Rajindar Sachar, J.
1. The respondents No. 2 and 3 filed a suit for a declaration that the land mentioned therein has been purchased by them from Bahadur Khan and Mst. Hamidan by a registered sale deed on 29-5 1963 for Rs. 2000/- and claiming that they should be declared Khatedar-tenant. The suit of the respondents No. 2 and 3 was dismissed on 13-10-1965 by the Assistant Collector. Respondents No. 2 and 3 filed an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority being the Appeal No. 733/1965.
2. It appears that the petitioners to the writ petition also claimed that they had purchased the land from the said Bahadur Khan and Mst. Hamidan by a registered sale-deed sometime on 13 3-1964 for Rs. 3000/-. On the basis of the said claim a mutation was affected in their favour on 25-3-1964. Respondents No 2 and 3 were aggrieved and went in appeal to the Collector, who remanded the matter back for further enquin. Aggrieved against that order the petitioners filed an appeal No. 600/1966 before the Revenge Appellate Authority. The petitioners also, after dismissal of the suit of the respondents No 2 and 3 by the Assistant Collector, filed a suit under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (to be called as 'the Act') for eviction of the respondents on the ground that the) had no title to the land. Respondents No. 2 and 3 applied to the Assistant Collector to stay the said suit, but the same was dismissed by the Assistant Collector by his order dated 11-8-66. Aggrieved by that order the respondents No. 2 and 3 filed an appeal being No 926/66 before the Revenue Appellate Authority.
3. All the three appeals namely 733/65, 600/66 and 926/66 came up for hearing before the Revenue Appellate Authority. The Re venue Appellate Authority first dealt with the Appeal No. 733/1965. The appeal was allowed and the suit of respondents No. 2 and 3 was decreed.
4. After decreeing respondents No. 2 and 3 suit the Revenue Appellate Authority took up the appeal by the petitioners namely 600/1V66, which was an appeal against the order of the Collector remanding the mutation matter. The Revenue Appellate Authority took the view that as the respondents No. 2 and 3 have been held to be Khatedar in the suit property there was no point in continuing the mutation proceedings; and held the appeal to have become anfractuous and dismissed the same.
5. The Revenue Appellate Authoirty then dealt with the appeal No. 925/196, which had been filed by the respondents No. 2 and 3 against the order of the Assistant Collector refusing to state the suit filed by the petitioners The Revenue Appellate Authority took the view that as the suit by respondents No. 2 and 3 was being decreed (in Civil Appeal No. 733/1965) by Which they were had to be Khatedar tenants there was no strength left in the suit filed by the petitioners claiming to be Khatedar-tenant against the respondents No. 2 and 3 on the ground that the were the passers. It consequently dismissed the suit of the petitioners which was penting in the lower court and also dismissed the appeal No. 925/1966 filed by the respondents No. 2 and 3 against the order of the lower court refusing to stay the suit, as it had become in fructuous.
6. The petitioner was aggrieved and filed a revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has agreed with the Revenue Appellate Authority that the sale in favour of respondents No. 2 and 3 was earlier in. point of time to the alleged sale in favour of the petitioners arid, therefore, the respondent. No. 2 and 3 have been right held to be Khatedir by the Revenue Appellate Authority and dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner. The present writ petition has been filed against the order of the Board of Revenue.
7. Mr. Soral, learned Counsel for the petitioners, could net satisfy us that the decision of the Board of Revenue, in any way, suffers from infirmity, The finding by the Board that the same was for consideration in favour of the respondents No. 2 and 3 is a finding of fact and under Article 226 of the Constitution we are unable to take a different were from that taken by the Board of Revenue. The result is that the decision of the courts below that the respondents No. 2 and 3 have become Khateda is by virtue of sale in their favour, is unassailable.
8. Mr. Soral had then sought to pursuade as to hold that the dismissal of the suit filed by the petitioner which was pending in the lower court by the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue was illegal. The argument is that the suit which was pending in the court of the Assistant Collector could not have been dismissed by the Board in proceedings in miscellaneous matters when the said suit was still pending in the lover court It is not disputed that the petitioner was a part) to the suit filed by the respondents No. 2 and 3. The very point whether the respondents No. 2 and 3 were in possession in pursuance of a valid title was decreed in their favour when their suit was decreed in Appeal No. 733/IJJ65 Once the Board of Revenue found the respondents No. 2 and 3 to be in authorised occupation of the land and Khatedar the suit of the petitioner pending in the first court for eviction of respondents No. 2 and 3 on the ground that they were trespassers was obviously futile and no longer maintainable any had to be necessarily dismissed. It may be that technically the respondents No. 2 & 3 may have gone to the first court had the suit been dismissed trailer than having been dismissed by the Appellate Authority. But that would only be a difference without, any significance. Once a decision had been given in a suit earlier filed by the, respondents No. 2 and 3 holding them to be Khatedars, there was nothing left in the suit later on filed by the petitioners fir a declaration that respondents No. 2 and 3 were trespasses The suit of the petitioners, thus, was barred b) constructive res judicata. In that view, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by the dismissal of his suit by the Appellate Authority, because in any case if would have met, the same fate at the hands of the Assistant Collector.
9. It is well settled that jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked unless serious prejudice and substantial injury has been caused to the petitioner. In the present case, we do not find any reason to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court as no prejudice appears to have been caused to the petitioner. The writ petition has no force and the same is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.