1. This second appeal arises out of an application filed by the third defendant in the suit, objecting to the sale of certain properties at the instance of the plaintiff who had obtained a decree against the fourth defendant in the suit. The suit had been instituted against three defendants of whom the first defendant and the third defendant were the sons of the second defendant. As the first defendant died pending the suit his son the fourth defendant was added as his legal representative. Defendants 2 and 3 contended that the debt incurred by the first defendant was a personal debt of his and that they and their interests in the joint family property could not be held liable therefor. The case went to arbitration and a decree passed in terms of the award held that only the one-third share which the fourth defendant (as the son of the first defendant) had in the joint family property was liable for the suit debt. Defendants 2 and 3 were exonerated. It is the attempt of the plaintiff to bring the fourth defendant's one-third share to sale that is now contested by the application under appeal.
2. At the outset, we would observe that the applicant has, in our opinion, no locus standi to present this application. Assuming for the sake of argument that for the purpose of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, even an exonerated defendant is a party to the suit, the question still remains whether he has a locus standi to pray for particular reliefs. No proceedings are now; sought to be taken against the third defendant or his interests in the family property. We have also been informed that proceedings taken on behalf of the fourth defendant to question the sale have failed and we presume that as against the fourth defendant the sale has become final. The mere fact that the petitioner is an undivided member of the coparcenary of which the fourth defendant is also a member will not suffice to give the petitioner a locus standi to maintain the present application see the observations of Sulaiman, C.J., in Chhotey Lal v. Ganpat Rai I.L.R. (1934) 57 All. 176 (F.B.).
3. In these proceedings, the appellant has sought to bring in the question of the date of the confirmation order with a view to contend that the interim attachment before judgment made during the first defendant's lifetime became wholly inoperative because no decree was passed during his lifetime. We have not been shown any warrant for this contention. Reference was made in this connection to the line of authorities in this Court dealing with the effect of attachment before judgment in personal actions against individual coparceners who happen to die before judgment. It seems to us that this line of authorities has no bearing upon the question arising in the case. Nothing turned in those cases on the question whether there was only an interim attachment during the original defendant's lifetime or also an order of confirmation. The point for decision in those cases related to the liability of the coparceners to whom the undivided share of the defendant coparcener survived on his death. The question of liability arose in those cases because under the Hindu Law no coparcener other than a male descendant will be liable for the personal debts of a deceased coparcener when the hitter's share in the joint family property survived to him, but an exception was made in cases where the share of the deceased had been effectively attached during his lifetime. No such question can arise in a case where the deceased coparcener has left a son, because the son's share will be liable for the father's debt notwithstanding1 that it might have come to him by survivorship or by birth and even in the absence of any attachment obtained during the father's lifetime.
4. It accordingly seems to us immaterial in these proceedings that the first defendant died before the decree was pronounced. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.