1. We must take the Judge's finding on the fact to be that both the widows received the boy is adoption,for that is the evidence of the plaintiff's 5th witness on which the Judge relied.
2. The further statement that he makes that the adoption was made by the senior widow was merely a legal inference that he considered it necessary to come to for upholding the adoption. Taking it then as the fact that both widows took. part in the ceremony of adoption the question is whether that affected its validity. In this case the junior widow was authorized under paragraph 2 of the will to make the adoption of a boy approved of by the senior widow. Their act in joining to make the adoption must be deemed as done in pursuance of the will and if the senior widow was allowed to do more than she was required to do by the will, that would not detract from the validity of the act required to be performed and which was performed by the other widow. In point of Jaw the adoption should be taken to have been made by the junior widow, as she was the person authorized to make it. The senior widow's act in also accepting the boy was a work of supererogation which, it would be unreasonable to old, rendered the adoption invalid. Utile per inutile non-vitiator. In the view we have taken of this case it is not necessary for us to consider the hypothetical cases of an adoption made by two or more widows jointly, suggested in the arguments of the appellants Vakil. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.