1. We think the decision of he lower Appellate Court that in the absence of an express contract the dower in this case was exigible on demand, was a right decis on, following the rule down in Tadiya v. Hasanebiyari. That rule has been quoted with approval by the Privy Council. Mirza Bedar Bukht Mohummad Ali v. Mirza Khurrum Bukht Ali (1873) 19 W.R. 315. The rule is in our opinion more consonant with reason than the rule held to prevail in some other Presidencies where the proportion in which such dower is to be considered prompt or deferred is left uncertain. We take it that the dower is consideration for the marriage and therefore that unless payment of the whole or part of it is, expressly postponed, it is payable on demand. This appears' to be the view the parties themselves entertained of the matter, for the defendant did not plead that any part of the dower was deferred, but on the other hand he pleaded that it had been paid in full, thereby showing his consciousness that it ought to have been so paid either according to custom or according to the law ruling in this Presidency for the last 30 years. Even if the weight of authority in other parts of India were opposed to the law laid down in Tadya v. Hasanebiyar (1870) 6 M.H.C.R. 9 we think more harm than good would be done by altering it after this lapse of time in favour of another rule which is inexact and unworkable in practice.
2. This second appeal coming on for final disposal on the 1st of March 1.9,00, after receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench before a Division Bench (consisting of the Cheif Justice and Mr. Justice Benson) the Court delivered the following filial.
3. In accordance with the full Bench decision, the second appeal is dismissed with costs.