Kishan Mal Lodha, J.
1. These two appeals under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 arises out of the common judgment dated May 9, 1985 of the learned single Judge, by which the petitioner appellant's two writ petitions : No. 2057/82 and 463/85, were dismissed.
2. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2057/82 Prem Prakash v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. was filed seeking to quash the order Ex. 2 dated October 12, 1981 of the Collector and District Magistrate Bikaner and Ex. 3 dated April 28, 1982 of the Collector & Distt. Magistrate Bikaner. It may be stated that Ex. 2 is the no objection certificate, issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, Bikaner under the Rajasthan Cinematographs Act and Ex. 3 is the permission letter for raising construction. This was conditioned that before the construction is commenced, respondent No. 4 Jugraj Sethia, who is partner of respondent No. 3, should obtain certificate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
3. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 463 of 1985 was filed by the petitioner for quashing the communication Anx. 4 dated October 16, 1984 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government and Anx. 5 dated January 3, 1985 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the name of Governor of Rajasthan,
4. The writ petitions were contested by respondents No. 3 and 4. The learned single Judge dismissed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2057 of 1982, observing that the petitioner appellant was, not pursuing the writ petition bonafide and that his conduct does not justify any interference by this Court as he slept over his right.
5. We have carefully considered the reasons given by the learned single Judge in coming to this conclusions in the light of the arguments that have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant for assailing the aforesaid conclusions
6. We may state at once that having considered the reasons given by the learned single Judge, we find ourselves in complete agreement with him and do not feel any necessity of repeating them. The conclusion of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition No. 2057/82 is correct, and does not call for any interference.
7. So far dismissal of Writ Petition No. 463/85 is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the order on the ground that the Dy. Secretary who sent the communication (Anx. 4) dated Oct. 16, 1984 has jurisdiction to pass the order. In other words, it was submitted that the Dy. Secretary was not-competent to issue the communication Anx. 4, which he did and that the principles of natural justice have been violated in passing the orders Annxs. 4 and 5. which are challenged in the aforesaid writ petition. The learned single Judge while meeting the objection that the Deputy Secretary had no power to issue orders regarding conversion of land from industrial to commercial purpose, has stated that Annx. 4 is merely a communication by the Deputy Secretary to the Government. The first word used in Annx. 4 is funsZ'kkuqlkj A perusal of Annx. 4 shows that the permission of conversion from industrial to commercial purpose, was communicated by the Deputy Secretary. In these circumstances, it is futile for the learned counsel for the appellant to conteded that it is an order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government regarding conversion from industrial purpose to commercial one. The learned single Judge was therefore right in over ruling the aforesaid contention. The order Anx.5 making exemption was assailed by the learned counsel on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. The learned single Judge noticed that the objections Anxs. 1, 2, and 3 were of course, sent but they were not addressed to the competent authority, for, they were sent to the Special Secretary Finance, who has nothing to do with the orders under challenge as the orders were passed by the Urban Improvement & Housing Department and they were conveyed by the Dy. Secretary (Administration). In these circumstances we agree with the learned single Judge that the petitioner appellant cannot take advantage of the fact that the competent authority did not afford any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner appellant, in as much as no objections were filed before the competent authority.
8. Lastly it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that power under Section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act has wrongly been exercised and exemption could not be allowed as no 'public interest' is involved. We have carefully considered the provisions contained in Section 20 of the aforesaid Act and the reasons given in this regard in the order under appeal. In our opinion the State Government has rightly passed the order under Section 20 and exemption cannot be challenged on the grounds raised by the petitioner-appellant. It was not necessary in this case to resort to Section 20(1)(b) as power has been exercised under Section 20(1)(a) in the public interest.
9. No other point was pressed. There is no force in these appeals and they are dismissed summarily.