1. The question raised in this appeal is whether, as held by the Judge, the suit was barred by limitation. If Act I of 1876 applied, the claim would not be barred, for the period would then run from the date of the Collector's refusal in 1882. If the Collector was made a party to the suit, as suggested in 3 M.H.C.E. 134 even then, the right to sue would accrue only from the date of the Collector's refusal. Viewing the suit as one for declaration of title, the period would run not from the date of sale, but, as observed by the Judge, from the date on which the respondent denied the appellant's right. It is conceded for the appellant that each of the villages purchased by the appellant was a distinct permanently settled estate, and that it had been separately assessed prior to the purchaser.. It is contended for the appellant that Madras Act I of 1876 will only apply where what.is, sold is not an entire permanently settled estate, but only a portion which requires to be separately assessed and registered. The Act purports to make better provision for the separate assessment of alienated portions of permanently settled estates, and Section 1 provides that the alienor or alienee of any portion of a permanently settled estate, or the representative of such alienor or alienee, may apply to the Collec tor of'the District, in which such portion is situate, for its registration in the name of the alienee and for its separate assessment to the land revenue. Sections 5 and 6 provide that any person, aggrieved by the fact of separate registration, or by refusal to order separate registration, may sue in a Civil Court for a decree declaring that such separate registration ought not or ought to be. made, while Section 7 declares that any person, aggrieved by the apointment of the assessment may. appeal to the Board of Revenue and the order of the Board of Revenue shall be final,  These sections suggest that the intention was to regard separate assessment and separate registration as distinct acts or descriptions of relief' The Act provides for two thingsseparate registry and separate assessment of a portion of an estate. If the Act applied to an alienation of the whole estate, the word 'apportion' would be of no effect. In the present case, there is no necessity for any apportionment of the assessment on the alienated portion, and all that is sought is its registry in appellant's name. If the suit were treated, as it should be with reference to the frame of the plaint,' as one for change of registry, no question of limitation might arise, and the appellant is entitled to insist that it should be so treated. We hold that Act I of 1876 has no application, that following 3 M.H.C.E. 134 the Collector is a necessary party and that time began to run from his refusal to register. We reverse the decree of the Lower Court and remand the suit for the Collector to be made a party, and direct that the suit be reheard. Costs of this appeal will be provided for in the revised decree.