Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.
1. The 649th Section of the Code includes under the term 'the Court which passed the decree' a Court which would, at the time of the presentation of the application for execution, have had jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason that the Court in which the suit was instituted had been abolished. The District Court then was in this case competent to act under Section 223 of the Civil Procedure Code and we have only to consider whether, in empowering it to transfer a decree for execution to any Court subordinate thereto, the legislature intended that the term ' any Court ' should bear its ordinary signification and include a Court which ordinarily would not be competent to entertain the application, because the subject-matter would be in excess of the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction.
2. It is to be noticed that, in empowering the High Court or District Court to transfer suits, the competency of Courts in respect of jurisdiction is kept in view, and the exercise of the power of transfer is limited, so that a suit, if removed from the ordinary forum, can be transferred only to a Court competent to try the same in respect of its nature or amount--Civil Procedure Code Section 25.
3. In Section 223, paragraph 7, this restriction is absent, and the description of the Court to which proceedings in execution may be transferred is limited only by the condition that it be a Court subordinate to the Court which passed the decree.
4. Although by the Civil Courts' Act of this Presidency the ordinary jurisdiction of Munsifs in suits and applications of a civil nature is limited to those in which the subject-matter does not exceed in value Rs. 2,500, it appears that an extraordinary jurisdiction is conferred by the Civil Procedure Code in cases to which Section 223, paragraph 7, relates. We must, therefore, hold that the order of the Munsif was not invalid by reason of want of jurisdiction, but it was clearly erroneous in directing execution for a sum of which the decree did not impose the payment on the appellant.
5. If the decree-holder has, subsequently to the passing of the decree, ascertained facts which entitle him to a personal remedy against the first defendant in respect of the rents for which the second defendant alone was by the decree declared responsible, he should have applied for a review of judgment. The appeal from the order lies to this Court under Section 13 of the Madras Civil Courts' Act.
6. The order of the Munsif in so far as it directs execution for the rents against the first defendant is set aside with costs in both Courts.