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Sambasiva Chari Vs. Ramaswami Reddi - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1898)8MLJ265
AppellantSambasiva Chari
RespondentRamaswami Reddi
Cases Referred and Peary Mohund Aich v. Anunda Charan Biswas Ib.
Excerpt:
.....no reason why this principle should not be followed in cases like the present, when it has been adopted as a rule of law in cases to which the limitation act and general clauses act apply......kumara akkappa v. sithala naidu 476 place the matter beyond all doubt. nor is section 10 of the general clauses act or section 11 of the madras general clauses act applicable, inasmuch as they do not refer back to acts of the year 1865.2. but there is a general principle of law which has been recognized in two recent cases by the high court of calcutta shooshee bhusan v. gobind chunder (i. l. r. 18 c 231 and peary mohund aich v. anunda charan biswas ib. 631) that 'where parties are prevented from doing a thing in court on a particular day, not by any act of their own, but by the act of the court itself they are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity.' i. l. r. 18 c 636. we see no reason why this principle should not be followed in cases like the present, when it has.....
Judgment:

1. We are clearly of opinion that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to extend the time of 30 days limited by Sections 18 and 51 of Act VIII of 1865 for bringing a Summary Suit to set aside a destraint. The cases at Veeramma v. Abbiah I. L. R. 18 M. 99 and Appa Rau Sanayi Aswa Rau v. Krishnamurthi Ib. 20 M. 249 and Kumara Akkappa v. Sithala Naidu 476 place the matter beyond all doubt. Nor is Section 10 of the General Clauses Act or Section 11 of the Madras General Clauses Act applicable, inasmuch as they do not refer back to Acts of the year 1865.

2. But there is a general principle of law which has been recognized in two recent cases by the High Court of Calcutta Shooshee Bhusan v. Gobind Chunder (I. L. R. 18 C 231 and Peary Mohund Aich v. Anunda Charan Biswas Ib. 631) that 'where parties are prevented from doing a thing in Court on a particular day, not by any act of their own, but by the act of the Court itself they are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity.' I. L. R. 18 C 636. We see no reason why this principle should not be followed in cases like the present, when it has been adopted as a rule of law in cases to which the Limitation Act and General Clauses Act apply. We, therefore, rule that the plaint in this case which was filed on the 31st day after the distraint was filed in time, the 30th day being a Sunday on which the Court was closed in accordance with the rules of this Court.

3. The decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly reversed, and the appeal remanded for disposal on the merits.

4. The plaintiff's costs in this Court will be paid by the defendant and the costs incurred in the lower Courts will abide and follow the result of the further trial ordered.


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