1. The two questions referred to the Full Bench are:--When a charge is made by a complainant to the Police against more than one individual, and the Police, while charging before the Court one or more of such individuals of the offence complained of, do not charge them all, is a complaint of the Court under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, necessary to prosecute the complainant under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, in respect of the person or persons whom the Police have not charged before the Court; second, if the answer is in the negative, is such a complaint under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, required on the particular facts of this case owing to the complaint telegram having been exhibited and filed for the prosecution? What question 1 is intended to cover is whether in the circumstances stated the Court had jurisdiction or was competent to act under Section 476. It is unnecessary to go more into detail into the facts. Question No. 1 sufficiently sets out the necessary data.
2. Under Section 476 the Court only gets jurisdiction to inquire and make a complaint under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, if the offence under Section 211 appears to have been 'committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court.' Here there is no question of an offence having been committed in the Court, and the point is whether the words 'in relation to any proceeding in any Court' are wide enough to cover the case stated. The 'false' complaint was in a telegram to the District Superintendent of Police charging four persons with stabbing another. The Police investigated and charged only one of these four with the stabbing and the trial of that charge is the relevant 'proceeding' in the Court, as the charge of stabbing against the other three was not brought before the Court and did not properly form the subject-matter of any inquiry or trial before the Court.
3. The combined effect of sections 195 (b) and 476 is restrictive. In so far as the matter to be dealt with under the various sections mentioned in Section 195 (b) is in relation to a proceeding in a Court, the unrestricted authority of the Police to arrest for and charge a cognisable offence is taken away. In a case under Section 211 when the police or the complainant or any one else brings the charge, which is the subject-matter of the offence, to trial in a Court, then it may be fairly contended that the offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in the Court. But where neither the complainant nor the police nor any one else brings it into Court, we can see no sound reason why the Court should interpret sections 195 and 476 so as to hamper the otherwise unrestricted right of any one to complain direct of the offence under Section 211. We do not think that the fact that the trial was the effect of the complaint ipso facto brings all matters mentioned in the complaint 'in relation to' the trial, or in fact brings any matters mentioned in the complaint into that relation except those which are relevant to the charge being tried in the trial itself. It is not difficult to conceive of cases where false matters might be stated in a complaint to the police but are not made matter of charge or trial because they were wholly separable from the subject of the proceeding in Court and have no real relation to it. Judicial action taken solemnly by the Court under Section 476 should be confined to cases in which the observation of the Court itself or an inquiry or trial ad hoc has brought the offence to notice.
4. Not many rulings on the point, are cited before us. Those that assist are Muhammada v. The Crown I.L.R. (1928) Lah 408, Emperor v. Hardwar Pal I.L.R. (1912) A. 522 and Emperor v. Kashi Ram I.L.R. (1924) All. 906. The earliest of these is Emperor v. Hardwar Pal I.L.R. (1912) A. 522 which is to the effect that, in a case like the present, under the old Section 195, the sanction of the Court would be necessary. In Emperor v. Kashi Ram I.L.R. (1924) All. 906 the referring Judge doubted the correctness of Emperor v. Hardwar Pal I.L.R. (1912) A. 522 and went further, holding that a complaint not made to the Court could not retrospectively be regarded as in relation to a proceeding in the Court, merely because it had subsequently come to be tried by the Court. The Bench agreed with him so far as to hold that a charge made against one person and others will not amount to a charge against him in relation to a proceeding in Court simply because the others were brought to trial. This was followed by a Bench in Lahore in Muhammada v. The Crown I.L.R. (1928) Lah 408. The ruling in Tayebulla v. Emperor I.L.R. (1916) Cal. 1152, which the Bench in Lahore follows would indicate that the Calcutta Court holds that it is only in so far as the Police or the complainant himself had brought the complaint to the stage of a judicial inquiry or trial that Section 476 will apply. That is on the lines of the Lahore and later Allahabad ruling. We find ourselves in agreement with these views. We would therefore answer the first question that when the charge is made by the complainant to the police against more than one individual, and the police while charging before the Court one or more of such individuals with the offence complained of, do not charge them all, the Court has no jurisdiction to take action under Section 476 against the complainant in respect of those not so charged.
5. As to question 2, we are agreed that the mere fact of the telegram being exhibited and filed in the case does not make the contents of it a matter 'in relation to the proceeding' in the Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction to take action under Section 476.