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Lal Chand Goyal Vs. Jeet Raj Tatia - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberS.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 540 of 1968
Judge
Reported in1977WLN(UC)53
AppellantLal Chand Goyal
RespondentJeet Raj Tatia
Cases ReferredAmbey Parsad v. Jaipur Metals and Electrical Ltd.
Excerpt:
rajasthan premises (control of rent & eviction) act, 1950 - section 14(2)--eviction decree passed against a tenant--he files an appeal--held, he continues to be tenant till disposal of appeal.;i have absolutely no hesitation in holding that a person against whom a decree of eviction has been passed continues to enjoy the status of a tenant till the appeal filed by him is his any adjudicated upon by a court of law.;(b) rajasthan premists (control of rent & eviction) act, 1950 - section 13(1)(h) personal necessity issue regarding determination of greater hardship framed and case remitted to lower court.;case remanded - - 3. the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has placed reliance on section 14(2) of the rajasthan premises (control of rent and eviction) act, 1950..........additional district judge no. 1, jodhpur dated september 17, 1968 upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned additional munsiff-magistrate no. 1. jodhpur dated may 8, 1968.2. the facts of the case, in brief, are that jeet raj filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant lal chand from a garage which constituted the suit property. the contention of the plaintiff was that he required the garage bonafide for himself and his family's personal use and occupation. the suit was decreed by the learned additional munsiff on may 8, 1968. the defendant feeling aggrieve d against the judgment and decree of the learned additional munsiff tilted an appeal before the learned additional district judge no. 1, jodhpur. this appeal was dismissed on september 17, 1968, and the judgment and.....
Judgment:

P.D. Kudal, J.

1. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District judge No. 1, Jodhpur dated September 17, 1968 upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional Munsiff-Magistrate No. 1. Jodhpur dated May 8, 1968.

2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Jeet Raj filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant Lal Chand from a garage which constituted the suit property. The contention of the plaintiff was that he required the garage bonafide for himself and his family's personal use and occupation. The suit was decreed by the learned Additional Munsiff on May 8, 1968. The defendant feeling aggrieve d against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Munsiff tilted an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur. This appeal was dismissed on September 17, 1968, and the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court was upheld. The defendant-appellant feeling aggrieved has come up in second appeal before this Court.

3. The learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant has placed reliance on Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), which provides that no decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it.

4. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent contended that the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was contended that the decree for ejectment has already been executed and the plaintiff, respondent has already been put into possession on 12-5-1971. It was further contended that the appeal filed by the defendant-appellant has become infructuous as tenant has been defined to mean the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is or, but for a contract express or implied would be payable for am premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act. The contention of the learned Counsel is that as the defendant-appellant is not continuing in possession of the suit property, he ceases to be a tenant, and as such, the appeal filed by him has become infructuous and rendered non-maintainable.

5. The learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant has contended that when the second appeal was filed he prayed for the stay of the proceedings, but the stay application was rejected on December 11, 1968. He further contended that for all intents and purposes of this appeal, which is nothing but a continuance of the suit, the defendant-appellant should be deemed to be continuing in possession of the suit property as a tenant. It was further contended on behalf of the defendant appellant that no party can be prejudiced by the actions of Court of law. It was also contended that the mere fact whether stay has been granted or refused will not change the t talus of a person who has appealed against the judgment and decree of the lower Courts.

6. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent placed reliance on A.A. Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami AIR 1971 Mad. 162 and Pooraram v. Hastimal 1967 RLW 395. On the strength of these rulings it was strenuously contended that the tenant ceased to have the status of the tenant once a decree of eviction has been passed against him under the provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel for the defendant-tenant placed reliance on Ambey Parsad v. Jaipur Metals and Electrical Ltd. 1967 RLW 234, and contended that the tenant evicted during the pendency of the appeal in execution of decree is tenant and entitled to the benefits of Section 13-A of the Act.

7. Having given my most anxious consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have absolutely no hesitation in holding that a person against whom a decree of eviction has been passed continues to enjoy the status of a tenant till the appeal filed by him is finally adjudicated upon by a Court of law. Section 14(2) of the Act provides that no decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be passed if the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it.

8. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears expedient and necessary in the interests of justice that the following issue be framed and remitted to the lower appellate Court for recording evidence and finding thereon within three months from today:

Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it

9. On receipt of the findings from the lower appellate Court, the appeal shall be listed for final disposal.

10. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent prays for leave to appeal against this order. The request for leave to appeal cannot be acceded to as, this is neither a final order, nor any substantial question of law is involved. The request is, therefore, refused.


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