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Mohd. Irshad @ Dilshad Vs. State of Rajasthan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtRajasthan High Court
Decided On
Case NumberD.B. Criminal Appeal No. 620 of 2000
Judge
Reported inRLW2005(2)Raj1106; 2005(1)WLC255
ActsCode of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973 - Sections 154, 157, 161, 162, 313 and 357(3); ;Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 34, 300, 302, 307 and 341
AppellantMohd. Irshad @ Dilshad
RespondentState of Rajasthan
Appellant Advocate Bajrang Lal Sharma, Sr. Adv.,; Shital Das,; Babu Lal Sha
Respondent Advocate M.L. Goyal, Public Prosecutor
DispositionAppeal dismissed
Cases ReferredRachhpal Singh v. State of Punjab
Excerpt:
.....deposed that after the incident he was badly disturbed therefore he could not name naushad. there is incised wound of size 3cm x 1 cm x though and though inter costal muscles and plura in 8th inter costal area margins are clear cut regular well defined. bharat fakira dhiwar ((2002) 1 scc 622) it was held that merely because the articles recovered at the instance of accused from a place open and accessible to other evidence would not become unreliable when those articles were concealed by the accused there. , it is well within the jurisdiction of the high court to award compensation to the family of victim but compensation should commensurate with the capacity of the accused to pay as also other facts and circumstances of the case like the gravity of the offence, the needs of victim's..........placed on alamgir v. state, alamgir v. state ((nct delhi) (2003)1 scc 21) state of u.p. v. nahar singh, state of u.p. v. nahar singh ((1998)3 scc 561) and anil kumar v. state of u.p., anil kumar v. state of u.p. ((2003)3 scc 569) in support of the submission that since the scribe of the fir was not an eye witness the case of the accused was not prejudiced and the testimony of eye witnesses was creditworthy and rightly relied upon by the trial judge.14. in alamgir v. state (nct delhi) (supra), it was held that if a relevant fact not mentioned in the statement under section 161 but stated before the court by the witness that would not be a ground for rejecting the evidence on that aspect if the testimony of the witnesses is otherwise credit worthy and acceptable.15. in state of u.p. v......
Judgment:

Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.

1. The appellant (hereinafter described as 'accused') was placed on trial before the learned Special Judge (Sati Nivaran) Rajasthan and Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Sessions Case No. 79/1997. Learned Judge vide judgment dated September 26, 2000 convicted and sentenced the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC to suffer Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default to further suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for One Year.

2. Put briefly the prosecution case is that the informant Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu (PW.6) submitted a written report at 7.00 PM of February 28, 1996 at the Police Station Ramganj, Jaipur with the averments that around 5 PM on the said day when he was standing near Nagina Mandi, Irshad, Ashfaq and Guddu suddenly caught hold of Siraj (now deceased) and Dilshad inflicted blow on the left armpit of Siraj. The police station Ramganj Jaipur registered a case for the offences under Sections 307, 341 and 34 IPC and investigation commenced. Injury sustained by Siraj got examined, which was described in the injury report (Ex.P-10) as under:-

'Stab Incised wound of size 3 x 1cm x depth? Placed at Lt. side lower part of chest at Ant. Axillary line. The wound margins are regular and clean cut well defined with fresh bleeding.'

Since Siraj succumbed to the said injury the case was converted under Section 302 IPC. Post Mortem on the dead body was performed vide Post Mortem Report (Ex.P-13), according to which deceased sustained following ante mortem injuries:-

'(1) Stitched wound of size 28cm with 25 stitches over Rt. Para medial place of front of abdomen.

(2) Stitched wound of size 24 cm with stitch over left side front of chest, 3cm below nipple from mid stemal line to left inter part of Axilla.

(3) Stitched wound of size 3, 3/4cm over left side lower part of chest laterally in 8th (Eighth) Inter Costal Space.

(4) Stitched wound of size 2cm with dranage tube in left 7th (Seventh) Inter Costal Space aid thoresic cavity deep.

On dissection:

The stitched wound over abdomen has 25 stitches with tensear sukurs aid underneath muscles are also found stitched peritoneal is found stitched and peritoneal cavity containing about 300cc haemorrhagic fluid. Further examination shows there is stitching in area 5cm obliquely left done of diaphagne with tissue staining is present.

