1. The only point in this second appeal is one of limitation. Both the Lower Courts have dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that it is barred by limitation. The plaintiff brought this suit within three years of his attaining majority to set aside an alienation made by a limited owner. At the time of the alienation he was an infant and there were two persons, one his brother and another a cousin, who could have challenged the alienation. They did not choose to challenge it and the plaintiff's suit is more than twelve years after the date of the alienation. Mr. Sitarama Rao for the appellant contends that Section 7 of the Limitation Act applies and inasmuch as the plaintiff had a cause of action on the date of the alienation and as he was a minor at the time he could not have given a discharge till he attained majority and therefore the period of minority should be counted in his favour. Section 7 does not apply to the case of reversioners. The whole body of reversioners cannot give a discharge, or, in other words, cannot declare that an alienation is valid. No doubt, if they join in or agree to the alienation, it may be evidence of the alienation being for purposes which could bind the reversion, but they as a body cannot declare that an alienation is valid. That being so, Section 7, which applies to cases where persons who could give a discharge could not do so on account of incapacity such as lunacy or minority or some such thing could not apply to this case. This case, I think, is governed by the principle of the decision in Varamma v. Gopaladasayya ILR (1917) Mad 659 . In that case the Question was whether reversioners born after the date of the alienation had a right to bring a suit. The principle applied by the learned Judges was that the suit by a reversioner is of a representative character and the result of such suit if properly fought out would bind all the reversioners. Mr. Sitarama Rao distinguishes that case from the present on the ground that in this case the plaintiff had a cause of action on the date of the alienation. No doubt, if the widow had died on the date of the alienation he along Avith the two others would have become entitled to the property. But the question is not whether he could have sued. The question is whether the reversioners who coudd have rued within twelve years ought to have sued. The result of their suit would have bound the appellant and therefore when the body of reversioners who could have brought a suit did not bring a suit, time must be counted from the date of the alienation. The recent case of the Privy Council reported in Jawafrir Singh v. Udai Parkash ILR (1925) A 152 : 50 MLJ 344 (PC). does not apply to the present case. In that case the alienation of the son's share by a father was challenged. Their Lordships held that the minor could bring a suit within three years after attaining majority. In that case the minor's share was actually transferred and as he could not have brought a suit till he attained majority limitation did not run against him till he attained majority, and the suit having been brought within three years it was held not barred. Here there was no present right in the plaintiff. On the date of the alienation his right was only that of a reversioner and till the limited owner dies his right no doubt was to bring a suit for a declaration which was an exceptional right given in the case of alienation by Hindu or Muhammadan limited owners and this exceptional right which gives only a right of suit cannot be considered as a right in property which a person could assert on the date of the alienation. The case in Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh ILR (1917) C 590 : 34 MLJ (PC) does not apply to the present case. There a minor was sought to be bound by the act of the guardian when the minor himself was not a party to the proceedings. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.