1. The 2nd defendant who was the presumptive reversionary heir of one Venkatrayudu on the death of the latter's widow, executed during his life-time a mortgage deed in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of a portion of Venkatrayudu's estate. This was in 1892. In 1896 the 2nd defendant purported to convey to the widow of Venkatrayadu for a consideration of Rs. 400, his interest in the whole of Venkatrayadu's estate. Some twenty days after that conveyance she made a gift of the mortgaged property and other property to the plaintiff on the footing that she became the absolute owner by reason of the 2nd defendant's conveyance to her. The 1st defendant subsequently and after the death of the widow brought a suit on the mortgage of 1892, and became the purchaser in execution of the decree and obtained delivery of the property. The plaintiff brought this suit to recover possession on the strength of the gift in his favour by the widow and his claim was allowed by the Court below.
2. The 1st defendant appeals, and we think that the appeal is well founded. It is now clearly established by the decision of the Privy Council in Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh I.L.R. 24 A 94, that the right of a presumptive reversionary heir under the Hindu Law is no more than a spes succcssionis or expectation of succeeding to the property. That being so, he is incapable under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act of transferring such expectancy.
3. The fact that the transfer was in favour of the widow then in possession cannot make any difference so as to enlarge her limited estate into an absolute estate. The Vakil for the respondent argued that the transfer is analogous to a renunciation made by a widow in favour of the presumptive reversionary heir, so as to accelerate the latter's succession, but we do not think that there is any real analogy between the two cases. The mortgage made by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant will also be inoperative as a mortgage under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, but the sale in execution of the decree which took place after the reversion fell in to the 2nd defendant will be operative to transfer the 2nd defendant's interest in the mortgaged property.
4. No question arises in this case as between the reversioners who purported to make a transfer and the transferee, but the question is between the plaintiff claiming as the donee under the widow and the 1st defendant who purchased the right, title and interest of the 2nd defendant after the reversion fell in. As we hold that the transfer, by the 2nd defendant in favour of the widow, is inoperative as a transfer, the plaintiff's suit against the 2nd defendant must fail.
5. We therefore allow this second appeal, set aside the decree of the Courts below, and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.