Charles Arnold White, C.J.
1. The Subordinate Judge has held that the plaintiff's claim to recover possession of the land, which the plaintiff says forms part of the Vallam Mitta sold to his predecessor-in-title in about 1867, is barred by limitation. On appeal Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar has not contested this finding.
2. The only question we have to consider is whether, in the events which have happened, the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of a portion of t he amount paid by him as one year's peishcush, and a declaration that he is only liable to pay peishcush to the amount of Rs. 535 odd and not Rs. 823 odd.
3. The plaintiffs case is that Rs. 823 is the assessment on the mitta sold to his predecessor-in-title, which included certain lands which are now in the possession of Government. The defendant's case is that these lands were not included in the mitta and that the assessment was fixed with reference only to the lands now in the possession of the plaintiff.
4. In the view taken by the learned Judge it was not necessary for him to record any finding on the question raised in the first part of the 4th issue i.e.,--Whether the land in question forms part of the plaintiffs Vallam Mitta. He held that he had no jurisdiction to decide the latter part of the 4th issue, viz., what is the proportionate peishcush on the plaintiff's Valiant Mitta. There is no specific plea as to the jurisdiction of a Civil Court--and the question does not seem to have been raised in the issues. This, however, was not made a ground of appeal and the question was fully argued before us.
5. For the purposes of this question, I assume that the land in question originally formed part of the Vallam Mitta and that the assessment was fixed with reference to this land as well as with reference to the land which is now in the possession of the plaintiff. The Government have acquired a title by prescription to the land in question. In these circumstances, has a Civil Court jurisdiction to fix the proportionate psishcush payable by the plaintiff? I think not.
6. We have been referred to Section 8 of Regulation 25 of 1802, a Regulation which imposes restrictions on alienations in the interests of the public revenue. See Vizianagaram Maharaja v. Suryanarayana I.L.R. (1885) M. 307. The last paragraph of Section 3 of the Regulation has apparently no application to this case. Section 8, except in so far as it indicates the general policy of the law, does not seem to have much bearing on the question.
7. Section 58 of Act II of 1864 enacts that 'No Court of Civil Judicature shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any question as to the rate of land revenue payable to Government, or as to the amount of assessment fixed, or to be hereafter fixed, on the portions of a divided estate.'
8. I am of opinion that this is a general enactment and is not restricted to questions arising in proceedings under the Act of 1864.
9. As regards the construction of the section, my learned brother, whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading, takes the view that the words, 'on the portion of a divided estate' qualify the words 'land revenue payable to Government.' I doubt if the Legislature intended to draw any distinction between 'rate' and 'amount.' If they did not and if the words 'on the portions of a divided estate' are to be read as qualifying the words 'land revenue payable to Government' the latter part of the section would seem to be redundant. But even if these words do qualify, the words 'land revenue payable to Government' I do not think we ought to give the words 'divided estate' a restricted or technical meaning.
10. Act I of 1876 makes provision for separate assessment when a portion of an estate has been alienated. Under this Act, the Collector is to apportion the assessment of the alienated portion. A person aggrieved by the apportionment may appeal to the Board of Revenue and the order of the Board is to be final. A person aggrieved by the fact of separate registration being made, or not made, may sue in a Civil Court for a declaration, but as I read the Act, this does not give a Civil Court jurisdiction to deal with any question of apportionment.
11. Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar has contended that the equitable doctrine of contribution applies and that the plaintiff can call on Government, in their capacity of owner of land on which he has paid assessment to contribute their proportionate share. In setting out the grounds on which the case of Rajah of Vizianagaram v. Rajah Setrucherla Somasekhararaz I.L.R. (1902) M. 686. was referred to a Full Bench, Bhashyam Iyengar J. observed that the doctrine of contribution applied when the arrears of revenue had not been paid to Government by the plaintiff but had been realized by the Collector under the Revenue Recovery Act from the income of the plaintiff's share after it had been registered as a separate estate. It may be that this would involve the apportionment of the assessment as between two co-sharers, but in that case there was no question as to the amount of the assessment as fixed by Government, which is the question now raised before us. I do not think we can sever the capacities of Government and say that we have jurisdiction to apportion the assessment as between the plaintiff and Government in their capacity of owner of the land, since the effect of so doing would be to exercise a right which I think the Legislature has taken away viz., the right to fix the land revenue or apportion the assessment payable to Government.
