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Pokkunuri Dasaratha Rao Vs. Chevuru Subba Rao Pantulu, Secretary Co-operative Stores Ltd. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTrusts and Societies
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1923Mad481; (1923)44MLJ382
AppellantPokkunuri Dasaratha Rao
RespondentChevuru Subba Rao Pantulu, Secretary Co-operative Stores Ltd.
Excerpt:
- .....and that the clause refers only to disputes regarding the internal management of the affairs of a society or disputes in regard to the principles which would regulate the conduct of business; a dispute for instance whether the society should purchase and deal in a particular commodity or should take up a particular line of business would according to this construction come within the terms of the clause; but a dispute arising out of any particular transaction would be outside the scope of the section. the words are quite general and i am unable to accept this contention. if the restricted construction contended for is to be adopted, i find great difficulty in understanding how such a dispute can arise between the past members of a society inter se. the words 'touching the business of a.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The question that was argued before us turns on the construction of Section 43(2)(1) or the Co-operative Societies Act II of 1912.

2. The dispute arose between the petitioner, P. Dasaratha Rao and the Co-operative Stores, Vizianagaram in regard to sums of money that were entrusted to the former for purchase of certain articles. The stores claimed a balance on the ground that after some adjustments had been made the sum was found due and that the petitioner was wrongfully withholding it from the stores. The liability was disputed and the Secretary of the Co-operative Stores made a reference in writing to the Assistant Registrar who held an enquiry and passed a decree against the petitioner.

3. Two contentions were raised before us by Dasaratha Rao. The first contention had reference to the interpretation of the words 'touching the business of a society 'in Section 43(2)(1). He contended that the present dispute does not fall within the said words and that the clause refers only to disputes regarding the internal management of the affairs of a society or disputes in regard to the principles which would regulate the conduct of business; a dispute for instance whether the society should purchase and deal in a particular commodity or should take up a particular line of business would according to this construction come within the terms of the clause; but a dispute arising out of any particular transaction would be outside the scope of the section. The words are quite general and I am unable to accept this contention. If the restricted construction contended for is to be adopted, I find great difficulty in understanding how such a dispute can arise between the past members of a society inter se. The words 'touching the business of a society 'can be understood in one sense only with reference to all classes of persons mentioned in the clause, and, as I said above it is difficult to imagine a dispute relating to the internal management of the affairs of a society between the past members inter se or again between persons claiming through a past member inter se.

4. The second contention was that the petitioner was a director and that he was therefore an officer and that the words in the section exclude the case of a dispute between an officer and the committee or between an officer and an offiicer. This contention again I am unable to accept. A dispute between a member and the committee or a dispute between a member and an officer is admittedly within the purview of the section. It was brought to our notice that under a resolution of the society a purchase committee was constituted consisting of six of whom four were directors and two were members but not directors and in his capacity as a member of this committee the petitioner became indebted to the society. For the respondent it was argued that the dealings which the society had with the petitioner were with him qua member and not qua director. This argument, so far as it goes seems to me correct. But I am prepared to go further and hold that on a true construction of the words of the clauses, a dispute between a member who happens to be an officer on the one hand and the committee or an officer on the other, does fall within the words of the section.

5. I therefore reject both the contentions advanced by the petitioner and in this view it becomes unnecessary to decide the other questions argued by the learned Advocate General before us on behalf of the respondent.

6. The application for review is therefore dismissed. In the circumstances I would make no order as to costs.

Krishnan, J.

7. I agree.


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