On dissection of chest:

The stitched wound injury No. 2 is injurious part of chest to left Axilla in 6th Inter Costal space and further exploration shows there is Inter Costal muscles are found partial stitches at place in 6th Inter Costal space and stitched wound of size 2cm with dranage tube is lying in 7th Inter Costal space with one stitched aid b/o thorasic cavity deep (Probably done surgically). On further exploration of injury No. 3 which is in 8th Inter Costal space externally. There is Incised wound of size 3cm x 1cm x though and though Inter Costal muscles and plura in 8th Inter Costal area margins are clear cut regular well defined. Further wound reached upto left lung lower lobe antuid laterally where the wound is stitched of size 5cm long with haematoma formation wound cut. There is about 300cc of the blood is present in left plura cavity. The lower side of 7th rib underneath wound is found cut in area of 1/2 x 1/4cm x though and though with tissue staining and haematoma formation around it are muscular haematoma present in Inter Costal area underneath.

The cause of death was shock and haemorrhage brought about as the result of injuries to vital organs. The injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.'

3. On completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. In due course the case came up for trial before the learned Special Judge (Sati Nivaran) and Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Charge under Sections 302 and 341 IPC was framed against the accused, who denied the charge and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined as may as 20 witnesses. In the explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused claimed innocence and stated that he in fact was Irshad but wrongly described as Dilshad. Three defence witnesses were examined and 37 documents were exhibited to show that the accused was known as Irshad and not Dilshad. Learned trial Judge on hearing final submissions convicted and sentenced the accused as indicated herein above.

4. The first contention of Mr. Bajrang Lal Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, was that even according to first information report (Ex.P-4) the person who inflicted knife blow was Dilshad and not Irshad. Irshad was the person who caught hold the deceased alongwith Ashfaq and Guddu. Evidently Irshad and Dilshad were two different persons, but strangely the prosecution had clubbed two persons Irshad and Dilshad into one as Irshad @ Dilshad'. Our attention was drawn to the statement of Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-3) on February 29, 1996, wherein Mohd. Shafiq stated that at the time of drawing the report Naushad was wrongly mentioned by him as 'Dilshad'. We were taken through the documents Ex.D-8 to Ex.D-39 and the statements of defence witnesses to show that Irshad was never known as Dilshad. It was argued that the trial judge in the impugned judgment did not frame the important question as to whether Dilshad and Irshad was the same person. Finding arrived at by the trial Judge in para 19 of the judgment was criticised from various angles. It was canvassed that the facts contained in the first information report can not subsequently be changed. Reliance was placed on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala ((2001) 6 SCC 181) wherein their Lordships of Supreme Court indicated that earliest first information of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirement of Section 154 Cr.P.C. There can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.

5. It was next contended that since the FIR was not transmitted forthwith to the Court of Magistrate by the investigating agency, inference could be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated in the case. Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar, Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar ((2002) 9 SCC 147) was cited in support of this contention wherein it was held thus:- (Para 7)

'Sending the copy of the special report to the Magistrate as required under Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code is the only external check on the working of the police agency, imposed by law which is required to be strictly followed. The delay in sending the copy of the FIR may by itself not render the whole of the case of the prosecution as doubtful but shall put the court on guard to find out as to whether the version as stated in the court was the same version as earlier reported in the FIR or was the result of deliberations involving some other persons who were actually not involved in the commission of the crime. Immediate sending of the report mentioned in Section 157 Cr.P.C. is the mandate of law.'

6. Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the ratio indicated in State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra ((1996) 10 SCC 360) wherein with reference to Section 161 Cr.P.C. following observations were made:- (Para 7)

'The evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused, but it can be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted. The fact that the hostile witnesses having given the statements about the facts within their special knowledge under Section 161 recorded during investigation, have been resiled from correctness of the version in the statements without giving any reason as to why the investigating officer could record statements contrary to what they had disclosed shows that they had no regard for truth; they fabricated the evidence in their cross examination to help the accused which did not find place in their Section 161 statements.'

7. Reliance was also placed on Husna v. State of Punjab, Husna v. State of Punjab ((1996) 7 SCC 382) wherein their Lordships of Supreme Court indicated as under:- (Para 6)

'As already noticed in the FIR the names of both the appellants were found missing. They were only named in the supplementary statements of PW.1 recorded during the investigation and in our opinion that statement, which was recorded during the investigation was hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and the Trial Court could not have relied upon the same as a part of the FIR. All the three appellants are brothers. No over act has been ascribed to Rupa, appellant during the entire occurrence. It seems rather improbable that if PW.1 had allegedly snatched away a pistol from Rupa, appellant before Husna fired a shot at Satish Kumar, he would not have fired the same to prevent Husna from firing the shot. Besides no empty recovered from the spot has been connected by the ballistic expert with the pistol allegedly recovered from Rupa, appellant. After carefully analysing the evidence on the record, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has not been able to satisfactorily establish the case against the appellant Rupa beyond a reasonable doubt. The possibility that he was named being the brother of Husna cannot be ruled out. His presence at the time of occurrence has not been satisfactorily proved. His conviction and sentence for the various offences as recorded by the Trial Court therefore cannot be sustained.