12. I think the Judge was right in this conclusion and I would dismiss this appeal, with costs.
13. For the purposes of the present appeal, the facts of the case may be stated as follows:
The plaintiff alleges that she has for several years past been paying peishcush in respect of lands described in the schedule to the plaint, which, she alleges, formed part of an estate described as the Vallam Mitta standing in her name, and which lands the Subordinate Judge has held to have been out of her possession for over twelve years and to have passed by adverse possession into the ownership of the defendant, the Secretary of State. The plaintiff does not contest now the right of the defendant to the ownership of the said lands, but asks that it should be declared that inasmuch as she has been paying peishcush in respect of the whole of the Vallam Mitta estate, such payment is in excess of the amount validly leviable from her, and that in future a smaller amount of peishcush should be levied than has been levied in the past viz., that the amount of the peishcush levied from her, in respect of the said lands should be deducted from the total amount of the peishcush levied in respect of the Vallam Mitta estate and that she should he charged with peishcush in proportion to the lands held to be actually in her possession.
14. It is argued on behalf of the defendant that no Civil Court has jurisdiction to consider the questions which must be adjudicated upon as a necessary preliminary before the plaintiff can be given the reliefs she seeks. The learned Subordinate Judge has upheld this contention of the defendant, and dismissed the suit, without recording any finding on the point whether or not the said lands originally formed part or were included within the limits of the Vallam Mitta estate, which stands in the name of the plaintiff, and in respect of which she has been paying peishcush. The question argued before us therefore has reference entirely to the point whether, assuming that the said lands did form part of the Vallam Mitta estate, the suit will lie.
15. For the purposes of making out that there is jurisdiction in Civil Courts to entertain this suit, the learned pleader for the appellant stated that his case is that the plaintiff is entitled to have a finding on the question whether, as a. matter of fact, the said lands originally formed part of the Vallam Mitta estate or not, for this reason, that if this Court should come to the conclusion that the plaintift is paying peishcush in respect of lands which she has not been holding, and which she is not any more entitled to hold, then such a finding, though not in itself binding upon the executive authorities, will strengthen her claim before them if she applies for a proportionate reduction of the peishcush payable by her. For the purposes of this part of his argument, the appellant's pleader admits that even if the facts were proved to be as alleged by the plaintiff, this Court would have no power to grant the relief claimed on the basis of their existence. Under these circumstances, there seems to be little doubt that the question cannot be litigated in the Civil Courts. Indeed the appellant's pleader himself did not press this point. He however contended that even if he is not permitted to prove the fact that the said lands formed part of the Vallam Mitta estate, solely in order that he may be able to base on such a finding an application to the revenue authorities for reduction of the assessment nevertheless admittedly there is jurisdiction in the Court to order that one of two or more persons who were joint holders of the same mitta, should contribute proportionately towards the peishcush the whole of which has been levied from the other joint holder or holders and it is argued that one of the reliefs that the appellant seeks, [viz., under prayer (2) of the plaint] is in effect a prayer that the defendant should be ordered to contribute towards the peishcush that is due on the Vallam Mitta estate, which for the 'purposes of this appeal must be assumed to be owned partly by the defendant and partly by the plaintiff. That the court has power to order one of several joint owners to contribute towards the payment of the assessment which has been discharged by another joint owner was decided in Rajah of Vizianagram v. Rajah Setrucherla Somasekhararaz I.L.R. (1902) M. 686 and we have been referred in particular to the remarks of Mr. Justice Bhashyam Iyengar on page 693 to the eftect that the right to contribution is ' bottomed and fixed on general principles of justice and does not necessarily spring from contract.' Those remarks were made when he was considering whether the claim to contribution was in any manner affected by the fact that the claimant had not himself paid the principal sum in respect of which contribution was claimed, but that such sum had been realized by the Collector from the income of the claimant's share after it had been registered as a separate estate, and the Court came to the conclusion that the said fact did not affect the claim. It was assumed that the right to contribution existed where the whole sum had been voluntarily paid by the claimant.
