1. We do not think that the order of the District Judge can be sustained. This is a suit by two persons, one of whom' is the General Trustee of the Temple and the other merely a worshipper instituted after leave obtained under Sectional 18, Act XX of 1863 and Section 539, Civil Procedure Code.
2. Even assuming that the first plaintiff as General Trustee of the Temple was at liberty to sue for the removal of the defendants in the Ordinary Courts, there can be no doubt he is not precluded from suing under Section 14, Act XX of 1863. This is clear from the very wide language of Section 15 of that Act which is framed so as to include not only persons having a pecuniary or direct interest in the institution, but also persons having interests of a far inferior character.
3. If the 1st plaintiff were the sole plaintiff, it would be right that he should comply with the rule laid down in Section 15, Civil Procedure Code, and bring his suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court as the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it: but the 2nd plaintiff being a mere worshipper, would not sue in the Subordinate Judge's Court. It is only the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of Act XX of 1363 which give him a suit for the removal of a trustee, andsuch a suit by a worshipper lies only in the District Court. It is competent to the two plaintiffs to join in a suit like the present. It follows that the rule in Section 15, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be held to apply so as to prevent the 1st plaintiff from joining with the 2nd plaintiff in instituting this suit in the District Court. Nor do we think that the plaintiffs are precluded from claiming in this suit relief by way of appointing a fresh trustee, vesting the trust property in him and settling a scheme because these reliefs are not claimed to be under Act XX of 1863, but only in a suit instituted under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code. If the removal of the defendants in the present suit should be ordered, then and then only it would become necessary to consider the claim to these reliefs at least so far as the first two, of them are concerned, and we ate unable to see why the plaintiffs should not be at liberty to ask the Court for such reliefs at once, instead of being required to institute a separate suit. To hold otherwise would we think, be unreasonable, having regard to the fact that the protection of the interests of the institutions is the purpose for which both ,S. 539, Civil Procedure Code, and Act. XX of 1863 Were passed.
4. We must, therefore, reverse the order of the District Judge, and direct him to receive the plaint and proceed to dispose of the suit according to law. Costs will abide and follow.