8. Reference was also made to State of Haryana v. Chandvir and Ors., State of Haryana v. Chandvir and Ors. ((1996) 8 SCC 678) and learned Senior Counsel canvassed that the witnesses who fabricated and improved their version from stage to stage cannot be relied upon.

9. Sum and substance of the submissions of learned Senior Counsel was that since the injury was attributed to Dilshad and Dilshad and Irshad were two different persons and scribe of the FIR was not produced the case of the accused was prejudiced and the finding arrived at by learned trial judge could not be sustained.

10. Refuting the submissions on the other hand Mr. S.R. Surana, learned counsel for the complainant contended that it was established beyond reasonable doubt at the trial that it was the present accused who inflicted knife injury on the person of deceased. Referring para 5 of Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), learned counsel urged that it is not the requirement of law that the minutest details be recorded in the FIR lodged immediately after the occurrence. The fact of the state of mental agony of the person making the FIR who is generally under the shock of the occurrence reported should be kept in mind.

11. Mr. Surana learned counsel urged that the exaggeration shown in the testimony of prosecution witnesses did not fundamentally change the nature of the case. What needed to be seen was whether the version presented in the court was substantially similar to what was stated during investigation. Reliance was placed on Sunil Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, Sunil Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi ((2003) 11 SCC 367).

12. Mr. Surana, learned counsel referred Surjit Singh @ Gurmit Singh v. State of Punjab, Surjit Singh @ Gurmit Singh v. State of Punjab (1993 Supp.(l) SCC 208) wherein there was confusion about the names of the accused and it was held as under:- (Para 9)

'First Information Report is not an encyclopedia of the entire case and even not a substantive piece of evidence. It has value, no doubt, but only for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the maker. Here the maker was young woman who had lost her husband before her eyes. The omission or misdescription of these details in the FIR which was recorded most promptly, within three hours of the occurrence, would not tell on the prosecution case or the statements of the eye witnesses with regard to the participation of the appellant in the crime. He had taken a leading and prominent part in spearheading and committing it. For these reasons the reversion of acquittal by the High Court was right.'

13. Reliance was also placed on Alamgir v. State, Alamgir v. State ((NCT Delhi) (2003)1 SCC 21) State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh ((1998)3 SCC 561) and Anil Kumar v. State of U.P., Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. ((2003)3 SCC 569) in support of the submission that since the scribe of the FIR was not an eye witness the case of the accused was not prejudiced and the testimony of eye witnesses was creditworthy and rightly relied upon by the trial judge.

14. In Alamgir v. State (NCT Delhi) (supra), it was held that if a relevant fact not mentioned in the statement under Section 161 but stated before the court by the witness that would not be a ground for rejecting the evidence on that aspect if the testimony of the witnesses is otherwise credit worthy and acceptable.

15. In State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (supra), it was observed that in the absence of cross examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of witness remained unchallenged and it ought to have been believed.

16. Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. (supra), was the case wherein it was indicated that since the scribe was not an eye witness, no prejudice was caused to the accused and no adverse inference could be drawn against the prosecution due to the non-examination of the scribe of the FIR.

17. We have pondered over the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record. The prosecution case is founded on the testimony of Muzaffar Ali (PW.1), Abdul Rashid @ Kale Khan (PW.2), Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu Khan (PW.6), Umardin (PW.7), Mehraj Khan (PW.8), Alladiya (PW.10), Samaullah Khan (PW.11) and Roshan (PW.12). All these witnesses deposed that it was Irshad @ Dilshad who inflicted knife blow on the left armpit of Siraj. These witnesses identified the accused as Irshad @ Dilshad in the Trial Court. They have categorically stated that Irshad @ Dilshad was one person. Informant Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu Khan (PW.6) in his cross examination stated that he got the FIR written by one Gani Bhai in the Hospital around 7 PM. While police asked him to submit the report. He further deposed that after the incident he was badly disturbed therefore he could not name Naushad. He also deposed that Irshad @ Dilshad was one person and known to him for the last 15 years. At the time of drawing report he had described Irshad @ Dilshad but because of mental disturbance he could not properly notice the facts stated in the report.

18. Bashir Khan (PW.5) and Gopal Singh (PW.19) were the Motbirs of arrest memo (Ex.P-6) of the accused. Both these witnesses deposed that in their presence Irshad @ Dilshad was arrested and they put their signatures on the arrest memo. No question was asked from these witnesses in the cross examination that Irshad was not Dilshad and Irshad @ Dilshad was wrongly written in the arrest memo.

