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Venkatramana Pai Vs. Sampa Alias Santappa Mallayya and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in95Ind.Cas.845; (1924)47MLJ256
AppellantVenkatramana Pai
RespondentSampa Alias Santappa Mallayya and ors.
Cases ReferredVidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Iyer I.L.R.
Excerpt:
- section 16 (1) (c) :[tarun chatterjee & aftab alam,jj] ready and willing to perform-concurrent findings of fact on consideration of evidence on record that appellants-buyers were not ready and willing to perform terms and conditions of agreement for sale - buyers failing to pay balance consideration before agitating matter before supreme court held, concurrent finding cannot be interfered with. section 20: [tarun chatterjee & aftab alam,jj] whether time is the essence of contract held, many instance in contract which repeatedly showed that time was to be of essence of contract were specifically mentioned. clear condition in contract that purchasers would have to definitely deposit balance amount by date stipulated in contract for sale show that time was essence of contract. .....current of decisions in this presidency has always been to recognise those as being valid for the life of the lessor or the trustee, or, what is equivalent to his life, his continuance in the trust and to construe words apparently wider in import as limited to the lifetime of the lessor qua trustee. that is what we propose to do here. there are no extravagant words in this instrument indicating a permanent lease such as mulgeni, etc., or other technical phrases of that import, and we think that the courts should strive, where they can, to put a liberal construction upon the instrument ut res magis valeat quam pereat so as to uphold it and carry into effect the intention of the parties. that being so, no question of limitation arises, and we must reverse the decision of the court below.....
Judgment:

Victor Murray Coutts Trotter, C.J.

1. I desire to say not one word more than is necessary for the decision of this case, because I am free to admit that I do not understand what the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Baluswami Iyer I.L.R. (1921) M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 enjoins upon us; but it appears to me that this much is clear that the real line of cleavage in this case is Are we to treat this instrument as being absolutely clear and, therefore fettering us in its construction, or as something capable of passing a qualified estate in the property to the tenant It is quite common for persons in the position of trustees of religious and charitable endowments to make lease of such property, and the common current of decisions in this presidency has always been to recognise those as being valid for the life of the lessor or the trustee, or, what is equivalent to his life, his continuance in the trust and to construe words apparently wider in import as limited to the lifetime of the lessor qua trustee. That is what we propose to do here. There are no extravagant words in this instrument indicating a permanent lease such as mulgeni, etc., or other technical phrases of that import, and we think that the Courts should strive, where they can, to put a liberal construction upon the instrument ut res magis valeat quam pereat so as to uphold it and carry into effect the intention of the parties. That being so, no question of limitation arises, and we must reverse the decision of the Court below and give a decree to the plaintiff for possession of the suit land with mesne profits from the date of the District Munsif's decree at the rate awarded by him until possession is given. The Appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

2. There will be a similar decree in Second Appeal No. 411 of 1921.

Ramesam, J.

3. I agree.


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