1. This petition raises a point of Court-fee. Plaintiff sued for a declaration of his right to a 4th share in Gamica mirasi office in a temple, in other words, for the office of a temple-cook entitled to certain emoluments and perquisites. He valued his suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 3,100 and paid, for the declaration he sought court-fee of Rs. 100 under Article 17-B of Schedule II. He asked for certain consequential reliefs. One of them was for a direction to the temple Committee by a mandatory injunction to cancel certain orders they passed and to permit him to perform the duties of this office and enjoy all the emoluments attached to it. He valued this relief for injunction at Rs. 100 and paid a court-fee of Rs. 11-3-0. There was also another prayer for an account, with regard to the. emoluments, for the year prior to the suit with which we are not concerned.
2. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the objection of the Court-fee examiner and found that the plaintiff under Section 7 (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act should pay Court fee on the amount at which he valued his relief, viz Rs. 3,300 altogether. It is urged that Article 17-B of the Court Fees Act is applicable on the strength of two decisions placed before me. The first is Karuppanna Nadar v. Mathalai Karuppa Nadar : AIR1939Mad776 . That was a suit originally filed in the District Munsif's. Court for a mere declaration that the plaintiff was the rightful manager of a school and for an injunction restraining the defendant from acting as such. The relief was valued at Rs. 100 and a Court-fee of only Rs. 11-3-0 was paid. It was held that the correct Article applicable was Article 17-B but that the value for jurisdiction was determined by the value of the institution and its properties, that the proper Court-fee payable would be Rs. 100 under Article 17-B and that suit should be filed in the sub-Court. That decision cannot be applied here for the simple reason that in this case, the plaintiff has taken upon himself to value the office which he substantially seeks to recover at Rs. 3,100. He cannot be heard to say that he can value his relief for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 3,100 and then that for purposes of consequential relief the value of his suit is incapable of valuation to evade Court-fee on this ground by valuing it at Rs. 1oo. Article 17-B applies to cases where in the plaint it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for in this Act. Plaintiff here has taken it upon himself to value the subject matter of the dispute.
3. My attention has been drawn to another decision in Angara Seshamma v. Peddisetli Suramma (1941) 1 M.L.J. 55, by Pandrang Row, J. That was a suit for a declaration of title to the office of archaka, for delivery of the office to the plaintiff and for restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of the office. It was also filed in the Munsiff's Court which directed certain amendments to be made in the plaint on which additional Court-fee should be paid. It was held that the Court-fee payable should be determined on the plaint as it stood and the plaintiff left to take the risk of applying for amendment and paying additional court-fee for the reliefs he asked. It may of course happen that contentions in the written statement necessitate an additional Court-fee being paid on the plaint if the plaintiff is to get the relief he desires. For instance, in a suit for declaration of title with a prayer for injunction, the defendant may claim to be in actual possession in which case, it is open to the plaintiff to ask to amend his plaint by a prayer for possession on payment of ad valorem court-fee. The plaintiff of course takes the risk of being non-suited so far as substantial relief is concerned if he does not pay this additional court-fee and this is what was emphasised in Seshamma v. Suramma (1941) M.L.J. 55.
4. Under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, in the case of suits other than those referred to in Section 7, paragraphs V, VI, and XI and paragraph X, Clause (d) in which court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. This statutory principle is applicable in my opinion to the present plaint in which the plaintiff has taken upon himself to value the subject-matter of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction and he cannot adopt a different valuation for court-fee. The learned District Judge's order is in my view correct and is upheld. The petition is dismissed with costs of the Government Pleader. Time for payment of additional Court-fee one month from this date.