16. For the appellant it is also argued that, if a claim can be made for contribution in respect of peishcush already paid, the court may make a declaration in accordance with prayer (3) of the plaint, viz. : that in future the peishcush payable by the plaintiff should only be Rs. 537-7-6 which is the sum that remains over after deducting from the whole of the yearly peishcush the amount claimed by the plaintiff by way of contribution in each year.
17. The Respondent meets these arguments by referring to the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, Sections 2 and 3 and the Madras Revenue Recovery Act 1864, Section 58, which, he contends, take away the jurisdiction of this Court to deal with the matters involved in this suit.
18. It is admitted by the learned pleader for the appellant that the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation is a bar to this Court altering the amount of assessment fixed thereunder on any land. It is also admitted that the assessment so fixed is leviable from every portion of the land in respect of which it is fixed. On the other hand it is clear that prayer (3) may in some respects have effects similar to that of a claim for contribution. The point was not taken before us whether a claim for contribution can validly be made in respect of sums not actually paid, but for which there is merely a liability that will arise in future. I therefore express no opinion on that point. It is unnecessary for me to do so, for, assuming that a claim for contribution could lie in respect of a future liability, it seems to me to be clear that to grant such a declaration as is claimed in prayer (3) would in its direct effect be to alter the assessment fixed on the land, and to declare that in future the assessment payable shall be not Rs. 823-3-0 bat Rs. 535-7-6. It was never contended on behalf of the appellant that this Court could pass such an order and I agree with the learned Chief Justice that the appeal must fail so far as the claim under prayer (3) is concerned.
19. It remains therefore only to be considered whether the claim under prayer (2) of the plaint can be sustained as a claim for contribution, and if so, whether Section 58 of the Madras Revenue Recovery' Act 1864 is a bar to such a suit.
20. For the Respondent it is contended that the claim under prayer (2) is no less a claim for altering the assessment than the claim under prayer (3). The two prayers are however in their nature essentially distinguishable in the particular above referred to viz., that prayer (2) is in respect of a sum of money already paid, and prayer (3) has reference to future payments to be made to the Government. That distinction not merely removes the doubt whether a claim for contribution can raise in respect of a future liability, but it also affects the very nature of the claim. For where the so-called contribution is claimed in respect of a sum to be paid as peishcush in future it must necessarily have reference to a claim by the Government as Collectors of Revenue, and any interference with the claim must contravene the provisions of the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation; where, on the other hand, the claim arises only after the assessment has already been paid [as in the case with prayer (2)] it seems to me to be clear (subject to two questions which I shall next consider) that there is no interference with the right of the Government to levy the full assessment : the claim for contribution in the latter case arises after the assessment has already been fully paid, and is in fact based upon such payment, and on a recognition of such payment having been valid and proper.
21. The learned Subordinate Judge has dealt with both prayers in the 14th paragraph of his Judgment; and he holds that one who acquires title to property by adverse possession is in the same position as an alienee and that the Madras Land Revenue Assessment Act of 1876 (Act I of 1876) is a bar to the Civil Courts apportioning the assessment in this case as in any other case. But this argument could equally prevent the Court from apportioning the revenue as between co-owners of property even for the purpose of deciding how much one of several joint holders has to contribute towards the payment of the assessment as between himself and the other joint holders of the lands--which it is admitted that the Court has jurisdiction to do. It therefore seems to me that the reasoning of the Subordinate Judge is faulty, owing to a failure on his part to distinguish between an apportionment of the amount of the revenue where on the one hand such apportionment refers to the right of the Government to levy the assessment, and where on the other hand such an apportionment is for a purpose not affecting the right of the Government as Collectors of Revenue as for apportioning it between joint owners.
