1. The sole point for our determination in this second appeal is, whether or not the suit is based on a contract in writing, within Article 116 of the Limitation Act. If it is, the claim is not barred. If it is not, the claim is barred. The facts found are that the landlord entered into a contract with the appellants's then representative in 1880, having agreed to lease to the latter certain lands for rent, and that in pursuance of such lease the lessee entered on the lands, but allowed the rent to fall into arrears.
2. The lessee executed and had registered a document in which he acknowledged his lessors's title, and the agreement to hold on the terms stated, but the lessor executed no instrument agreeing on his part to allow the lessee to hold as such.
3. It appears then clear that the contract cannot be said to be a contract in writing,' within the meaning of the words used in Article 116, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act. Part of the contract is in writing in the sense that the lessee has executed an instrument evidencing his liability under the contract, but there is no written evidence of the contract on the part of the lessor.
4. It is easy to see what might be the results of holding otherwise; a lessor might insist on enforcing onerous covenants  in a lease, bringing oral evidence to show that such covenants were in fact entered into, while the lessee might have given the lessor an agreement in writing in which such covenants were not expressly recited.
5. No doubt many contracts may be entered into and concluded orally, and it may be that in some cases a contract may be evidenced partly in writing and partly made out by parol evidence. We are satisfied that, where the legislature provides that, if the terms of a contract be in writing, and the document be registered, a longer period of limitation shall be allowed than is allowed either in the case of a contract proved wholly by oral evidence, or partly by. writing and partly by parol, it was the intention of the legislature that the contract in writing should be signed by both parties.
6. If then the claim to all the arrears sued for is prior to three-years before the date of institution of the suit, the whole claim must be disallowed with costs throughout, but if the claim to any. part of such Arrears is within the three years prior to the suit, the lessor must have a decree for so much and no more. The decree of the Lower Appellate Court is reversed and the case must be remanded as the evidence does not show how much of the sum claimed would be due to the plaintiff, applying the principles of the above judgment to the facts. The Lower Appellate Court will re-hear the case and pronounce a fresh decree. The costs of this appeal will abide and follow the result.