19. Hanuman Singh SHO (PW.18) registered FIR No. 80/96 and sent it to Gopal Puri, S.I. (PW.13) for investigation. The incident occurred at 5 PM and the report was lodged at 7 PM. The report reached at 2 PM on March 2, 1996 in the court of Magistrate. Hanuman Singh and Gopal Puri were not cross examined on the aspect of delay in sending the FIR.

20. We may summarise the fact situation as under:-

(i) As per the FIR Irshad, Ashfaq and Guddu caught hold of Siraj and Dilshad inflicted knife blow on the left armpit of Siraj who succumbed to the injury in the Hospital.

(ii) In the course of investigation arrest memo was drawn wherein Irshad @ Dilshad was shown to be arrested. Bashir Khan and Gopal Singh were the motbirs of arrest memo who categorically deposed at the trial that Irshad @ Dilshad was arrested in their presence. Testimony of these witnesses could not be shattered in the cross examination since they were not cross examination on the aspect that Irshad and Dilshad were two different persons.

(iii) Informant Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu Khan deposed at the trial that Irshad @ Dilshad was one person. This witness explained in the cross examination that since he was under the shock of the occurrence he could not name the accused properly. Mohd. Shafiq @ Babu Khan, Muzaffar Ali, Abdul Rashid @ Kale Khan, Umardin, Mehraj Khan, Alladiya, Samaullah Khan and Roshan identified the accused in the Trial Court as Irshad @ Dilshad.

(iv) Gani Bhai, the scribe of the FIR was not examined by the prosecution.

(v) Hanuman Singh SHO and Gopal Puri SI who investigated the case were not cross examined on the aspect of delay in sending the FIR.

(vi) The accused in his explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Stated that he was Irshad and not Dilshad. Three defence witnesses (including father of accused) were produced and 37 documents were got exhibited to show that the accused was known as Irshad and not Dilshad.

(vii) FIR was lodged within two hours of the incident.

21. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and on a careful scrutiny of material on record we are of the view that it was the present accused who inflicted knife injury on the person of the deceased. It is no doubt true that in the written report which was lodged within two hours of the incident, Irshad was described as having caught hold of the deceased along with Ashfaq and Guddu and injury on the person of deceased was attributed to Dilshad but the informant in his statement at the trial deposed that at the time of drawing the report he was under the shock of occurrence. Even the exaggeration shown in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., in our opinion, do not fundamentally change the nature of the allegations levelled against the present accused since he was correctly identified in the Trial Court by all the eye witnesses as Irshad @ Dilshad. In the arrest memo also the present accused was described as Irshad @ Dilshad and motbirs of arrest memo identified the present accused at the trial as Irshad @ Dilshad. These Motbirs were not cross-examined on the aspect that Irshad and Dilshad were two different persons. Since the evidence of motbirs of arrest memo viz. Bashir Khan and Gopal Singh remained unchallenged we find ourselves unable to reject it. In regard to the contention of non-examination of Gani Bhai, the scribe of FIR, we find the same as devoid of merit. Since the scribe was not an eye witness no prejudice was caused to the accused and no adverse inference could be drawn against the prosecution due to non-examination of the scribe. The omission or misdescription of the details in the FIR which was recorded most promptly, within two hours of the occurrence, would not tell on the prosecution case or the statements of the eye witnesses with regard to the participation of the present accused in the crime. FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire case and even not a substantive piece of evidence. It has value, no doubt, but only for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the maker. (Vide Surjit Singh @ Gurmit Singh v. State of Punjab (supra). Since no question was asked in the cross examination of the Investigating Officers on the aspect of delay in sending the FIR, we can not discard unchallenged testimony of the Investigating Officers.

22. It was next contended by Mr. B.L. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, that as per injury report (Ex.P-10) Siraj sustained only one injury whereas according to Post Mortem Report (Ex.P-13) as many as four ante mortem injuries were found on the dead body. We were taken through the statement of Dr. Y.N. Verma (PW. 17) who in his cross examination deposed that the said four injuries were the result of four blows inflicted on the person of the deceased and all the four injuries were responsible to cause shock and haemorrhage that resulted in the death of the deceased.