22. The first of the matters which I have above referred to as being necessary to be considered before the conclusion can be reached, that prayer (2) must be taken to be in effect a claim for contribution from a joint owner and must be adjudicated upon as such, is whether the fact that the defendant in this suit is the Secretary of State affects this point :--whether, in other words, the distinction between a claim for the alteration of the amount of revenue to be paid in future to the Government and a claim for payment back of a portion of the revenue already paid to the Government, disappears where the person from whom the payment back is sought is the Government, It may well be argued, as it has been before us, that the result of the two claims so far as the parties are concerned, is exactly the same. For, applying the reasoning to the present facts, in the one case the Government never recovers more than Rs. 535-7-6 and in the other case it pays back whatever has been recovered in excess of that sum. It seems to me, however, that the fact that the two claims have similar effects in the end is an accident, and that the claim against the Government as the holder of land must be considered in the same light as if it were any private individual holding lands; the claim must not be affected by the fact that the joint owner in this case is also the collector of Revenue. If the Secretary of State can acquire land by adverse possession like a private individual, he must hold such land with many of the same incidents as a private individual, and amongst such incidents it seems to me that one must be the liability to contribute towards the payment of the peishcush where the portion of the land held by him forms part of a mitta which contains also other land held by another owner who has paid the whole of the peishcush.
23. The other point to which I have above alluded as requiring to be considered before it can be determined if this suit can be entertained is whether a claim for contribution to the assessment against the Secretary of State does not involve the adjudication of questions which we are prevented from considering by the Madras Revenue Recovery Act 1864, Section 58. The contention of the respondent is that such a claim requires the Court to fix the rate of revenue payable to the Government and that there is no jurisdiction to do so.
24. The Section is as follows:
58. No Court of Civil Judicature shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any question as to rate of land revenue payable to Government, or as to the amount of assessment fixed, or to be hereafter fixed on the portions of a divided estate.
25. Had it not been for the remarks which have fallen from the learned Chief Justice, I should, have been inclined to doubt whether the words 'rate of land revenue payable to Government' can be held even in an Act so inartistically drafted as the present one, to have the same meaning as the words 'amount of assessment fixed'; the former expression ought, it would have seemed to me, to be interpreted as having reference to the standard according to which revenue is payable and the latter to the total sum at which the assessment is fixed, the one serving as a basis for calculating assessment and the other indicating the total arrived at on such a basis.
26. But, whether the two expressions are to have the same meaning or different meanings, in either case, it is to be determined whether the words 'on the portions of a divided estate' qualify the clause 'land revenue payable to Government'. If they qualify the said clause, the meaning of the Section Would seem to be that, in the case of portions of a divided estate, neither the rate of land revenue nor the amount of assessment shall be fixed by a Civil Court, and this interpretation seems to me to be most likely to give full effect to every word in the Section and to do least violence to any portion of it. It will be observed that the doubt as regards the interpretation of the section centres around two points, first, whether the two expressions 'rate of land revenue payable to Government,' and 'the amount of assessment fixed' have identical meanings, and secondly, whether the former of these expressions has to be taken in its unrestricted sense, or to be read as qualified by the words 'in the case of portions of a divided estate.' As regards the first point, I have already said that, in my view, the two expressions ought to have different meanings attached to them. As to the second point, I think that the words, 'in the case of portions of a divided estate' must be taken to qualify the first clause also, and my reasons for so holding are as follows. If we give an interpretation to the first clause which would not restrict it to cases where a divided estate is concerned, it would imply that this particular clause has reference to matters falling beyond the scope of every other provision contained in the Act. When I come to deal with the meaning of the words 'divided estate' it