1. The only question for determination is the meaning of the words 'date of amendment' in Article 182(4) of the 1st Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is contended tor the appellant that the 'date of amendment' must mean the date on which the decree is actually altered or corrected and not the date of the Court's order directing the amendment, and argument is advanced that an amendment does not bear the same relation to the order as a decree hears to the judgment and that therefore the provision in the Civil Procedure Code which says that the decree shall bear the date of the judgment is not applicable here. As a matter of fact, an order of amendment is itself a judgment and in accordance therewith, the original decree is altered and becomes a new and amended decree in accordance with the judgment pronounced. It seems therefore, clear that the date of the amended decree must be the same as that of the judgment. To hold otherwise would he to put in the hands of the ministerial officers of the Court the power to fix any date for the amendment of the decree quite regardless of the date on which the order was passed. The same view was taken in Nirit Lal Jha v. Kalanand Singh (1916) 36 IC 533 and we see no reason to hold otherwise.
2. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.