1. This petition has been filed by the Municipal Council of Madura against the decision of the Sub-Magistrate of Madura Town. Respondent was charged under Sections 249 and 338 of the Madras District Municipalities Act with having failed to take out a license for using a 22 horse power gas engine to work a rice hulling machine. The Sub-Magistrate refused to convict. He found that the case was governed by Section 250 and not by Section 249 of the Act. He was further of opinion that machinery used for rice hulling was not the kind of machinery contemplated by Schedule V (q).
2. It is argued on behalf of the Municipal Council that all that is required by Section 250 is permission for the original construction or establishment of a factory and that for the actual working of the factory an annual license is necessary under Section 249. I agree with the Sub-Magistrate that the argument is unsound. The Act clearly intends to draw a distinction between what it describes as 'industries' and 'factories.' The former are dealt with in Section 249 and the latter in Section 250. The industries included in Section 249 and Schedule V are licensed by the Chairman subject to the control of the Council. The power factories referred to in Section 250 are regulated by the Council itself subject to the orders of the Governor in Council.
3. It would, I think, be completely anomalous to hold that, after the Council had granted permission for the erection of a , mechanical power factory, it is open to the Chairman to refuse a license for its being worked or to impose impracticable conditions on its working.
4. I think that the Magistrate was right in holding that a license under Section 249 of the Act was not necessary in this case. I am also of opinion that the machinery referred to in Schedule V is machinery of a kind that is propelled by means other than those described in Section 250, which contemplates some sort of mechanical motive power. A decision of Krishnan, J has been cited In re Ramachandra Rao (1) which deals with Clause (q) of Schedule V. As I consider that Section 249 and Schedule V do not apply to this case at all, that decision does not really call for any discussion. All that I need say in regard to it is that I agree with Krishnan, J. that the machinery referred to in Clause (q) of Schedule V must be such as is likely to be dangerous to human life, health or property. The object of the clause. is, as he says, to bring under control the storing, manufacturing, and using of things which are dangerous to human life, or health, or property. The 'fuel or machinery' referred to in the clause must, I think, be of a sort that comes within that category. At the same time, I do not agree with him that the whole clause is governed by the words 'which is likely to be dangerous to human life, or health or property.' The first two parts of it cannot be so governed. The words 'manufacturing anything from which offensive or unwholesome smell arise' cannot grammatically be subject to a clause which begins 'which is likely'. Nor is it necessary to hold that the first two clauses are governed by the last. It is sufficiently obvious that the storing of explosives or combustibles and the manufacturing of things from which offensive or unwholesome smells arise are likely to be dangerous to human life, or health, or property, and no further qualification of them as such appears to be necessary. In my opinion the last clause governs that part of Clause (q) which begins with the words 'using for any industrial purpose'
5. In the result, I must dismiss the revision petition.
6. I agree.