will be necessary for me to consider the question how far, in construing a particular section which comes up for interpretation, the Court ought to take into consideration the provisions in an Act preceding or following that particular section, and it is, therefore, unnecessary for me to dwell further on this point at the present stage, the more so, as it was assumed before us that the clause in question does refer to a divided estate, the argument of the Respondent's counsel being rather to the effect that, under the circumstances of this case, the Valiant Mitta estate must be considered to be 'a divided estate,' and in order to decide what will be the proper contribution payable to the plaintiff in accordance with his claim, this Court would have to 'take into consideration' the 'rate of land revenue payable to Government on the portions of a divided estate' as well as the amount of assessment fixed or to be hereafter fixed on the' portions of a divided estate. Hence for the purpose of this appeal it has to be considered whether in the circumstances stated above, the Vallam Mitta estate can fall within the description of 'a divided estate.' There is no definition of a 'divided estate' either in the interpretation clause to the Act, or in any other section to which our attention has been drawn. It seems to me that, had there been nothing beyond the words of Section 58 to serve as a guide to us in giving a meaning to the words 'a divided estate,' it might still have been a very doubtful question whether an estate could be considered to be a divided estate, part of which had passed out of the ownership of the parson originally entitled to it, by his having been out of possession for over twelve years. But I agree that it might have been held in that case that, though the draftsman did not perhaps have such a state of circumstances as we are dealing with distinctly persent to his mind, and though the words employed are not very apt to refer to such circumstances, yet he must be taken to have meant to refer to all cases in which the estate ceases to form a whole, and wherever there is any division of them into two or more portions. It is well established, however, that in construing a particular section of an enactment it is necessary to consider the context in which such section occurs. Thus Lord Blackburn remarks in Turquand v. Board of Trade 11. A.C. 286, 'In construing this Act of course, like every other Act, we must take the whole of the Act together, and as this is a very long Act, containing, I think, about sixty pages of very closely printed matter, it requires, in order that we may be certain that we omit nothing, that we should look carefully at it altogether and consider all the clauses.' Again in Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming (1865) 19 C.B. 687 , I find that Montague Smith, J. delivering the Judgment of the court of Common Pleas consisting of himself, Erie C.J., Willes and Byles JJ. said 'the language of the 1st section may be sufficiently large to include some rights in gross. The subjects of claim are, right of common or other profit or benefit to be taken and enjoyed from or upon any land. The first and governing subject of claim referred to, is ' right of common.' This general phrase, which defines no species of common, is no doubt wide enough to include a right of common in gross, as, common of pasture; but it is not an apt or proper phrase to designate a several right to the exclusive pasturage of land, or any other several and exclusive right to take any particular profit of the land.... We think however, the first section ought not to be read alone but must be construed by reference to other provisions of the Act.' Similarly in Lord Auckland v. Westminister Local Board of Works (1872) L.R. 7 Ch. 597 James L.J., observes that he arrives at the meaning of the words, of the section he was construing, 'having regard to the old clauses in lieu of which this 75th Section was enacted, and having regard to the 74th section which immediately precedes it, and to the whole context of the Act and the whole spirit of recent legislation with regard to dealing with private persons' property, that the 75th section was only meant to apply to the case of a new bailding, structure, or erection being built on land which, for the purposes of the Act, would properly have been described by Mr. Vullianey as vacant ground.' The decision in the last cited case being that the words of a later section of the Act which were wide enough to cover alterations in existing buildings were to be confined so as to refer only to buildings erected on lands which had until then been vacant. So also in Hanfstaengal v. Empire Palace (1894) 2 Ch. 1 the Court cut down the meaning of a later section so as to harmonise with the other sections of the Act, and A.L. Smith L.J. observed. 'In construing a section of an Act of Parliament it is important to look at the whole Act, and not merely at the one section which has to be construed.'
