1. The appellants are alienees from a widow, the 1st plaintiff having sued as the nearest reversioner to the estate of the widow's husband, Sajja Brahmadu. The alienations were three in number. Taking them in the order in which the argument has proceeded, Ex. III is a will and involves Items 1, 6 and 12 of Schedule A and Schedule B. Under this will the 13th defendant, who appeals, and the 14th defendant, who does not appeal, acquired properties. The argument is attempted that by virtue of two transactions, evidenced by Exs. J and I, the 1st plaintiff is estopped from questioning these alienations. Taking it that these two transactions were in fact one and that the 1st plaintiff's father Venkayya got some items from the widow in consideration of relinquishing his reversionary right to the remainder, and taking it further that the 1st plaintiff himself has inherited those items which the father received, we think that the Lower Court is right in holding that there is no case of estoppel. The only reported authority appears to be Rames v. Sasi (1919) 30 C.L.J. 56 In that judgment the learned Judges point out that the plaintiffs do not claim through their father, who entered into the transaction, but directly as reversioners to the estate of the last male holder and that they could not therefore be precluded by any rule of estoppel from disputing the validity of the alienation, nor are they affected by the circumstance that they had after the death of their father taken by inheritance the land transferred by way of gift to him. Such a circumstance, they say, clearly does not operate as an acquiescence or ratification. We may add that no question of estoppel would seem to be in question because the 1st plaintiff has not made any representation upon which the other party acted, nor does he claim through any one who did make any such representation. It would only be by the application of some such principle as that the 1st plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate a transaction at the same time that he would be precluded from questioning these alienations, but no such rule of law has been brought to our notice. The case in Bahadur Singh v. Ram Bahadur I.L.R.(1922) 45 All. 277 is not in point because it was not a case of a reversioner. We think therefore that this part of the Lower Court's judgment must be upheld.
2. The 13th defendant is also concerned as alienee under Ex. II, a sale deed executed by the widow in 1908 of Items 4, 5 and 6 in Schedule A for a sum of Rs. 400. The recital in this document is that the widow wanted the money for the purpose of going on a pilgrimage to Benares. The 13th defendant himself as D.W. 3 has stated that she did not go until 1915, whereas the sale was in 1908, and this is more or less borne out by D.W. 5 who says she accompanied his party in 1914. In view of this wide discrepancy of time it is not easy to hold that the money was obtained for the bona fide purpose of going, to Benares or indeed was spent on that purpose. Nor, as the Lower Court points out, has it been shown that the widow was unable to meet the cost otherwise. We think that it has. arrived at a correct decision regarding this alienation.
3. There remains the appeal of defendants 8 to 10, who purchased Item 11 of Schedule A for Rs. 200. The sale deed is attested by Venkayya, the 1st plaintiff's father. There is no evidence to show with what knowledge or intention he did this and no question of estopping the 1st plaintiff can arise. Nor can the attestation be taken to be presumptive proof of necessity because the document contains no recital of the purpose for which the money was required. We must find also in this case that the alienation does not bind the reversioner.
4. The result accordingly is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.