M.L. Shrimal, J.
1. These two special appeals Nos. 47 and 49 of 1977, preferred by Nand Lal and Ganesh Lal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 are directed against the order, delivered in Civil wont petitions Nos. 1507 of 1976 and 1508 of 1976 on October 26, 1977; rejecting the writ petitions challenging the validity of the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, dated August 27, 1976, hiding that the transfers of the surplus land, transfer of 'which Was made after December 31, 1969, had had no right of hearing and consequently the appeals filed by them were not maintainable,
2. The facts giving rise to these special appeals are that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kota, (vide his order, dated July 12, 1976) refused to recognize the transfer of land made in favour of the appellants as the sale-deeds were executed after December 31, 19 9, and the Sub-Divisional Officer further hold that Bakhtawar Singh was liable to surrender 339 76 standard acres of land, being surplus land He was given an option to select for his-self and his sons land within the ceiling which he wanted to retain. It was urged that the Khatedar-tenant while exercising the option given to him included in the list of he acids (rendered, Khasra No. 39, measuring 29 Bighas and 1 Bitwa, situated in village Chatinda, as also Khasra No. 38, measuring 13 Bighas & 1 Bhswa of land, situated in village Bhojpura, alleged to have been transferred to petitioners Nandlal and Ganeshlal respectively. The petitioners raised an objection before the Sub Divisional Officer, bat without am success. The appeal find before the Revenue Appellate Authors y also resulted in fiasco
3. Aggrieved of the impugned orders, the petitioners instead of filing revision petitions before the Bard of Revenue, straightaway approached this Court, seeking re dress under Article 226 of the Constitution But both the writ petitions Nos. 1507 & 1508 of 1976 were dismissed by the learned Single judge.
4. As both these appeals emerge out of the same order and as common questions of law and facts are involved, they are bring disposed of by this common judgment
5. The contention of learned Counsel, appearing on bf half of the petitioners, is that statutory authority,' namely, the Revenue Appellate Authority, has acted in contravention of law in not interfering with or in not reversing the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, accepting the encumbered land. Earned Counsel further urged that the requirement of the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, is that where the person, surrendering excess lands, hold lands of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, he unencumbered lands shall so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands. It has also been submitted that at no stage of the proceeding any notice had been issued to the petitioners. Nonliving of the notices to the transferee petitioners violates the pineapples of natural justice. Placing reliance on Harnek Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab , learned Counsel argued that the petitioners were entitled to adequate opportunity to safeguard their interest under the proceeding, which culminated in adversely affecting their right to property.
6. The arguments advanced before the learned Single Judge were reiterated before us All these points, reiterated before us, have been exhaustively dealt with by the learned Sir gate Judge. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the concision in Harnek Singh's case A.I.R. 1972 Punjab and Haryana 232 (supra) dealt the the interpretation of Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1955, and that there is no corresponded g provision contained in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 It is a decision passed on the special facts of that case and is of no avail to the appellants. A perusal of Section 30 DD f the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 reveries that the transfer made upto Dec. 31, 1969 in favour of agriculturists, don incised in Rajasthan or in favour of Khatedar a' sons or brokers, intending to take the procession of agriculturists and capable of cultivating lands personally and who had affair ed the age of majority on or before the said date, could be recognized. The Sub division 1 Offered has rightly refused to recognize the transfers made in favour of the. petitioners vide his order, dated July 12, 1976. The appellant's have no grievance against the above order Their grievance relates to the manner of exercise of option by the Khatedar tenant and its acceptance by the Sub-divisional Officer and non-interference in the said order by the Revenue Appellate Authority
7. Now the questions, which need to be determined, are (i) what is the effect of not availing of the alternative remedy available to the petitioners; and (ii) whether the petit others had any high of notice against accepting the option exercised by the Khatedar-tenant, Major Bikhtawar Singh
8 In Smt. Dal Kanwar Bai v. Ram Singh and State of Rajasthan1976 RRD 136, a Single Bench of the Board of Revenue had set aside a senile order of the Sub-divisional Officer, accepting the surrender of land which was encumbered and as such the petitioners cannot be said to be correct in their submission that no useful purpose would have been served by filing a revision petition. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act i3 a se of contained Gote It provides for a complete machinery and recourse must by had to that machinery for redress and not to a petition under Article 226 of the situation It is not the begot of Article 226 of the constitution to convert this Court into an appellate of revision it Court. Whenever a litigant feels that revision it Court will not give him appropriate relief, there should be sorter thing more in a case to wan ant the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, something to show that it would be case of palpable injustice to ask the transferee to adopt a remedy provided by the Act The effect of 42nd amendment. of the Constitution is that the High Court previously had the freedom to issue a high prerogative writ notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, but it is now precluded from doing so because Article 226(3) of the Constitution provides that' no petition for redress of any injury referred in Sub-clause (b) or subclasses (c) of clause (1) she ail been retained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force.' Reference in this connection may be made to Jai Hanuman Tradng Co. Pot., Ltd. v. Commissioner of In ometax .