23. We have pondered over the submission and weighed the statement of Dr. Y.N. Verma. Dr. Verma in his cross examination also deposed that this possibility could not be ruled out that injuries No. 1 and 2 could be the result of surgery. As already noticed by us that in the post mortem report the autopsy surgeon wrote as under:-

On dissection:

The stitched wound over abdomen has 25 stitches with tensear sukurs aid underneath muscles are also found stitched peritoneal is found stitched and peritoneal cavity containing about 300cc haemorrhagic fluid. Further examination shows there is stitching in area 5cm obliquely left done of diaphagne with tissue staining is present.

On dissection of chest:

The stitched wound injury No. 2 in injurious part of chest to left Axilla in 6th Inter Costal space and further exploration shows there is Inter Costal muscles are found partial stitches at place in 6th Inter Costal space and stitched wound of size 2cm with dranage tube is lying in 7th Inter Costal space with one stitched aid b/o thorasic cavity deep (Probably done surgically). On further exploration of injury No. 3 which is in 8th Inter Costal space externally. There is Incised wound of size 3cm x 1 cm x though and though Inter Costal muscles and plura in 8th Inter Costal area margins are clear cut regular well defined. Further wound reached upto left lung lower lobe antuid laterally where the wound is stitched of size 5cm long with haematoma formation wound cut. There is about 300cc of the blood is present in left plura cavity. The lower side of 7th rib underneath wound is found cut in area of 1/2 x l/4cm x though and though with tissue staining and haematoma formation around it are muscular haematoma present in Inter Costal area underneath.

24. It is thus evident that prior to death the deceased had undergone operation. It is no doubt true that hypothetical answers were given by Dr. Y.N. Verma in the cross examination, but the same cannot corrode credibility of eye witnesses. In Ramakant Rai v. Madan Lal, Ramakant Rai v. Madan Lal (2003(2) WLC (SC) Criminal 719) their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated thus:- (Para 22)

'It is trite that where the eye witnesses account is found credible and trustworthy medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Benthan said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eye witnesses account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be credit worthy; consistency with the undisputed facts the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box, their power of observation etc. Than the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.'

25. We thus do not find any merit in this contention of learned Senior Counsel that post mortem report creates doubt in the truthfulness of the prosecution story. Statement of Dr. Y.N. Verma does not create such doubt which is neither free from a zest for abstract speciculation nor from an over emotional response. It is imaginary and trivial and does not base upon reason.

26. We also do not find any substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel that since alleged recovery of knife at the instance of the accused was made from the place accessible to all, the substratum of prosecution story stood shattered. In Maruti Rama Naik v. State of Maharashtra, Maruti Rama Naik v. State of Maharashtra ((2003) 10 SCC 670) on which reliance was placed the Apex Court held that recovery of weapon from a place accessible by other people and that too almost after nine days, was not sufficient to base conviction without further acceptable corroboration. But in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar ((2002) 1 SCC 622) it was held that merely because the articles recovered at the instance of accused from a place open and accessible to other evidence would not become unreliable when those articles were concealed by the accused there. In the case on hand it is established that knife was concealed in Kabristan in such a manner that it was out of visibility of others in normal circumstances. Therefore evidence of prosecution in regard to recovery of knife at the instance of the accused cannot be discarded.

27. We have also considered this question although not raised, as to whether the accused on the allegation of causing single injury on the person of deceased, could be held guilty under Section 302 IPC? It is trite that in a murder case number of injuries is irrelevant and it not always the determining factor in ascertaining the intention and it is the nature of injury, part of body where it is caused and weapon used which are indicators of fact whether accused had intention or not. In the case on hand the accused stabbed the victim on the left side of lower part of chest at Ant. Axillary line causing stab incised wound measuring 3 x 1cm x depth. The wound margins were regular and clean cut. Such an injury in our opinion not only exhibits the intention of the accused in causing the death of the victim but also the knowledge of the accused as to the likely consequence of such attack which could be none other than causing the death of the victim. Looking to the nature of injury, part of the body of the deceased and the size of the knife we are of the view that the act of the accused came under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC and the accused was rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 302 IPC.

28. For these reasons, we find no merit in the appeal and the same stands dismissed.

29. That takes us to the application submitted by Mst. Hanifa Begum, the mother of victim, seeking compensation from the accused. We have scanned the application and the documents appended with it. Under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., it is well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to award compensation to the family of victim but compensation should commensurate With the capacity of the accused to pay as also other facts and circumstances of the case like the gravity of the offence, the needs of victim's family etc. (Vide Rachhpal Singh v. State of Punjab), Rachhpal Singh v. State of Punjab ((2002) 6 SCC 462) Since there is nothing on record to show the capacity of the accused to pay compensation we find ourselves unable to issue any direction under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. The application of Mst. Hanifa Begum accordingly stands rejected.


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