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Charles Snell and Alexander Seddons Vs. the Queen - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1883)ILR6Mad201
AppellantCharles Snell and Alexander Seddons
RespondentThe Queen
Excerpt:
railway act, section 26 - disobedience of rule--accident-liability. - - 3. it is no answer to the charge that the rule had been habitually broken, if the evidence as to the disregard of it is reliable, nor is it any answer to the charge that obedience to the rule would possibly not have prevented the accident which occurred......j.1. it is shown that, by a general rule sanctioned and notified as required by law, the guard and driver of a ballast train should, on a line worked on the block system, stop the train at a station and should not leave the station till the guard has received from the station master and delivered to the driver a ' line-clear' certificate.2. it is also shown that on the 27th october the appellants disobeyed that rule, and it cannot be doubted that by so doing they endangered the safety of persons using the railway between the seringapatam and french rocks stations.3. it is no answer to the charge that the rule had been habitually broken, if the evidence as to the disregard of it is reliable, nor is it any answer to the charge that obedience to the rule would possibly not have.....
Judgment:

Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Kindersley, J.

1. It is shown that, by a general rule sanctioned and notified as required by law, the guard and driver of a ballast train should, on a line worked on the block system, stop the train at a station and should not leave the station till the guard has received from the Station Master and delivered to the driver a ' line-clear' certificate.

2. It is also shown that on the 27th October the appellants disobeyed that rule, and it cannot be doubted that by so doing they endangered the safety of persons using the railway between the Seringapatam and French Rocks Stations.

3. It is no answer to the charge that the rule had been habitually broken, if the evidence as to the disregard of it is reliable, nor is it any answer to the charge that obedience to the rule would possibly not have prevented the accident which occurred. The appellants are liable to conviction not by reason of consequences directly referable to their default, but by reason of the danger or risk which it entails. The sentences are not unreasonably severe. The appeal is dismissed.

4. Ordered accordingly.


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