner. I am not impressed with this objection either. The remedy by way of revision in the facts and circumstances of the case could not be said to be an efficacious add effective one and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be dislodged on such a plea. This preliminary objection is, therefore, also ruled out.
9. Taking up the first contention, it may be stated that a temporary permit could be granted only in the circumstances specified in Sub-clause (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 62(1) of the Act. Sub-clause (d) of course enables the R.T.A. to grant temporary permit to meet a particular temporary Deed. In column 4 of this application which relates to the purpose for granting temporary permit the respondent Corporation had simply mentioned-'For convenience in the interest of traveling public. The purpose shown is nothing be a bald statement without any particulars as to the temporary need. Indeed it is vague and does not meet with the requirements of Section 62(1)(c) of the Act. In Jagdieb Prasad v. State Transport S.R. Civil Writ Petition No. 147 of 1975 decided on 24.7.76 I bad held that the words to meet particular temporary need' occurring in Section 62(1)(c) of the Act had great significance as particular temporary need implies a specific need for which a temporary permit is asked or and the application which did not disclose the particulars of a temporary need was bad one in law. That judgment was challenged in Division Bench but it was affirmed by the Division Bench also vide Tikamchand v. S.T.A.T and Ors. D.B. Special Appeal No. 147 of 1975 decided on 12.8.75. In A.P. State Transport v. K. Venkataramlreddy (1971) SCC (III) 803. The Supreme Court held that an application under Section 62 of the Act which does not contain the particulars of the temporary need should not have been entertained and should have been d is missed in limine. To the similar effete is the view taken in Shri Kishan Sayara Devi v. State Trsnaport Authority AIR 1976 Raj. 164 and Mohrl. Yunus v. Regional Transport Authority S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1869 of 1970 decided on 20th of October, 1970. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not assail the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions He, however, made a reference to a Single Bench decision of this Court in Bherulal v. State (1976) WLN 458. In that case Sachar, J. bas taken a view which apparently rule counter to the catena of decisions of this Court, one of which was even affirmed by the Division B rich Even Sachar, J. had not dissented from the decisions of this but has tried to distinguish them, although the distinction pointed out is not of any substance. The weight of the authorities of this Court. Is against the view taken by Sachar J. and I am not prepared to depart from the established view of this Court which also has the approval of the Division Bench. Sachar J. has held that the grant of permit is merely an administrative act. With all respect I am on able to agree with him on this point. The grant of temporary permit baa to be made in the light of the relevant considerations specified in Section 62 of the Act after applying judicial mind and, therefore, it is of a quasi judicial character. In that view of the matter I am not prepared to concede to the contention of Mr. Munsbi that it in cot necessary to mention particulars of temporary need in the application under Section 62 of the Act. The view which I have taken on this point, I need not decide other points.
10. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs and the impugned order dated 22nd of September, 1975, is hereby quashed and the Corpora lion is restrained from plying its buses under the impugned permits.