27. In accordance with the principles above referred to, if I turn to the rest of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act 1864, in order to see if there is any other portion of it which may throw light on the meaning of Section 58, I find that the words 'divided estate,' the meaning of which has to be determined, occur in Section 46, and that Section 45 refers to the division of a landed estate. In this section it is clear that a divided estate refers to a 'part of a landed estate held under a Sanad-i-Milkiyat-i-Istimrar or otherwise subject to the pay-meat of a lump assessment' that has been sold 'in discharge of arrear of revenue' under Section 44. The sections intervening between Sections 46 and 58 deal with the postponement of such a sale on security being tendered, with powers of arresting a defaulter in case of non-payment of arrears of rent, and similar matters. The learned Counsel who appeared for the respondent was unable to refer us to any other provision of the Act which has reference to a divided estate, or to any sale or alienation or division other than a sale for the purpose of recovering arrears of revenue. These considerations lead me to the view that the words 'divided estate' in section 58 must also be construed so as to have reference to such a division of the estate alone as is contemplated in the rest of the Act and that it can have no reference where the estate has become 'divided' by one portion of it having been acquired by a third person through adverse possession. The result at which I have arrived as to the meaning of this section is in accordance with the general principle that sections of this nature which takeaway the jurisdiction of civil courts must be strictly construed. In my opinion therefore this section has no application to the present case, in as much as in the present case we have no 'divided estate' coming within its terms. For reasons similar to those that I have above stated, I am also of opinion that this section can be no bar to a civil court apportioning the assessment which is admittedly due to the Government for the whole of a particular mitta when such apportioning is made for the purpose of deciding in what portions that total assessment has to be borne by two or more persons, who have become owners of portions of such a Mitta and that this section can have no application to the rights of joint holders of lands amongst themselves as distinguished from the liability of each of them jointly and severally to pay the whole assessment to the Government.
28. Another argument which was taken before us on behalf of the appellants was that the Madras Act I of 1876 indicates that Act II of 1864 could not have been intended to apply to estates which had become divided otherwise than on a sale for the recovery of arrears of revenue. It was argued that the later Act provides for the apportionment of assessment by the Collector, and takes away the jurisdiction of civil courts to apportion it in the cases of estates which have become divided by voluntary alienation, and that this shows that the earlier Act could not have governed cases of voluntary alienations. For, had it done so, the later Act would have been unnecessary. For the purpose of considering this argument, it becomes necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act. It was passed for the purpose (as indicated in its preamble) of making better provision for the separate assessment of land revenue of portions of permanently settled estates alienated by sale or otherwise. It permits an application to the Collector for the apportionment of land revenue and lays down the procedure on such an application being made. The civil court's jurisdiction to decide the question whether separate registration ought to be made or not is saved, but their jurisdiction for the actual apportionment of the assessment is taken away.
29. Having given to the matter careful consideration I agree with the learned Chief Justice that though the later Act may throw light on the general scope of the earlier Act, the former does not help us in arriving at a decision on the particular question with which we have to deal.
30. I need not, for the purposes of the present appeal, consider the question whether any of the provisions of Regulation XXV of 1802 or any other rule of law will prevent the plaintiff in this case from being able to establish in a Court that portions of the Valiant Mitta estate are no more held by her, and that they have passed into the ownership of another person. When that question has to be determined, the court may have to decide whether it can take any cognisance of transfers of property, voluntary or involuntary, which are not registered under Section 8 of Regulation XXV of 1802. That question does not arise in the present proceeding before us.
31. For the reasons above-stated, I am of opinion that this case should be sent back to the learned Subordinate Judge for a finding on the fourth issue, viz., 'whether the land forms part of the plaintiff's Vallam Mitta, and what is the proportionate peishcush thereon'.
32. I need hardly say that I feel unable to be confident in my judgment on those points on which I find that the learned Chief Justice has taken a different view. I feel however that the considerations to which I have alluded above must outweigh this reason for distrusting my own Judgment.
Charles Arnold White, C.J.
33. Tyabji, J. Differs; the result is the appeal is dismissed with costs.