1. The suit was brought to remove first defendant from the management of certain temples to which he had been appointed manager by fourth, fifth, and sixth defendants and to the management of . which plaintiffs claimed an hereditary right.
2. The other members of first defendant's family were not made parties, nor was there any indication that first defendant was sued in any other than his individual capacity for what was his single act of assuming management of the temples under the authority of the fourth, fifth, and sixth defendants.
3. The decree contains nothing from which it can be inferred that it was intended to render any member of first defendant's family but himself liable, and the appellant as representative of the first defendant can only be held liable to satisfy the decree to the extent of any assets of first defendant that have come to his hands and not been properly accounted for. The interest possessed by first defendant in his lifetime in the family property survived to the other members of the family, and does not enure as assets of the deceased in the hands of the appellant. We must, therefore, reverse that part of the order of the District Judge which makes appellant liable to satisfy the judgment-debt of the deceased from the Tarwad property.
4. The appellant will have the costs of this application.
5. We see no objection to the issue of execution against the second and third respondents as representatives of third defendant to the extent of any assets of third defendant that may be found to have been taken possession of by them and not duly accounted for. But the order of the District Judge is wrong in making the second and third respondents liable in respect of the share in the family property which the deceased had in his lifetime. In accordance with the course of decisions, this share survived to the coparceners and is not liable to be treated as assets of the deceased.
6. The question whether second and third respondents may or may not be made liable in another proceeding to discharge the judgment-debt of their father is quite distinct from their liability as representatives.
7. We reverse with costs the order in so far as it renders second and third respondents liable to discharge the debt of the third defendant from what was during his lifetime his share in the family property.
8. It appears also from the decree that the third defendant was not made liable for costs of plaintiffs in the suit. The order of the Judge in this respect also will be reversed.