9. As regards the petitioners' right to be heard, suffice it to say, that the transfers of the lands made by a Khatedar-tenant after December 31, 1969, cannot be recognized and they are rendered ineffective against the State Government. For the purpose of determining surplus land of the Khatedars, such transfers are required to be ignored. Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land)(Government; Rules, 1963 made there under do not provide for the issuance of a notice to the transferees Under Section 30.E(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955, a duty has been cast on the person holding land in excess of the ceiling area to make a report of such possession and surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situated. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan tenancy Act, 1955, the person (i.e.. the Khatedar) retaining the possession of the land after April 1, 1966, is excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, is deemed to be a trespasser liable to adjustment from such excess la id and to pay papacy in accordance with Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The petitioners are purchasers pending proceedings. They were bound by the result of the pending ceiling proceedings, between Khatedar Bakhtawar Singh and State Government, at the time of alleged sale by the Khatedar in favour of the purchasers. Where a transfer is not recognized, the land covered by such transfer has to be treated as land of the Khatedar, whose land is being acquired. Thus, it is manifest that the legislate tire by necessary implication excludes the right of trail fore purchasers to be heard The truant re ire entitled to on reimbursed and the transferor is bound to restore to them the average obtained by him, Terry can also come reimburse not under Rule 22 of the Rules of l963, not of the compensation amide paid of he state Government to the transferor in respect of such land under Section (3)-G of the Act. Taus, under the scheme of Chapter III-B of the rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 the Legislature, by necessary implication, excludes the applicant ton of the principles of natural justice rogation Audi altered par tern in favour of the transferees. In sum, they have no right of being heard.
10. In the Union of India v J.N. Sinha and Aer A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 40, the question regarding the principles of natural justice came up for consideration while dealing with the fundamental rule No. 56 J. There Lordships, repelling similar contention, raised by the respondent in that case, observed as under:
It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Court should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures & the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision of there spec fishy or by necessary implication excludes the application of an or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice We ether the exercise of a power conferred should he made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upot, the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is confirmed and the effect of the exer case of Chat power
11. A series of legislation has been gradually adopted and provided for land r forms and for acquisition of right, title and interest in lard from the land holders and intermediaries. The motive behind the present Act is to ensure equitable distribution of agricultural land for securing the object that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed, as best to sub serve the common good, as enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The State acquires land under this Ac under the ceiling provisions not for making propitious for fair distribution of land amongst land is agricultures and other desert 11 prisons with a view to remove the disparity in the holdings of agricultural lat bend to increase agricultural products. That is why the leg Stature, in order to acquire expedition the surplus land, did not make an) provision under Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rules made three under regarding giving an of portent of being heard to the transferees, of the land whose transfers have not been recognized under the law of the land for ceiling purposes The principles of natural justice cannot be stretched to defeat the very purpose and object of the Act itself.
12. We find no infirmity in the orders of the learned Single Judge.
13. The two special appeals, being bereft of mercies are hereby dismissed in limine.